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SELECT ESSAYS

Tending to the

Universal Reformation

OF

Learning:

Concluded With

The Art of War,

Or a SUMMARY

Of the *MARTIAL PRECEPTS*

Neceſſary for an Officer.

By *William Freke*, Eſq;

LONDON,

Printed for *Tho. Minors*, in the *Inner-Temple-Lane*. 1693.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

THE AUTHOR'S Apology.

DEo, Patriæ, tibi, *ſeems a Common Motto, that all Mankind are equally fond, and ambitious of*; I *will not ſay, that they all Anſwer it alike*: *But the Character which is ſo univerſally approv'd of, ſurely needs no Apologies for its Entertainment*: *And yet, after all,* I *know a Cenſure that will as naturally, as unjuſtly, follow it*; *What!* Saul among the Prophets, *or a Man attending Buſineſs in Print? And ſo, O Sir! you are an Author! And why not? What is the ſhame of it? Is not a good Author a Maſter of as great Charity as an Almoner?*

The Author's Apology.

An Author *not Licens'd by Common Vogue, as well as Authority, looks like one with the Plague-sore upon him; and every one that passes by him, is ready to Write*, Lord have mercy upon him *on his Door; and not a Man-Gossip, but what is for passing his Verdict upon him. But, whatever others imagine, for my part, I am none of* Captain Tom's *Followers, nor ever will be: I shall never think any Man, for that Reason alone, to be Reflected upon in his Business, because withall, he is a Master in Science, and Notion also.*

Besides, it is no more agreeable to my Constitution than my Inclinations, to glide away insensibly, and beguile my self of half my Time at a Tavern: I know there are a great many petty Arts full as advantagious, as real Skill in Professions; but use them who will, I am resolv'd not to Con-man my self for Interest: and I neither can, nor will buy Favour at the rate that 'tis beneath me, to purchase it at; if it come in a more regular way, 'tis welcome.

'Tis a much more pleasant Exercise to me, thus to bestow my leisure hours in curing the several Errors of my Mind: And, whatever others may fancy, I shall never think it loss of time

time, nor barely a diversion, pertinently to improve my Understanding: True Sense is a Sword to him that Commands her; and he's an ill Master of her, that having once got her, is not able to turn her to all Advantages upon Occasion.

I know 'tis a prudent Rule in Life, not to ramble out of the way in needless Excursions: Nor do I think that in this I have transgrest it; it is my design but to perfect my Notion, and in what is absolutely useful, and not to run to either Folios or Trifles: Nay, and even this is not a Work as of to day with me. The Papers I Present the Reader *with, are not new, I have had them Years by me; and what I have done of late, has been only to Correct and Revise them a little for the Press.*

But, Do I seem too Pert, or Pragmatical in what I Write, in pretending so Confidently to Instruct our Seniors and Masters? why I have just the same Excuse that all other Authors have had before me: You may be sure, I had never Wrote what I have, had I thought it had been Impertinence and Arrogance only; and, after all, Will you say I am deceiv'd? truly I have no other Answer for you neither, than that Authors seldom call a Council, to know whether

whether what they Write, be all juſt Orthodox or not.

So, Do you think, in Humility, I ought to have forborn preſuming thus? Why truly, and as to the Point too, I am a little conceited, I muſt confeſs it; nay, I were an Aſs for Printing what I have done, if I did not think it to the purpoſe. But what! after all, I am miſtaken in my mighty Imagination; and it may be ſo: but ſurely then alſo, I have done no more, than what a whole heard of Fools has done before me.

And yet, after all, the World may be deceiv'd, and find my matter better than they expect it: All Perfections are entail'd on no Man, and there is many an excellent Spokeſman that makes a bad Writer, as well as there are a great many good Writers, That, as St. Paul *and* Moſes *Write of themſelves, are neither of Voluble Tongue, nor Extraordinary Preſence.*

It may be too, you think my Stile *too light; and truly if you do, I ſhall not alter it, nor quarrel with Nature for not giving me another Genius, or Diſpoſition: Alaſs! our* Stile *is like our* Stature, *no more to be altered by our Thought, than our Bodies: ſuppoſe, with the ſame*

ſame Reaſon, you ſhould quarrel with the Features of my Face, or the Gate or Meen of my Body; And why may not I, with as much Reaſon, Complain, and be aggriev'd at the ſight of yours?

After all, Mr. Johnſon, *and Mr.* Rimer's *Mettled* Stiles *to me, look with full as much Native Beauty as ever a ſlow-pac'd Don's in the Univerſe: Every thing in its way; 'tis as natural for the Cholerick, and the Sanguine, to be daring and ſprightly, as 'tis for the* Melancholy *and* Phlegmatick *to be heavy and dull.*

But will not all this pleaſe you neither? Truly, I ſhall not cramp my ſelf to a Spaniſh Cutt *to do it; if it won't, I have wrote what* I *have, and* I *have thought it worth Publiſhing: accordingly,* I *have publiſh'd it; and* I *hope,* I *have no need to be aſham'd to Father it;* I *have deliver'd it in my own way, for* I *am reſolv'd never to turn fool by an unnatural Imitation.*

After all, I have made my Title, Apology, and Book, all of a piece; if thou likeſt it, 'tis at thy ſervice; if not, I am reſolved not to be melancholly upon it: I won't ſay, Ad captum Lectoris habent ſua fata Libelli;

belli; *for I am willing to submit the Judgment of my Book to the Readers, and to allow it no greater weight than he is pleas'd to standard it at: but surely, I might add also, That a great many good things have been lost in the world, because men have not known the value of them.*

And, however the World may relish it, yet surely, I think, I may say too, That there is a Gift of Thinking and Digesting, as well as Flourishing and Bantring, or writing tedious Tomes or Volumes either; 'tis not every tall Boy that can jest with flashy Wit and Thought at random; nor every Author that can appear in Folio, that can either speak, write or judge of Good Sense, or true Wit; and though even such may prove Master Criticks in a Coffee-House, or Well-Titled in a Booksellers Shop; but then, Ne sutor ultra crepitum.

In plain terms, the haughtiest Combatants through the meer dint of Extempore *Natural Parts only; and the greatest Mountebanks disguis'd with the false Paint of Learning, prove but as Pigmy Drolls to a moderate Man at Arms, and one truly accoutred with the Weapons and Defence of good Thought and Literature.*

Non

The Author's Apology.

Non Cicero, Cicero, nec Appelles, natus Appelles;

Id, quod uterque fuit, fecit utrumque Labor.

After these, I know no other considerable Apology, but that thou pass by some roughness. Perhaps thou mayst be offended at too frequently in my Stile: I tell thee before-hand, 'tis greatly collective; In the Temple Church there are Stones that they say are cast, and many compos'd out of one; alass! we have lost the Art: And when thou considerest therefore, that the Building I am rearing, lays it's Foundations as wide as all the Knowledge of the Universe, thou needst not wonder that every stone in it is not melted or cemented as into one, or carv'd, or gilded and adorn'd, like bawbles in Ladies Closets.

Surely, he's a good Workman in such case that joints his Building well, and that handsomely pursues his Draught and Designs: If therefore the sense and sincerity of my Work has been full and just, I think I may well leave

belli; *for I am willing to submit the Judgment of my Book to the Readers, and to allow it no greater weight than he is pleas'd to standard it at: but surely, I might add also, That a great many good things have been lost in the world, because men have not known the value of them.*

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FOXI

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leave the Fretwork and Chequering it to an after part. Perhaps I know as well as another Man, what it is to have my Stile heavy, bag'd, and incoherent; but he muſt be more than a Man, yea an Angel, that can perfect ſo laborious a Task as I have deſign'd, without ſuch faults.

To be ſhort; As to the ſubſtance of my Attempt, I hope I *have anſwer'd it to the full; as for the reſt, Reader, uſe thy pleaſure; thou ſeeſt* I *undeceive thee before hand; and therefore if it diſpleaſe thee, be angry at thy ſelf, and not me: And yet,* I *hope,* I *ſhall not vex thee ſo much neither by it; for* I *have not taken a little pains in the matter, to make my coherence as poliſh'd as needful.*

To ſhut up all; Are you offended that I *write ſo little of Logick, and ſo much of Cenſure and Reputation? Heads that ſeem to be but as Triſles, when compar'd with a Science; and ſo in many other the like caſes. Why truly, at preſent you muſt conſider, That you are with one that ſets up for a Reformer, and perhaps at laſt, thou mayſt be convinced by him too; not only that too many of our Sciences are trifling, but that there are many other Subjects that require far more of our care than any of the little*

little Kick-ſhaws, that the Schools have dreſs'd up for us; if not, I can but again tell you, the Reformer may err as well as the Science-maker.

To conclude; after theſe, I *might add,* I *expect a whole Troop of petty Carpers, Criticks of the moſt noiſe, but juſt of as much judgment as to be able to make Errata-men for the Preſs; and truly, as for theſe, the Author is willing to let them applaud themſelves in their Kackling; their Cenſure is not likely to do either much harm or good; if it were, he would tell them, he does not pretend to be able to correct every Comma, Letter, or little Variance in his very ſenſe, by the Preſs from his Copy: But, as for theſe Men, the Author is rather of Opinion, That they want an Apology for what themſelves do, than he in Vindication of himſelf againſt them. And ſo he bids all*

Farewell.

THE ENTRANCE, OR THE Digester.

THE *Turkiſh Spy* tells us, the *Arabians* ſay, That a Man muſt forget twice, and learn thrice, e're he can expect to be perfect. If that be a good Rule, I am perſuaded theſe Eſſays will pleaſe; for if to perfect and lay by, and then to mend and lay by, and then to correct again and lay by, be the way to render a Book compleat and uſeful, I am ſure theſe Eſſays cannot be defective; which like the *Venetian* Veſſel, have ſuffered through time, ſo many Corrections and Alterations, that the Author himſelf hardly knows, whether there is ever an Original Piece left in them. Painters ordinarily preſent

you with your Picture after twice or thrice ſitting. Books are the draughts of our Souls; and why then ſhould we be leſs curious in the Pourtraictures of our Souls than our Bodies?

Some Men again think it enough, if their Porch be well adorn'd, and their Reader when firſt uſher'd in by a brisk Sally, wheedled with the hopes of an Entertainment accordingly; but ſurely, how agreeable ſoever ſuch Methods are for the intereſt of the Bookſeller, the Author gets no Reputation by ſuch Arts: For my part, I declare, there is not an Eſſay herein, that to the beſt of my knowledge, has not coſt me full as much pains as this Entrance; and I don't know of one thought that I have inſerted throughout, that I would not have expunged, if I thought it would nauſeate with my Readers; that in ſome caſes I am a little larger in explaining my ſelf, ſurely may be very well allow'd: Are all Mens Capacities either equal to receive Inſtructions, or their Prejudices eaſy to be rooted out?

As for the deſign of my Book, it may ſeem to interfere with a great many lately publiſh'd. We have every day *Journals* of *Abridgments*, and the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, the Authors of the *Univerſal* and *Hiſtorical*

ſtorical Bibliotheque, together with the *Athenian Society*, have obliged us with large Volumes of Abſtracts; but none of all theſe is what I have here propos'd and deſign'd. They abridge Books, I Subjects; they refer you to Authors at large, and Analize ſeveral on the ſame Subject; I on the contrary have endeavour'd to extract the Marrow of all, by all to render each Subject entire, and to trouble the Reader with neither Catalogues of Authors, nor Quotations, but purely the very heart of his Subject entire, or Reflections in what is uſeleſs in it.

And ſhall any one after this, acquaint me, that my Performance is ſhort, that my Deſign is large; alaſs! he forgets what I propoſe is but in Eſſay, nay, that the Perfection of Knowledge is more than human; and that more than Eſſay is not modeſt. If therefore by theſe ſhort Eſſays, I can prove a faithful Remembrancer to the Learned, of the preſent State of Knowledge, and a happy Guide to the Student, through the ſeveral uſeleſs Labyrinths, introduced by Pedantry into human Knowledge, to keep him from thoſe unhappy Rocks, that have Shipwrack'd many Excellent Parts, I think my brevity in it will be the more acceptable, and my deſign

ſuch, if well anſwer'd, as all the World muſt cheriſh.

For my part, I could wiſh I were even yet ſhorter than I am, 'tis the bane of good Books, when their length makes them tedious: But to be more brief, I as much deſpair at, as to be more perfect. The whole Field of Wiſdom and Science is my Subject. What Man ſo vain, as to think to contract it in a Sheet? So that Body of Knowledge that has puzzl'd whole Ages of the wiſeſt, who is ſo weak as to arrogate the Maſterdom of it alone in himſelf? Surely, one might as well expect to decipher a Court in a Cottage, as Univerſal Science in a little Tract; nay, the Bounds of Univerſal Wiſdom are ſuch, that the beſt of us know but in part; and GOD has made it one of the Bonds of the Univerſe, that we mutually rely on one another in our Imperfections.

But to paſs by all further Apologies, and to deſcend into the very reaſoning of our Methods, both of our Writings and Studies, let us conſider a little: We Study, but why? that our Knowledge may be profitable to our ſelves and others, and benefit Poſterity. But inſtead of this, and for want of a due Method, what do we do, but intangle our ſelves in the Cobwebbs of

of nicer Notions, and even confound all that follow us?

Alaſs! the very Source of Wiſdom is almoſt corrupt amongſt us; and a Learned Man is a Chimera we have now no Idea of. Shew me one in a million that can tell you the Bounds of Learning, that can tell you Abſtract from Pedantry, how much is fit to be known, and that can ſatisfy the mind, that all further Enquiries will be needleſs?

A Youth that is now bred a Schollar, is like a Veſſel launch'd at Rovers, and in the midſt of the Ocean, without either Pilot or Rudder; he may do well or not; but if he does ſucceed, 'tis through the Vigour of his own Parts: For, as for the Directions and Helps he is to expect, they will rather amuſe and diſtract, than lead him right.

We enter upon Languages, and their Criticiſms are infinite; ſo we proceed to Sciences, and there we are loſt in a Wilderneſs of Subtilties; our Metaphyſicks puzzles us, our Logick fetters us, and our nice Mathematicks is a Field, where even our greateſt Maſters are loſt.

Nor is even our Morality better; our Vertues and Vices are loſt in endleſs Schemes and Subdiviſions; and our Divi-

nity is wrangled to Pyroniſm, ſo that when we look about us, we know neither where to begin, nor where to end; and when we would proceed, we do not know where we are.

Hence alſo, if a Man be Learned, yet he is never known; there is no Standard to try him by. And hence it is, that there is no Encouragement for real Wiſdom; all that the World looks for, or knows how to eſteem, is but the little Cant of Pedantry; and if a Man leave that, tho' on never ſo good grounds, he is more likely to get the Name of a proud illiterate, than of a Schollar or Wiſeman.

But where is all this while then our real improvement of Wiſdom? Alaſs! this is but a more perplex'd and ſubtle Ignorance, and a Chaos of Literature. And what does not this Lumber require a Digeſter then? Indeed a Man of Vigorous Parts himſelf may diſpoſe it ſome way to his uſe; but how many become meer Schollars, and are loſt in the Confuſion, and that dare not ſo much as look out of this Cloud?

What a ſhame 'tis, that Man that was made to be as a Lord of the Creation, ſhould thus be loſt even in his Dominions over his own Notions! And what ſhall we

we call this Art that leads us thus? no, 'tis a laborious Distraction. Were this an Art, 'twould facilitate our Actions; whereas, instead of that, it clogs them, and impedes our natural Force. A Bird that's wild, sings better than one ill taught.

Besides, can that be an Art for the use of life that would require even two Ages of us, if we had them to attain them? Or shall we ever esteem that as an helpful Speculation that must drown us in the Theory, before we can come to Practice? And is not this too true in the common Circumstances of Learning? Is not what we call a moderate competency of Knowledge, now become almost even a work for our Lives?

Who can almost enumerate, much more think to peruse the infinite Volumes of Science? Nay, let us but state any one of the Arts and Sciences in the whole Enciclopaidion, and let us see who has the command of all her Branches, and to whom we may not add; nay, let us see, how many are imperfect Plagiarys, and how much is wanted in the best, that might be added on the perusal of all.

Let us see likewise what vast Bodies the Sciences even contracted compose, is *Alsteds Epitome*, in his *Enciclopaidion*, fit to be

enlarged: Or can we reduce the Schoolmen to a Nut-shell? Nay, or can we complete the usual Tables, much less an absolute *Cursus Mathematicus*, in one managable Volume?

And what then! Are all these fit for a Schollar to study? or can we not obtain a competent Idea in these things without our Leaders melancholly Schemes and Niceties? Alass! if we Cant, we had better banish Studies, and burn our Books, and live like true Philosophers altogether, *Secundum Naturam.*

The mischief of it is, we have a sort of men Title and Table learn'd, who because they can manage the inconsistent Scraps of Authors, to get themselves a Reputation by it, cry up, and endeavour to support this Gallimaufry; and without one had a 1000 mouths to out-cry the little Beagles, that these men raise up to support their Reputation, one had as good save ones Breath as speak, tho' with never so just a Cause.

I must confess for my own part, I have not been wanting to study, and may be as much as the best of them, and that in the whole Body of Learning too; and whatever Mountains others can espy in it, I declare, I am unfortunate and thick-sighted,

ſighted, for I can find but few.

This I find indeed, that the weight of Univerſal Learning, as it now ſtands, is too great for mortal Shoulders, too long for their peruſal, too nice for their Memory, too various for their Imagination, and too confus'd for their Judgment; but this I muſt declare withal, I ſee not why it may not bear a rational Contraction; for the moſt part of it is meerly curious and impertinent, or at leaſt it ſeems ſo to me.

So curious may I ſay, that could any Man foreſee the fruitleſs Labour that our Pedantry would coſt him, before he would be able to lay by her Spectacles, as he ſhould do, he would as ſoon go into an Houſe of Correction, as undertake ſo irkſom a Task, as to be a Schollar, and ſo impertinent. That in the moſt of his Studies, could he but judicially ſee what he was doing, he would as ſoon buſy himſelf in catching of Butterflies.

But the Matter is, when a man enters thus amongſt the Crowd of Learned Fools, 'tis a Thouſand to one, if ever he keep his Senſes longer for to be able to bring him back again. And hence it is, that we have few or none to lead us from it, whilſt we have almoſt infinite Examples to encourage us in the Dotage. And

And thus when I firſt begun my Studies, I could quickly ſee that there was a World of Pageantry that ought to be laid by, that our Books were even compos'd of a ſpecious Empty Vein, and which beguil'd us with Appearance in ſtead of Subſtance: but how to ſeparate this Droſs from the Finer Oar, or how to cut off the Excreſſence, and preſerve the Body, that ſeem'd a work almoſt as difficult even as *Alexander*'s in Conquering the World, I may ſay *Herculean*, and harder than to cleanſe the *Augæan* Stables.

I plainly ſaw alſo, that as the Preſent State of Learning was a Vail for the Hypocrite, being too dark to let Men really Ingenuous, be otherwiſe than Modeſt, and leaving full room for Confidence and Ignorance to vent their pretences; ſo I ſaw plainly that there was a ſort of Men in the World, that would oppoſe any ſuch attempt, were it only to keep their own Blindneſs from being expos'd.

But as withal I ſaw, that if ſuch a Work were finiſh'd, it would even force its own way in the World, and illuſtrate its ſelf; and, through its uſe, turn its own Advocate in proving ſo Beneficial to Mankind; ſo I was reſolved to ſee what I could do about it; and as I was ſatisfied

of

of the Lawfulneſs and Charity, nay, and I may add, Goodneſs of my attempt, ſo I durſt truſt the Succeſs of it to God, in duty to whom I deſign'd it.

As for my Method in it, I have not exactly followed the excellent *Des Cartes*, I never yet engag'd my ſelf to a Nine years Oblivion of what I formerly Read, nor have I tied my ſelf to any Principles whatever, abſolutely, whether Divine or Moral; I always thought both thoſe courſes of little advantage to him that ſtudies Wiſdom, in truth rather Obſtacles than Aſſiſtants.

Indeed in this I have imitated him, I have Meditated moſt freely; but withal, I have both Read and Heard too: for my part, I have neither fear'd Errors, nor been jealous of my Genius; but I have truſted it freely, as it were upon a Promiſe, in my Judgment, that at all hazards 'twould be ſincere to me, nay, and in all caſes, and againſt all prejudices whatever.

And to this purpoſe I perus'd all the Books I could come near; nor did I care on what Subject, ſo they were Excellent; for my Deſigns were after an entire Reformation of Learning; and tho' I deſign'd, in a manner, to Re-build all a-new, yet I did not think to be ſo ill an Husband, as to tear up all the Old Foundations

dations, where I found them ſound and ready before me.

So that, by this means, I Collected almoſt without end; I took the Notion, and left the Dreſs; nay, and I carefully ſeparated what I thought might be of uſe, and left what I ſaw as needleſs: I did it but in Sentences indeed at firſt, becauſe I looked for only Matter, and not Form: but then I did it carefully, that if poſſible I might not leave any thing material that I ſhould not reduce to its proper Head.

Indeed, in my Method how to deliver it to the World, I was not a little confounded; for as I ſaw that to heap up Precepts without Order, were to make them uſeleſs: ſo on the other hand, I obſerv'd, to tye my ſelf to a clear coherence, were a burthen intollerable; and beſides, not conſiſtent with thoſe perpetual Additions that would be neceſſary to a growing Idea.

I choſe therefore a Mean for my Digeſter, and as ſuch a looſe Eſſay, a Body that could either Retract or Dilate, ſo I choſe alſo rather to deliver my *Eſſays* in Confuſion than Order; for ſince ſo vaſt a Subject could not rationally ſeem to bear an orderly coherence; I did not ſee why I ſhould affect it, eſpecially when I conſider'd

der'd, that ſuch a careleſs change and variety, would not only eaſe and delight my ſelf, but my *Reader* alſo.

To be ſhort, Wiſdom, in full perfection, is too great for Man: and, as one would reduce that uſeful part of her, that is within our capacities, to an apt and pertinent brevity for uſe, ſo withal, one would not arrogantly think to force her to Bounds too exact for the reach of Mortality: as I deſpair'd therefore of ever attaining any preheminence in her, by the vigour of any ſingle attempt, ſo I rather choſe to leave my Method freely to an eaſie looſneſs, that might be apt for any Addition or Amendment.

Whether what I have now done, may be ever done fuller or better, I cannot tell; I am ſure it has mine own full Vigour in it, and I ſhould have been glad with all my heart, could I have met with a Companion, to have improv'd and aſſiſted my Deſigns: but 'tis generally the Misfortune of Men, who are Charitable in ſo great and laborious Undertakings, to be forced to walk alone.

I have no more to trouble thee with in this place, except it be that thou excuſe the Roughneſs of my Stile; remember 'tis Collective, and though by pains I might

might make it more Correct, yet I hope already 'tis ſufficient for Uſe, if not for Ornament. Oratory was never agreeable to the rigidneſs of my Genius, I could never yet leave Matter to catch at Butterflyes, and gather Flowers.

Beſides, the Niceties of Curious Diſcourſe are infinite; and I am ſenſible, that after my greateſt care, I muſt Write with a Style and Method imperfect, or not venture at Five Words a day: Pure Perfection in all things is only God's; and when a Man has once atchiev'd in any thing the full ſtrength of his Genius, what he attains after, is but by Sallies, and at beſt makes but Abrupt, Imperfect, and Incoherent Efforts.

But why ſhould I Court thee thus with Apologies? if thou art *Ingenious*, thou canſt not but follow thine own advantage; If thou art *Humourſom*, I had as good endeavour to embrace the Wind, as to move thee. Whether therefore thou likeſt me or not, I am not deceived in thee: That Man muſt think of Reconciling Contraries, yea Impoſſibilities, that aim at Captivating all Men, the Perverſe and Tractable, the Contradictious and the Modeſt, the Virtuous and Vicious, Pious and Wicked, Learned and Ignorant, with the ſame *Diſcourſe*. Of

Of BOOKS.

A Good Author ſhould have the Stile and Courage of a Captain, the Integrity of a Dying Man, and ſo much ſenſe and ingenuity, as to impoſe nothing, either weak or needleſs on the World.

Some Men thruſt out their Bratts amongſt us, e're they are at the Stature of Wiſdom; and not knowing the preſent growth of Learning, oblige Men with Crudities inſtead of Diſcoveries: But who ſuffers moſt by it? the *Reader* can eaſily lay them by.

So ſome even Fire the State to get Books ſuppreſs'd, and they'r in the right where they are Seditious; or elſe ſure Man has an equal Right to Writing as Speaking; or, if not, Why one more than another?

Does the Variety of Books offend you? ſurely it has at leaſt this good in it, it hits all Humours. Do they overwhelm you with their Number? Certainly you miſtake; and rather want Judgment to diſcern what are proper for you.

So, Does an *Ignoramus* preſent you with Muſhrome Thoughts, and cannot you lay them by? *Muſt none but Civit-Cats have leave to ſh----?* and, if not, Who ſhall ſever the bad, without endangering the good?

Nay,

Nay, I may add, The beſt of *Authors* are not without their Faults; and if they were, the World, I fear, were too purblind to entertain them, as they would deſerve. *Enoch's*, the firſt and beſt of Books, are loſt.

Thus one, by a long *Preface*, cools the Fancy e're he entertains it; a ſecond frights his Reader by his Voluminouſneſs. Alaſs! we muſt conſult the weakneſs of Man, as well as the Meer extent of our Subjects.

Nay, did the real dignity of our Subjects lead Books, they would be ſhort enough, while ſprightly hints would more delicately pourtraicture our Minds than the largeſt Circumlocutions.

And ſurely therefore I may add, there is an empty Wantonneſs in all the profuſe Embroideries of Authors. And what are our Legendaries, our varniſh'd Compariſons and Explanations, but a beggarly and tedious Tautology in a better dreſs?

Thus the pedling Canter never wants a Noſegay of Vertue or Religion, be his Text never ſo barren; and there is not a Subject that he ſhall not ſcrew in his whole ſtock of Knowledge upon it.

On the contrary, your finer Poets have made but ſix Verſes a day, and a late famous Author would return back to his Study again, but to ſecure ſome more excellent Notion from Oblivion; and yet there is an Error even in this alſo. One

One keeps his Book Seven years by him ere he Prints it, as if it ripen'd by lying, and not Care, Examination and Perusal.

A Second cites *Euclid*, to prove a Circle Round; and a Third condemns the whole Body of Wisdom for some little pedling *Nostrum*.

A Fourth Enamour'd with the Whimseys of the Ancients, has half his Book Quotations, and creeps along by the Shore of *Authors*, as if he were afraid to trust himself to the free Compass of Reasoning.

Surely I would no more Quote *Authors* by Tables thus, than slight their Assistance altogether, by laying New Foundations. When thou Readest my Book therefore, I expect thou look for my Sense, not *Aristotle*, or St. *Austin's*.

So shall I Write nothing that is not purely my own: alass, there is nothing New under the Sun; nay, And why have not I as much right to my Thoughts, as he that Wrote them a 1000 years ago?

Should I say, I borrow nothing from no Man, Who could gain-say me? I have the same circle of Creatures, and I must needs therefore track after others, and surely therefore our invention about them is equally ours also.

Succeeding Ages feed upon one another; and the Senſe and Fleſh I have digeſted are as much mine, as they have been others before me, or elſe may be I cannot ſay I have either Senſe or Fleſh at all.

We have all our appointed ſeaſons to enjoy Wiſdom, and the Sun in; our Anceſtors have but beat the Track before us, where our Poſterity would follow of courſe; And who can claim a Common Road?

Where then is the injury of Plagiariſm, does an *Author* deſerve his Merits muſt preſerve him, nay and they will too, if he has them: Who ſhall add to a Picture of *Apelles*? *Ex pede Herculem.*

At worſt, is Honey the worſe for being gather'd from many Flowers? Indeed to theive meanly is ungenerous, and to follow Parties, corrupts all; or elſe is not my diligence in Collections to be preferr'd?

But alaſs, after all, the Fountain Errour of *Authours* is vanity; and that which puts them upon the Tenters, is, that they ſeek Eternity; but ſurely 'tis one thing to have it, and another thing to deſerve it.

You think your Truths will make the World commend you whether they will or no; alaſs, you muſt proſtitute your honour to obtain the common Vogue.

A Man had as good be a common Hangman, as an impartial Moral Monitor: and as for Speculative Knowledge, the Man that found, but that the World was round, was treated, even by St. *Austin*, as an Heretick.

As my Lord *Bacon* rightly says, the World, like a River, bears up things swoln and empty, while Gold and Jewels sink; and thus Vain-glorious and Romancing *Ovid* no doubt survives many a better *Author*.

Of *CRITICKS.*

A *Critick* to a good *Author*, like the Refiner's Fire, but Purges his Imperfections to make him ſhine the brighter, whilſt the *Anſwerer*, like *Don Quixot*, expoſes himſelf with poſt-abſurdities.

Shall we ſay of a Garriſon'd Army of Thoughts, that 'tis taken, becauſe the enemy has defac'd the Walls with dirt, when the truth is, the Anſwerer like the Viper, by gnawing the File, has but bit his own Teeth away.

Criticks, like Bald-pate Boxers, while they attack others, generally take care to Print nothing of their own, they malitiouſly root up all they can, though they Plant nothing in the World of Learning themſelves.

Criticks, like Robbers, are only excellent in a Plunder, and in which caſe, their onely Game is to Magnifie themſelves by Expoſing others; their Armory the whole Field of Malitious Rayling and VVrangling.

Surely if our Brother is weak, we ought rather to pity him, than abuſe him; nay, is he Perverſe and Fallacious? yet can it either

ther become us, or our Cauſe, to Confute him otherwiſe than with Humanity: that Conqueſt is to our Credit, where our Adverſary is duly Magnified.

What ſays the Scripture of Pious Frauds? Will it let us hold the Truth in Unrighteouſneſs? No, we may not do ill that good may come; if we do, we are aſſur'd our Damnation is Juſt.

Some Men indeed are ſo linked to their Errors, that Charity, which loves to Anſwer all with Tenderneſs and Softneſs, would be glad to part them; he that errs, through Frailty, is at leaſt out of the harms-way of Errour; but he that offends Preſumptuouſly and Obſtinately, muſt need fall together with it.

But the meaner *Critick* that even hunts for Slander, and delights in Contumely; the generous Maſtiff ſhould teach us to ſcorn ſuch Curriſh Yelping; indeed 'tis a Reflection on a Man of Senſe, to give a Common Rayler but the hearing.

Of *DIVINATION* and *ASTROLOGY.*

THere are certain Truths enough in the VVorld ſurely, to improve our Underſtandings by, that we need not confound our ſelves ſo much by Conjectural ones as we do; 'tis true, the Influence of the Sun and Moon might tempt one to an *Eſſay* in this matter, but when it has been ſo long ſucceſsleſs, I don't know whether the proſecuting it further will argue rather a Madneſs and a Folly, than a Preſumptuous Contempt of God's Commands, in prying into thoſe things he has ſo deſignedly conceal'd.

Nay, did Men underſtand themſelves aright, the very vanity of theſe things were enough to make them hate them, and they would ſooner be idle then ſquander away their time ſo impertinently; but above all, had they any Conſcience, they would regard God's VVrath againſt our deluding Diviners, if they had not the VVit to ſee how they were impoſed upon by them.

'Tis

'Tis full time now to sweep away these Cobwebs of Superstition, and Relicks of Paganism; were we to contract with the Devil, then these Little Blinds might be wisely set to Disguise the Predictions he acquaints us with, and to seem to tell that little Fore-knowledge he hath, by our own Skill; but for us otherwise to dive into Senseless, Groundless, and Irrational ways of Prediction, I declare, in my Opinion, is such a meer stupidity and weakness, that we had much better cast the Dye for our Fortune.

So, would not a Man of Moderate Thought be asham'd to imagine, that God has given an Extraordinary Power of Conjuring by his Name *Tetragrammaton Adonay Sadai*, &c. So, Who but a Madman would think the Number Five Cabalistically sanctified, because a Man has Five Fingers, Five Toes, *&c.* And so who but one that has more Fancy than Judgment would mind the Climacterical Years, when indeed the year is since much lengthened? yea, several days since that Whymsey was first broach'd, so that 61 now would have been 63 then.

So, what shall I say of our Common Crosses and Charms? the Devil fights

with us, like a *Parthian*, flying; pretends himſelf to be vanquiſh'd by us, that he may the better Conquer us through Superſtition by his flight? So what ſhall I ſay to your Set-form of Words, the *Seeve* and *Sheers*, and your other Trifles and Gewgaws? If words do any thing really, it muſt be through Faith, and if Faith be once ſo powerful, it can eaſily effect without a Set-form, like Conjuring; but if Words prove powerful without Faith, *Latet anguis in herba*, we have all the Reaſon in the World to apprehend ſome Deluſion from our Common Enemy the Devil.

Nor indeed, with all the Power of the Devil himſelf, are we likely to do or know much, whatever our Corruption and Rebellion may promiſe us; Alaſs, the Devils are under perpetual Chains of Darkneſs, the beſt of their Oracles were always doubtful; and if God has denied the Foreknowledge of things even to the good Angels themſelves, as Chriſt aſſures us, How is it likely he ſhould ſhew a greater Favour to the Wicked Appſtate Spirits?

So we are curious in other Predictions; we are deſirous of an exact Fore-knowledge; alaſs, Shall we never be content-

ed

ed with the plainer Diſpenſations of Providence? Is God obſcure and myſtical in his Propheſies, even to lead his Church its ſelf? And ſhall we deſire preſumptuouſly a Prerogative he has not vouchſafed even to the Univerſal Church; nay, and when all the Pious and Learned Men of Ages have not been able to unfold thoſe Holy Propheſies that in the *Revelations*, and otherwiſe he has given us? Can we be ſo mad to expect, or rely upon more certain Predictions of their own?

In ſhort, if there be any Divination lawful, it muſt be through the ſigns of Natural Cauſes; thus Chriſt himſelf allows to Divine by the Face of the Sky.

Sero rubens cælum cras indicat eſſe ſerenum.

Si mane rubeſcit ventus vel pluvia creſcit;

and ſo we may gueſs when a Weſtern wind blows, or that a Rain-bow looks pale, that Rain is likely to enſue; and that when the Rain-bow looks clear, that it is going away; but what is beyond this, muſt be either Sin or Deluſion.

Of

But to proceed a little to particulars, and ſo firſt

Of *Aſtrology.*

Our *Aſtrologers* pretend, that the Bodies above are the Male, the Terreſtrial the Female; and the Creatures on Earth are the Off-ſpring engender'd between them: But pray, who ſhall declare their Generations? I do not doubt but that there is ſuch an Art as *Aſtrology*, in ſome degree; But who is the Artiſt? What are the ſet-Bounds of influence? And how are we to gather it? How far does Providence and its Free-Agents interrupt it? And what Stars are more particularly eminent in their influence.

Let our Star-gazers alledge what they will, the Reviewing *Hiſtories* paſt in the Stars would have perfected this Art abſolutely before now, if it had been attainable by the Wit of Man; when alaſs, conſult but your *Aſtrologers*, and you ſhall not find two to Prognoſticate alike: After all theſe advantages, Read but their Books, they agree not in their Methods; nay, if they foretel the Weather, which is more immediately under the influences of the Stars, and which Grace cannot be ſup-

pos'd

pos'd to alter their influence in, to give them their old *Sham*, *Astra regunt homines sed regit astra deus*: yet you shall find that they as often miss as hit, and which, in my Judgment, in plain terms, declares meer Chance.

St. *Austin's Confessions* give us an excellent passage of the impertinency and fallaciousness of this Science: It seems the Mistress and the Maid were both with Child by their several Husbands at the same time, and an *Astrologer* being willing to Predict the several Fates of their Children, order'd care to be taken of Marking the exact time of both their Births; now so it happen'd, that Mistress and Maid were both brought to Bed at the same instant, and their several Messengers met at the just half way, to give each other accounts of it; And what think you then ought to be the success of this Chance, ought not these two Sons, as they then happened to be, to have equal Fortune and Success in the World, at least with respect to their several Circumstances? yes surely: but alass, the Stars fail'd their Artist, the Servant was born and died a Servant; whilst, as St. *Austin* observes, the young Master afterwards became vastly advanc'd in his Fortunes.

But

But I give *Aſtrologers* too much ground when *I* triſle thus upon Experiments; let me hear them reaſon a little; thus what particular virtue is there in a *Sextile* or *Trine*, before the *Quartile* or *Oppoſition*? beſides, if there were, like Blockheads, they take the *Trine* of appearance, and never mind the real one; thus a Retrogradation ſhall imaginarily give you two *Trines* of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, when, in reality, neither of thoſe is the true *Trine*; ſo what ſtuff your direct Retrogade ſtationary and ſwift are, when, in reality, the Planets have no ſuch imperfections; and all that Trumpery we conceive, forſooth, becauſe we will follow the blind Mazes of our Anceſtours, and their Errors in *Aſtronomy*, and which made them make them in their *Aſtrology* alſo.

Further, how ridiculouſly they have fram'd and order'd out their Twelve Houſes, and attributed their ſeveral Powers to them, according to the two old Latin Verſes,

1 2 3 4 5 6
Vita lucrum fratres genitor nati valetudo,
7 8 9 10 11 12
Uxor mors pietas regnum benefactaq; Carcer.

What

What Nonsence 'tis to give the Ascendant most power, which can scarce have any Operation for Distance, and vapours upon the Native, whereas, in truth, the Mid-heaven, and the Planets most Southerly, and the Stars in the *Zenith*, ought to have the greatest Operation in all reason; and so in case of their being Perigeon, and Apogeon; so, how absurd 'tis to give *Saturn* a greater influence on the Native, than even the *Sun*, that in truth is the very Earthly giver of Life.

Besides too, were *Astrologers* true to their Rules, and Examin'd all Significators, Planets, Houses, and Fix'd Stars, with their several Aspects, Applications and Transits, they would find themselves so confus'd, that they would never be able to pick out a Judgment: And what if you add to all this the part of Fortune, the part of Honour, and several other parts that Nice *Astrologers* order to be Calculated, as well as the *caput & cauda Draconis*, all Castles in the Air; Where could you and your Judgment be able to be fix'd amongst such almost innumerable significators and their Applications.

Nay further, one tells you your Fortune by a Horary Question, another by a Revolutional Figure, another by your Nativity,

another

another by Profections: Now if you examine it, all these Figures shall, nay must be different, and yet your Artist, from the Latitude of Fore-telling, *I* before described, must by one Significatour or another, serve them all up to one Tone, and whether the Devil may not sometimes inspire them in this Chance to their Delusion, *I* very much Question.

Hence also if you consult them, one shall cast up your Significatours stronger, another weaker; one measures the time of Accidents one way, and another a second; a third Person does not like your Common Tables of Houses, and yet forsooth all these must speak, and write as infallible in their way, although no Reason can reconcile them, or shew one more in the right than the other, nay, though they contradict one another; yet alass we must believe them all, as the *Infallible Oracles of Truth*; *Hinc quanta fides Hominum!*

I have Studied this Art my self, and *I* have flatter'd my self often in Chance-predictions; but when *I* have consider'd that in all things there is but a wrong and a right, and that all Men naturally favour, and even Deifie Divination, *I* cannot but see, and detest my own Weakness in regarding it; indeed, if *Astrological* Predictions

dictions were certain, they would by their fatal neceſſity deſtroy and conſume Religion, and all the Arts and Sciences with it.

To be ſhort, if Men muſt have their *Prognoſticating* Whimſies, were it not better rationally to frame them from the Noble Hypotheſis of *Des Cartes*, than from ſuch meer Maggots as our common Artiſts do? Thus Spots growing in the Sun rationally would foretel ruine to his Sphere, and Comets Prognoſticate a Diſorder, would follow in Nature; but to lay ſuch weight on meer Chymera's, as the Imaginary Houſes, Nodes and Fancies of *Aſtrologers* are, at beſt ſavours of a little tincture of either Melancholly, or Impoſture, judge which you will.

Of the Dependants of Aſtrology.

But beſides its ſelf, it's ſcarce conceivable what a pack of Brats and Monſters *Aſtrology* brings forth with it; it marks you out Natural Magick by Planetary Influences, and Characters on Herbs; it tells you Mens Fortunes by Figures, the Planets make through Moles, Lines, and other Marks; and hence it teaches you *Chiromancy*, *Phyſiognomy*, *Metapoſcopy*, nay *Augury* depends on the ſame Root; and not

a Bird that flies to the right, but portends Ill-luck, though to a Thouſand Spectators: indeed, there is not a Man, either Mad, Bewitch'd, or Propheſies, but ſtreight the *Aſtrologer* will give you a Reaſon for it; though by and by again, to ſave himſelf at a Fault, he will tell you, a Good Man is above the Stars.

Thus Teleſmes, or Taliſmans alſo, and our Divining Rods, are a Spawn of *Aſtrology*; but, in my Judgment, of juſt as much force as Powder of Poſt, without the aſſiſtance of *Witchcraft*, and then I don't know but a Man may do feats, like the *Egyptian* Magicians, but by the power of the Devil, and not by our little Conjectural Blind Arts, unleſs Ceremonially; for my part I once made a Teleſme of *Venus* my ſelf in Silver, but found no more effect in the Mettal than before. So *Brown* in his *Vulgar Errours*, ſays, he tried the Divining Rod, but he found it all Cheat and Deceit.

Further, *Geomancy* is another Off-ſpring of *Aſtrology*, indeed her very Ape, for ſhe follows her into her Diviſions and Partitions of Houſes, *&c.* *Cornelius Agrippa* wrote a Book of this; and in his Treatiſe of the Vanity of *Arts and Sciences* tells you, he believes it as good as the beſt; but with-

back-

all, that it is all Lyes. And indeed, What an odd Chymera Foundation this Art has, that Men, by making Points backwards, with their Left-hands upon the ground, ſhould fancy the Stars ſhould lead them, by drawing thoſe Points into Figures, to Predict by them; a Man had better by half beſtow leſs pains, caſt a pair of Dice, or dip a Leaf in *Virgil*, if he is reſolved to be Superſtitious, and ſo diſcover his Fortune that way, rather than run himſelf to the Niceties of *Geomantick* Houſes, and Fathers, your *Lætitia*, &c. for it.

So I cannot but wonder too, what Intelligence, and of what Planet it was that taught us the Juriſdiction of Planetary Days and Hours? 'twas very happy the Natural Day was not divided into Twenty Hours, as it is now into Twenty four; for if it had, our Divinors had been forc'd to have made a New Computation; beſides, that as it is, every Planet has not his equal ſhare in the day, And why ſhould he not have it in the Day, as well as he has it in the Week?

Aſtrology therefore, if it ſerves for any thing, it is to be as the Devils Lure into the more obſcure and black Receſſes of *Magick*: I my ſelf remember too well, what

Studies it wheedled me into, when *I* gave it the favour of my Thoughts; as first, to seek to the Planets intelligences for my Knowledge, and after to other Spirits: Now, though *I* resolv'd to pay an exact deference to the Duty *I* ow'd to God all the while, yet *I* could not, in a long time, perswade my self, but that such Arts, as in the case of *Balaam*, might be lawfully attainable, though at length *I* was convinced they were presumptuous.

But where shall we end the further Whimsies of Predictions? *Pythagoras*'s Lot, Predicting by the Number of our Names, the Jewish Caballa telling Mysteries, and Prognosticating from Titles, Numbers and Letters; your *Rosacrucian Figments*, what shall *I* say, Do not Men deserve to be deceiv'd, when they imploy themselves to catch such shadows of Wisdom? indeed, 'tis their due reward, that they miss and lose the substance by it.

So what shall we say to *Hydromancy*, *Puromancy*, and *Aeromancy*, nay and *Alectromancy*, that fore-tells by the pecking up of Corn by a Cock, Are they not trumpery, that scarce deserve the naming? So of *Palmestry*; How shall we reconcile the giddy and senseless contradictions and variations of *Authors* about it? So in *Physiognomy*,

ſiognomy, Who but one that had it from ſome *Spirit*, or *Star-Intelligence*, could be brought to think any uſeful or certain ground in it? Only Man that runs a Whoring out of the Ways of Truth, ſeeks to, and believes every thing he ſhould not. Or elſe who would fancy, that *Mars* muſt be thruſt into the Palms of the Hand, while little *Venus* and *Mercury* have the honour to poſſeſs in chief, with the grand Planets, the Thumb and little Finger?

But beſides theſe, there are *Omens* alſo, the weakeſt of all Fore-tellings; but how often of fatal conſequence, not from the Prediction I mean, but from the deadning the ſpirits of them that ſuperſtitiouſly believe them, *I* need not mention; indeed they are ſo uncertain, that their very *Interpreters* are forc'd to fly to the Mind of the Perſon *Omen'd*, and what conception he had of the accident, to Conſtrue it; and which is, in ſhort, to make Mens Thoughts and Fancies Predictions.

William the Conqueror was an evident confirmation of this Truth; at his firſt Landing in *England*, his Foot ſlip'd, and he fell flat on the Earth; and the Morning he fought, his Eſquire put on his Back-piece before, by miſtake. Now theſe *Omens* daunted ſome, but the Conqueror

Interpreted them beſt, who merrily ſaid, the Fall ſhew'd the Earth was willing to be acquainted with him; and the change of his Armour ſhew'd, he was to change his Dukedom for a Kingdom, as it after hapned.

As for Propheſies, when they relate to State-Affairs, they are dangerous, and have deſervedly drawn down many good Laws to ſuppreſs them, not that they are ſo formidable in themſelves neither; but that which gives them credit, is, *Firſt*, That Men mark when they Hit, and never when they Miſs. *Secondly*, The Nature of Man, which loves to turn all to Divination, calls even probable Conjectures, and obſcure Traditions, Propheſies; And *Thirdly*, and laſtly, that almoſt all of them being near infinite in number, have been Impoſtures, and by idle and crafty Brains, meerly contriv'd and feign'd, after the event paſt, with ſome evil deſign and influence on the preſent times.

But why do I ſtay ſo long upon Particulars? Where ſhall we end the more noxious Methods of Deluding and Superſtitious *Theurgy*, Devilliſh *Geocy* and *Necromancy*? as if the Devil could not perſonate a Ghoſt: So where ſhall we conclude, with the Faeiry Siſters, the Inviſible Ring

Witchcraft

Witchcraft and *Conjuration*, the uſe of *Chriſtals*, *Pentangles*, *Circles*, and an Hundred other little Devilliſh Machinations, wherein, though the Devil does not Immediately, as in *Witchcraft*, draw Men to Expreſs Covenant with him, yet as by many ſad Experiments has appear'd, he gradually ſinks them into all manner of wickedneſs, and in the end drowns them in Eternal Deſpair; and thus he tempted our Saviour at firſt, only to fall down and Worſhip him: He is a ſubtle Enemy, and knows very well how to bait his hook ſuitable to the Perſons he intends to catch by it.

Of *MEEKNESS.*

SUrely *Meekneſs* needs no Praiſes; *Meekneſs* is the Moral Paradiſe, nay, *Meekneſs* is the only Cement to the Faults and Errors of Humanity; VVhat can we do without bearing with one another?

Meekneſs was the Perfection of *Chriſt*, and Peace is the very Attribute of God himſelf; and can any thing be wanting then to make them amiable?

Alaſs! Do not we every day, without thinking, commit a Thouſand little faults againſt others? And will we not give the Charity we cannot but deſire?

And yet after all, the Subtilty of the Serpent muſt be mixed with this Dove-like Innocency; 'tis a ſtrange Temptation Men have, that ſee they can wrong us with Impunity; And why ſhould I, by a too great ſoftneſs, proclaim my ſelf a prey to all?

The World may call ſuch Submiſſion, Vertue and Clemency; but, alaſs! 'tis Facility and Fear that lead to ſuch Cowardize, and not *Meekneſs*. True Vertue is a ſtreight Line, that neither virges for Laxineſs nor Glory.

So

So the Imperious Commander, the Dogmatical Opinionatre, and the Moroſe Cynick, who deſire all to be enrol'd among the Virtuous, are Men that would ſeem too perfect to be born with; but, alaſs! who want the *Meekneſs* and *Patience* of others more, who err more, and yet preſerve the Peace leſs?

I have not an Interiour Peace in a union of Thoughts and Opinions with my Brother; But muſt I therefore in Self-conceit break the Exteriour Peace in the Devoires of Humane Civility?

Does my Brother err? And why may I not as juſtly quarrel at the Diſeaſes of his Body, as the Imperfections of his Mind? nay, Why am I not as angry at the imperfect variety of the Weather?

To reform others perfectly, is as impoſſible as vain: What have we to do then, but to deſpiſe all little Capricious Humours, and to amend our ſelves?

Do I hazard the Peace in rebuking my Brother? And why may not he be as rough to me? at leaſt, may he not as juſtly reſiſt ſo unjuſt an Impoſition?

I am obliged to love my Brother; And how may I then make him look coldly on me, through my croſſing him; is this my Humility, in doing as I would be done unto?

I. S. has different Opinions from me; And what then, ought I not to have all the Conſideration that Truth or Charity will permit me for them: Indeed is it fit that I ſhould cavil with him about them?

I have condemned my ſelf in Errors often; but I cannot ſay ſo of my Brother; Is it not juſt then, that I rather humbly and ſubmiſſively prefer his Judgment before my own, than be angry at the Variance?

Of *CONTENTION.*

A *Contentious Spirit* is both Barbarous and Bruitiſh: What is the benefit of Humane Reaſon, unleſs in Humanity? And are not Humanity and Contention contraries?

Contention either Infects us to a Likeneſs, or Cankers out our Spirit with Cowardize: What, all the day in Battel, and neither Fly nor Fight?

Chriſt ſays, to call our Brother Fool Contentiouſly, is as Damnable as Murder; Can he that delights in Provocations be aſſur'd what will follow them?

The

The leaſt Evil of *Contention* is, that it abates our Virgin Reſpect and Civility for one another; And is it a ſlight matter for us to traduce each other to Contempt?

My *Contention* is in Revenge; And what then? Is Revenge, either a Chriſtian or Moral Apology, or is there not a juſt and modeſt Vindication of my ſelf without it?

Do we think, through *Contention*, to back every Wild Colt we meet with? nay, And can we otherwiſe then expect ſome time or other to meet with ſuch Swine, as will turn again, and rent us?

Surely, gentle and ſoft Applications are beſt for Conviction; and as a Contempt paſſes to our Perſons through *Contention*, ſo to our Inſtructions alſo.

Does *Seneca* wrangle with a Fool? he degrades his *Philoſophy* by the equality of the *Contention*; But does *Seneca* adviſe, and is the Fool ſtubborn? *Indigna eſt Cæſaris Ira.*

Of CONTRADICTION.

DOes my Brother Contradict me, he has as much right to it, as I to ſpeak to him? And why then am I concern'd? but he does it, you ſay, unjuſtly; And are you as aſſur'd that you do not as unjuſtly provoke him to it, by requiring too hard things of him?

I have a right to hold my Tongue, and be ſilent at all times; but if I ſpeak to my Brother, I have no right to make him Anſwer me juſt as I pleaſe.

But my Brother is Croſs and Perverſe you ſay, and will unjuſtly contradict me; And what then? Whoſe fault is it that he is uneaſie to me? Am I Mad to diſpute him when he is out of Humour? Or do I want to ſee how he can Croſs me, or I vex my ſelf?

Beſides, Alaſs! there is no end of ſome Mens Perverſeneſs, and 'tis in vain to expect to cure it; Should even God himſelf Write or Speak, he would no more want an Anſwerer, than the Devil in the like caſe, an Advocate.

And yet after all, and for all this, though I can ſee my Brother is in an Error, and I

am

am obliged to uſe agreeable means to ſet him right, yet can I diſcern his heart to ſay, He lies, is falſe, or that he is perverſe?

Surely God only, who ſearches the heart, can lay ſuch charges to my Brother; and what though in ſuch caſe I may contradict him, yet, in Charity, I wrong him, to ſay, he is either falſe, or lies? I ſee but the Miſtake.

Thus, though I have the ſtrongeſt Natural Duty on me to Reprove my Brother, and nothing but his Malice for it can diſcharge me of it; yet does that give me either power to Judge, or Force him in his Actions?

The Wiſe and Good indeed have a rightful Dominion and Empire in reigning over Mens Thoughts, and we are bound in Conſcience to ſubmit to it; but ſurely every confident Contradictor has not the ſame Reaſon for our Submiſſion?

Lapis Errantium; or the Stray-office: *For all manner of things Loſt, Found, or Miſlaid within the Weekly Bills of Mortality of the* CITY *of* London.

IT is not my buſineſs at preſent to run out upon the Antient Uſe of this Office in other Kingdoms, which, by its very Name, I am perſwaded a great many Learned Men are not unacquainted with; I ſhall wholly confine my ſelf therefore to ſhew, of what a General and Great Benefit ſuch an Office muſt needs be to this preſent City; and, in doing that, I ſhall fully Anſwer my End in this Little *Treatiſe*.

And that I may the better do that, therefore, *Firſt*, I ſhall, briefly as I can, give the particular State of ſuch an Office. *Secondly*, I ſhall Anſwer all manner of Objections againſt it: And *Thirdly* and laſtly, I ſhall ſhew the wonderful Conveniences of it; And in all theſe I ſhall be the ſhorter, becauſe the very hinting at the Great Uſes and Conveniences of it, will be ſufficient to excuſe all need of other Apologies for it.

The

The State of the Office I ſhall Repreſent briefly thus; *Firſt*, In a Set-Table of Rates and Fees, to be Paid and Allow'd to the Finder and Office; And, *Secondly*, in ſome few Reflections on them.

If the Thing Found be Valued at				Then the Finder to have of it for his Honeſty and Care in Bringing it,			And the Office to have for their Keeping it.		
l.	*s.*	*d.*		*l.*	*s.*	*d.*	*l.*	*s.*	*d.*
0	0	6		0	0	2	0	0	1
0	1	0		0	0	4	0	0	2
0	2	6		0	0	8	0	0	4
0	5	0		0	1	0	0	0	6
0	10	0		0	1	6	0	0	8
0	15	0		0	2	0	0	0	10
1	0	0		0	2	6	0	1	0
2	0	0		0	5	0	0	2	0
4	0	0		0	9	0	0	3	0
8	0	0		0	16	0	0	4	0
100	0	0		10	0	0	2	10	0

My Reflections upon this Table, are theſe,

Firſt, That all things Found ſhall be Valued, at a Rate, by Appraiſement, and that if any Difficulty ariſe between the Finder and Loſer, ſo it ſhall be decided, each of them chooſing an Appraiſor, and if they ſhall not agree, nor find an Umpire in two days, that then the Office ſhall do it for them; and that ſhall be Deciſive.

Secondly,

Secondly, If either finder or looſer, or the Lord on Eſcheate, in two days notice refuſe to appoint their Appraiſors; that then the Office upon both or either of their Defaults, ſhall be able to get Appraiſors to ſet a value, and to give the finder his due thereon, and to keep the Goods, or ſell them, if periſhable, and keep the Mony till the Looſer, or the Lord of the Royalty ſhall allow him both his, and the finders Fees.

Thirdly, That all things enclos'd Writings in a Box, Mony in a Cloaths in a Trunk, ſhall not till the Looſer come, or the L Royalty claim them; but tha Finder may have them to be be Apprais'd, or otherwiſe as he ſire it, before they be deliver'd out Office.

Fourthly, That all things of real value, the Office ſhall be ready on bringing in to receive, and to give the Finder his due immediately; but for Dogs Pocket-Books, and Keys, it ſhall reſerve them to give an account of them, or elſe make an Entry where they are to be found, as the caſe ſhall reaſonably require.

Fifthly, If Goods, periſhable are found, that then the Finder and Office ſhall have power

powei in convenient time, to ſell them by Appraiſors, and ſo to be anſwerable for the Mony only.

Sixthly, That if any thing above 20 *s.* value be found, that it remain in the Office at leaſt a Week, that the Right Owner be not cheated by a Colluſion of the Finder; So if Goods, or Money, above 20 *l.* value be found, that they remain in the Office a Month, before they be Delivered, except the Pretended Loſer give in Security for their Forth-coming; but after a Month, that they be delivered him only on a Note of the Loſers place of abode and quality, to inform after Claimers.

Seventhly, That all Pocket-books, or Dogs that are found, ſhall be valued as at 5 *s.* and Keys of all ſorts, as at 12 *d.* to avoid all Diſputes; and that Bills of Exchange, by which the Mony might be receiv'd, ſhall be valued as Mony.

Eighthly, That all things under 20 *s.* value ſhall be forfeited to the Lords of the Royalty, if not called for in ſix weeks; and all things under 10 *l.* value, if not called for in a Quarter of a year: As for all things, of a greater value, to remain a Year and a day, as the Law directs before, the Lord to have them.

Laſtly,

Secondly, If either finder or looſer, or the Lord on Eſcheate, in two days notice refuſe to appoint their Appraiſors; that then the Office upon both or either of their Defaults, ſhall be able to get Appraiſors to ſet a value, and to give the finder his due thereon, and to keep the Goods, or ſell them, if perishable, and keep the Mony till the Looſer, or the Lord of the Royalty ſhall allow him both his, and the finders Fees.

Thirdly, That all things enclos'd, as Writings in a Box, Mony in a Bag, or Cloaths in a Trunk, ſhall not be open'd till the Looſer come, or the Lord of the Royalty claim them; but that then the Finder may have them to be open'd, to be Apprais'd, or otherwiſe as he ſhall deſire it, before they be deliver'd out of the Office.

Fourthly, That all things of real value, the Office ſhall be ready on bringing in to receive, and to give the Finder his due immediately; but for Dogs Pocket-Books, and Keys, it ſhall reſerve them to give an account of them, or elſe make an Entry where they are to be found, as the caſe ſhall reaſonably require.

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Laſtly,

Laſtly, Let no Man think that to allow to the Finder and Office, in this caſe, 12 *l.* 10 *s.* in the Hundred, is too much; for, as when he is in hazard of all, it's well if ſo little will procure it; ſo indeed, leſs will not be ſufficient, either to incourage the Finder, to bring in what he has diſcover'd, or to Anſwer the truſt and hazard of the Office in Keeping and Regiſtring it.

The *Objections* that ſeem likely to be made in this Caſe, are theſe;

Firſt, That ſuch an Office will deſtroy Royalties.

As to that I *Anſwer*; 'twill rather vaſtly promote them: For, as now, all Findings are Conceal'd; ſo, by this Means, they being Diſcover'd, they will be aſſur'd of them: indeed in this caſe they will be forc'd to make ſome allowance to the Office and Finder for their Care; but that ſurely will be Reaſonable, when 'tis no more than is required of the Loſer.

Secondly, That the *Gazette* will be wrong'd in their Publications.

But as to that I *Anſwer*; It muſt needs be very inconſiderable; For Publications there

there are generally of Dogs ſtolen of Value, and of Horſes, and of other things loſt in the Country; and, as to thoſe, you ſee, this Office gives no diverſion.

Thirdly, That this may be apt to encourage Thieves; but, as to that, I ſay, on the contrary, that it cannot but be the greateſt diſincouragement to them imaginable; for when they who have loſt, or been rob'd of their Goods, ſhall repair to this Office, and make their Entry of them there, not only the Office will be ready to ſeize them, but every one that happens on ſuch Suſpicious Goods, will know ſpeedily where to repair to know whoſe they are, and whereupon a Diſcovery muſt neceſſarily follow.

Fourthly, That we ſhall want power to make the Loſers, and Lords of Royalties allow the Fees of finding, and the Fees of the Office; but, as to that I propoſe, we may be effectually help'd by an *Act of Parliament*; if not, by the *King's Patent*.

Fifthly, But you will ſay, What Security ſhall the Loſer and Finder have, not to be wrong'd by the Office? I ſay, they ſhall have a Publick Security given in by him that keeps the Office, to ſee that what ever is left there ſhall be forth-coming, and the Office-Books lying always

Publick, they ſhall make their Entries, if they pleaſe themſelves; and if Goods of Value be found, the Office ſhall be reſponſible to the Finder, that it give him notice to have a juſt Appraiſement, if he deſires it, before the Goods are deliver'd to the Loſer; and in the ſame manner ſhall the Lord's Right be ſecured alſo.

Sixthly, But you will continue to Object, that Finders will ſtill conceal their Goods and Mony notwithſtanding: I ſay, to prevent that, a Clauſe in ſuch an *Act of Parliament*, That if the Finder bring not in the Goods or Mony within a Week after they are found, he ſhall not only loſe the Profit of ſuch his Finding to the Informer, but be liable to an Action of Trover, with treble Damages on Conviction; I ſay, ſuch a Clauſe would make it almoſt impoſſible that any thing ſhould be conceal'd from the Office.

The Benefits of ſuch an Office, would be ſuch as theſe.

Firſt, You ſee this Office will be as a General Place of Notice for ſeizing all manner of Suſpicious Goods.

Secondly, This Office will as well Encourage, as Threaten a return of Found Goods;

Goods; For when Men ſee they may have honeſtly a good Reward, they will ſcarce, by being diſhoneſt, hazard the loſing all, and paying for it too, by an Informer, which, in the preſent Caſe, they will be in great danger of, eſpecially when we conſider, that Finders have generally too much Joy to be Silent.

Thirdly, An Informer, in this Caſe, would be ſo far from a contemptible and ſervile Office, that it would not be too mean, even for a Gentleman to undertake; and, though he might give his Reward to whom he would, yet, in honour, he might aſſiſt any one, when ſo baſely and meanly injur'd.

Fourthly, As nothing is ſo inconſiderable, that ſome People have not a Fancy for; ſo nothing ſcarce can be of ſo little a value, that this Office would not draw to it, a little, ſure, and honeſt Profit would tempt thither, even things of Six pence worth; and he, that in ſuch caſe, will not care to carry the thing to the Office himſelf, will not want ſome one or other, that he might oblige by it.

So that the benefit of ſuch an Office muſt needs be, I may almoſt ſay, paſt Expreſſion; in ſhort, 'twill make this Great City and Suburbs to have the Correſ-

pondence almoſt of a Family; and it ſhould be no ſmall Recommendation of this Office, to a conſidering Man, that it has been in another Nation before, and therefore conſequently to be preſum'd to be of ſucceſs, as well as of moſt conſiderable publick benefit to this.

In ſhort, if Uſe and Innocency can recommend any thing, this Office has all the advantages poſſible; and I ſhall ſay no more of it, becauſe no Man can look into his own Thoughts, and not be convinc'd of it, and that even in many things not here mentioned.

The PROJECT; or, The Method of putting this Office in Practice.

Firſt, That for the eaſe of Finders, there be four or five places appointed for the Receipt of Found Goods; As at,

1. *Charing-croſs.* 2. *Temple-barr.*
3. *Leadenhallſtreet.* 4. *Southwark.* And

Secondly, That for the eaſe of the Loſer, theſe be only places of Receipt; and that one Chief Office being appointed, as at *Temple-barr*, that all Found Goods and Mony

Mony be fetch'd daily from thoſe places of Receipt, about the hours of 8 and 12 each day; So that Goods left in the Morning ſhall be ready for the Owner, for a certainty in the Afternoon; and thoſe left in the Afternoon, the next Morning at the one Principal and only Office of Delivery.

Thirdly, This Method to continue all the Week, and all the year round, *Sunday* excepted.

Fourthly, That ſeveral Books for Entring ſuch Goods and Mony be kept as well at the ſeveral places of Receipt, as the Principal Office, and that they be in four Columns, and under four Heads in manner and form following.

Things Loſt. Place where. Finder. Loſer.

Fifthly, That when ſuch Goods are fetch'd from the ſaid ſeveral places of Receipts, that then a Duplicate be brought with them of all their ſeveral Entries, to be Recorded in the General-Office; of all, which Duplicates, the General-Office may once a Week, take an Account, by comparing them with the ſeveral Books of Receipts.

Sixthly, All the Office-Books to be Mark'd; and lye Publickly; so that if the Finder see but the things Entred, 'tis impossible but that they must come to the Losers knowledge; and 'tis as impossible that any Lords of Royalties should be able to lose their Rights.

Seventhly, The Goods being thus remov'd to the General-Office, the Finder may receive notice when to meet at an Appraisement, if he has not receiv'd his due before; and the Loser may know what his demands are; so that, if he agree to them, there will be no more, but that the Office receive the Mony.

But as for the Entry of Suspicious Goods to be seiz'd, that as it ought to be in a distinct Book, so for the Readier Recourse, it should be only done at the Principal Office at *Temple-barr*; so the like for a Caution Entred for Goods Lost, that the Owner may have Notice sent him if they come to this Office; and for this the Office is to be particularly paid, according to the length of their Entry; but where the Goods are found, no other Fees are to be paid for the Entry, than in the Table before.

Of

Of *CUNNING.*

THe Cunning Man and the Wiſe Man differ not only in point of Honeſty, but Ability. He that can pack the Cards does not always play well.

Cunning Men, like Juglers, are only vers'd in two or three Little Tricks, while Wiſdom excels in the whole Ring or Circle of Action.

But is Wiſdom to be deſpis'd, becauſe others ſculk through their Cunning? Shall a General abandon all Diſcipline, becauſe his *Parthian* Foe fights flying? No; rather diſcovering his petty ſhifts, let him deſtroy him in his Wiles.

Surely, Cunning Men are too weak for Council; for Practice, and Underſtanding Men, indeed, they may do well enough; but he abuſes himſelf that turns them out of their Channel, and truſts them.

Were Men always Skilful, they would never uſe Craft or Treachery: Alaſs! that Men are Cunning, is from their little Minds, which, if it can conceal its ſelf in one place, quickly diſcovers its ſelf in another.

Hence the Cunning Man is as ridicu-

lous as odious; while the greateſt art of ſuch Subtile Men is, to conceal their Skill; the wiſer ſort of them know therefore their intereſt, and are Subtile only on ſome great Occaſion, and for ſome great Advantage.

Beſides, he that is out of the plain way to deceive others, has not ſo ready a proſpect of the Cheats deſign'd againſt him; ſo that not only a Man is ſooneſt deceiv'd, when his conceit of Cunning beats him from his Guard; but Cunning Men are afraid of us, when they ſee an exact ſimplicity.

And thus 'tis the Perfection of Wiſdom, to ſeem to fall into Snares laid for us, for fear of worſe, and yet to avoid them; but, by Subtilty, 'tis as eaſie to deceive ones ſelf, and not perceive it, as 'tis difficult unperceiv'd to deceive others.

Uſual Tricks of Cunning, are, to ſurprize, and faſcinate with the Eye, to propoſe in buſineſs, when our Friend is in haſt, to ſurprize with bold Queſtions, and to foyl, by Ungrateful and Unſeaſonable Deſires, the thing we would not have done.

Of WISDOM.

MAN is not more above a Brute, than the one above the other, through the advantage of Wiſdom. *Plus poſſe*, ſurely is alſo *Nobilius Eſſe*.

Wiſdom as from a Tower, gives us the true proſpect of things. Where the higher we climb, the clearer we ſee, and the fairer is our View.

And yet Wiſdom conſiſts not in trifling Curioſities and nice Speculations. Wiſdom not only ſolidly pourtraictures Vertue, but gives it practick Life alſo.

The Fool hates Wiſdom as exceeding his reach; the Sluggard envys, inſtead of attaining it, while the wicked Man abhors it, as the Touch-ſtone to his Actions. But ſurely he that hates Wiſdom: hates his own Soul with it.

Wiſdom is as our guard aſſign'd us by God. Wiſdom clears our mind of undigeſted Thoughts and Reſolutions, while ſhe looks down with Contempt and Unconcernedneſs on the little tumults of Fancy and Paſſion below.

Reaſon haſtned in the digeſtion by Fancy and Paſſion, the giddy Apes of Judgment and

and Courage, like Fruit gather'd unripe, ſets the Teeth on edge, whilſt Wiſdom leads us without Repentance.

Our Saviour tells us, *Qui ſequitur me, non ambulat in tenebris:* And ſurely, not without the juſteſt cauſe; if the fear of the Lord cannot be the beginning of Wiſdom, what elſe can move us to act or judge impartially?

Surely, 'twas by Wiſdom, that holy men approach'd to God, and became Prophets, *Wiſd. Sol. cap.* 8. Can we think, we ſhall not anſwer to God for it then, if we omit to improve our Reaſoning?

Was it nothing, that *Moſes* was skill'd in all the Learning of the *Ægyptians*? Surely, God had neither gather'd his Prophets into a Colledge at *Bethel*, nor made the Learn'd St. *Paul*, the chiefeſt of the Apoſtles, if he had not regarded even our induſtrious ſelf-improvements?

But alaſs! what are all our improvements without the grace of God, and ſincerity? *Solomon* tells us, Wiſdom will not enter into a malitious Soul, *Wiſd.* 1.

The perverſe, be he never ſo ingenuous, yet by degrees will he vitiate his Principles by his Practice; the corrupt Man may ſhift and be a good Sophiſter, but never reaſon well; to be wiſe and good, are reciprocal.

The

The Seeming WISE.

REaſon has not more Admirers than there are Hipocrites; who admiring only the Profits of Wiſdom, approve juſt ſo much of her, as can be agreeable and ſerviceable to their ends.

Some indeed ſee but the Appearance of things, their Thoughts and Reſolutions, perpetually tripping up one another; and they deſerve our pity. But how many ſet up the Hypocriſy of a formal Gravity, above all the Reaſoning of Man?

How many through a wild Banter and Paradox, content themſelves in meer endleſs and giddy Extravagances? A decaying Merchant has not more Tricks for his Credit, than ſuch Perſons for their Sufficiencies.

Sometimes they are ſo cloſe and ſo reſerv'd, that they will not ſhew you their wares, but by a dark Light, hinting as if ſomewhat more weighty were conceal'd; and they'd at leaſt have you think, that they underſtand more.

So ſometimes they are ſhrew'd by Countenance, and wiſe by Signs; while they bear

bear it out by ſpeaking a great Word, and being Peremptory.

Is any thing beyond their reach? 'tis eaſily exploded as curious or impertinent; and then even their ignorance ſeems Judgment. But alaſs! Can ſuch ſhuffling appear otherwiſe than ridiculous to any Man of ſenſe?

Some are never without a difference, and ſo amuſing Men, by a ſubtilty blanch the Matter; ſo they find it eaſy in deliberations to affect the negative ſide: When Propoſitions are denyed, there is an end of them.

But certainly, this affecting of objecting and foretelling Difficulties wholly, is the very Bane of Wiſdom. There is an harder work indeed in perfecting our Contrivance; but ſurely for that reaſon alone, a Man ſomewhat abſur'd, is better either for Buſineſs or Counſel, than one either over-formal or exceptious.

Of

Of LOGICK.

IF any thing can excuſe the ſuperfineneſs of our preſent Logick and Argumentations, it muſt be the depth of their Wiſdom, and the ſtate of the Univerſities in uſing them; and yet even then in my ſenſe, they were better laid aſide, or at leaſt more regulated, and more pains ſpent in the exact definitions of Words, and ſetling ultimate Principles and Maxims, than the meer Forms of Reaſoning.

In truth, the Schools have render'd the Niceties about Syllogiſms almoſt infinite: So that when we have lookt for the Purity and ſimplicity of truth through their Diſputes, we have found our ſelves maz'd by our own Forms, and Rules in our ſearch, and inſtead of being help'd out in our difficulties by them, we have diſcover'd our ſelves ſunk deeper by the weight of our Guides: And when we ſhould conſider about the ſubſtance of our Argument, we are taken up with thinking whether we may ſay properly, *Negatur Minor*, or no.

I ſhall not therefore deſcend into the little Niceties of Logical Propoſitions, their Categoricks, Hypotheticks, Disjunctives, Univer-

Univerſals, Indefinites, *&c.* nor into their Formalities of their ſeveral Argumentations, their Enthimems, Inductions, Exemplum's, Sorites, Dilemma's, and Syllogiſms. Let them that have a mind to catch Butter-flies purſue them if they pleaſe, for my part I will not.

So, what ſhall I ſay of our ordinary Logical Fallacies, as *Quod emiſti ediſti, Carnes crudas emiſti, ergo, &c.* ſo *Duo & tres ſunt par & impar, quinque ſunt duo & tres, ergo, &c.* Would not a Man of any judgment be aſham'd to think, that one ſhould be put to a formal diſtinction in terms to anſwer ſuch trifles, to be forc'd to have ſet Topicks to diſcover the Myſtery of Nonſenſe: In truth, were moſt of their Arguments but reduc'd to writing, nothing would be more ridiculous; they are nothing but a few empty Catches in meer Words at beſt. And the Excellency of a Sophiſter, as I find, is not to fly to Principles of Truth, but Quirks.

In ſhort, therefore in my judgment, and I think I judge right, this Sophiſtry is ſo far from an improvement of the Underſtanding, that 'tis as a Crop of Thorns and Weeds in our Ingeny; and tho the forms of Argumentations, and their ſeveral Rules, as *Barbara Celarent, &c.* may have a great deal

of

of Art in their Regulation and Compoſure; yet, no one, at beſt, can deny, but that they are rather curious than uſeful; that a Diſputation may be very well brought to a juſt Criſis without ſuch formality; and conſequently, that the great ſtudy and labour about it, might be better ſpar'd about ſomething more material.

Its Parts.

But to deſcend more particularly into its parts; And ſo, firſt, as to its Predicables, Predicaments, and Ante-predicaments: Would not a Man think, that thoſe *Termini* comprehended ſome Divine matter? Surely one would: But, when it comes to the Teſt, 'tis all Trifles. Thus what a ridiculous and obvious diſtinction is *Unum vagum ut aliquis lapis, unum determinatum ut Johannes, unum Demonſtrativum ut hic arbor, & unum Hypotheticum ut hic filius Senior:* Is this Quibling, in trifling diſtinctions, worthy of a *Philoſopher?* if it is, let my Friend peruſe Dr. *Wilkins's Univerſal Character*, and he ſhall have enough of them, though by that Ingenious Author deſign'd for a far better purpoſe.

So

So for your *Proprium's quarto modo*; As, 1. *Proprium ſoli non omni ut hominem eſſe doctum.* 2. *Omni non ſoli ut hominem eſſe bipedem* (Plato's *Gooſe.*) 3. *Omni & ſoli ſed non ſemper ut ridere.* 4. *Omni ſoli & ſemper ut riſibilitas in homine:* Is not this pretty ſtuff, that a Man muſt be bound to tell another he talks Nonſence, by the Rule of *Proprium* 4to. *modo?* What is this but Pedantry? indeed but a kind of Brutality, and unworthy of the liberal and generous ſearch of a Rational Soul.

Indeed, the Rule of *genus*, *ſpecies*, and *difference*, might be of excellent uſe, were it in proper place, as in a Treatiſe of *Method*, or *Analyſis*, but diſguis'd in ſuch Cant, with a *ſummum ſubalternum ſimpliciter*; or, *ſecundum quid*; in truth quite defaces it, and makes it to become all of a piece with the reſt.

So further, What ſhall we ſay to the Ante-predicaments, the *Equivocum*, *Univocum*, *Analogum*, and *Denominativum*? And why may not we as well bring in the *Metaphoricum*, *Ironicum*, and an 100 more? And ſo for your *Voces abſtractæ*, *contretæ*, *ſimplices*, *complexæ:* Why may not you as well add, *finitæ*, *relativæ*, and infinite others? In ſhort, Is not this meer Trumpery, and fitter for a Dictionary,

nary, or a *Caſtaneus*'s diſtinctions at beſt; but ſurely, not worthy of a Philoſopher, to ſtrut up a Science withall. Indeed it makes Logick appear like a Gouty Leg, in reſpect of the Body of Wiſdom.

So the Predicaments in new Philoſophy, are:

Mens, menſura, quies, motus, poſitura, figura,
Sunt cum materia; cunctarum exordia rerum.

And why may not theſe do as well as *Ariſtotles* 10. *Subſtantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Paſſio, Ubi, Quando, Situs, Habitus: Ludovicus Vives* is of opinion, that you may add many more; and for my part I think 'twere no hurt there were none at all; indeed if they are of any uſe, 'tis to help invention: and as for invention it ought to be treated of diſtinctly, at leaſt it belongs more to *Rhetorick* than *Logick*.

So alſo, what Predicamental Diſtinctions we have got, as *Quantitas Entitativa, & quantitativa?* So that there are five intellectual Habits under *Quality, viz. Intelligentia, Sapientia, Scientia, Prudentia, & Ars*; whereas they may as rationally make fifty, and by the ſame reaſon diſtinguiſh every

ſeveral Object of Wiſdom into a ſeveral intellectual Habit.

And to ſhut up all I have to reflect of this nature, I ſhall add, what has Logick to do with Definitions? She is only to teach men to reaſon: Let the Vocabulary help them to Terms, particular Sciences to Principles, and Definitions; her buſineſs is only to caſt up the Account. So what hath ſhe to do with Diviſions into Univerſals, Eſſentials, Integrals, Subjects, Accidents, *&c.* Let her leave all to their proper places, to *Analitica* and Method, and the Principles of the Subjects ſhe diſputes of.

Of Arguments.

But as we would thus take away our too formal Univerſity Diſputes, as the Mothers of Quibling and Wrangling; ſo on the other ſide, one would leave ſo much to Art as might be able to lead a Diſpute to a Criſis. Thus we ought to let our Deſcriptions, Definitions, Genus and Differences, be laid down as *Poſtulata* or *Principles*; and if they be denied, prove them from the Fountain Topicks of Sciences.

So we ought to skill, how to run an Argument to a Contradiction or Abſurdity; not I mean a Nice and Logical Contradiction and Contrariety, than which nothing is more Pedantick; but to a real and ob-

obvious Contrariety and Inconſiſtency, and under which every one ought to ſubmit, and not to diſpute on, as if he aim'd at Victory, and wrangle, rather than to ſearch for Truth; and therefore, in ſincerity, we ought to deſiſt, as if we had no further Reaſon for what we firſt affirm'd: Where we are ſenſible, we are not able to make any thing further appear.

But as for your common Logical Contradictions, as I have ſaid nothing, is more impertinent: Thus, that two *Negatives* make an *Affirmative*, can only be from cuſtom. Indeed, did Men follow the true Concatenation of Thought, and were they not more Artful than Wiſe; two *Negatives* were Nonſenſe. So what need have we of the puzle of Contrary, *Subcontrary*, *Subaltern*, and Contradictory; is it not to maze us?

So when two Diſpute, is it not much eaſier to bring all to the Teſt of a plain Contradiction to find Truth, than to ſtand quibling, *Quidam homo eſt doctus, quidam homo non eſt doctus?* Indeed, as *Cornelius Agrippa* well reflects, Logical Terms and Niceties are like the *Trojan* Horſe, which tho not powerful enough to enter by force of Reaſoning, yet when once admitted, and taken for granted, will at leaſt

baffle and deſtroy your Cauſe, by their ſtarch'd and empty Formality.

And yet this we muſt needs grant of Arguments in general, that they are as much better for the growth of Wiſdom, then Lectures as many Heads are than one. As the Underſtanding is more lively when whetted and ſharpned by Contention, than when flat in its ſelf; but yet your ſingle Diſcourſes are better than Diſputes, when debauch'd to a perverſe Wrangling: And hence, how often have our wiſeſt men reflected on the Formality of Syllogyſms?

In the infancy of Philoſophy indeed, ſuch a ſhew of Wiſdom were tolerable; but ſuch Pedantry at theſe days, that the two or three firſt Years of a Univerſity Students time, ſhould be ſpent on ſuch Traſh, as I remember too well, is intollerable.

In ſhort, therefore as nothing but Perverſeneſs and Malice can come from Contention and Wrangling; ſo if you diſpute, let nothing provoke or confound you. Is your Adverſary hot? be calm and ſlow; meaſure your Words as it were by the *Pendulum* of a Clock. Is he interrupting and violent? Let him alone; 'tis eaſie after an hours Diſcourſe by three or four words quite to confound him, if he is in an Error; and remember there is a way to Anſwer ſhort and ſmart.

But

But as in Set-Diſputes, for the better progreſs, we ought to limit each ones ſhare to a propoſition or two at a time. Thus ſuppoſe it were only by *Enthymems*, that we entertain'd our Diſputes; ſo we ought never to admit of *Metaphors* or *Similes* in a rigid Argument; to let a man diſpute us ſo, is to let him fight in a Cloud, when he ought to appear on equal Terms, and naked; and ſo to grant the leaſt point in diſpute wrongfully, is a confuſing Folly; and ſo not to be able to reduce your Argument to particulars; what is it, but to make it recoyle in its ſelf?

Are you in a Diſpute therefore, and do you find your Adverſary perverſly through a Spirit of Wrangling, to withſtand you in clear and evident Principles of Truth? Never ſuffer him to move you to further Argument after that. If you have no Moderator, ceaſe for good and all, ſtanding firmly and eternally on the firſt Error. He that admits the leaſt corner of a falſe Foundation, forgets that his whole Building will ſurely fall by means of it; and beſides, that Sophiſtry in its ſelf, is Diveliſh; and when it has other ends than a fair and candid ſearch for Truth, is to be hated and avoided by all.

Further in Arguments: Without you are ſure to ſpeak alone, and not to be interrupted, as in the Pulpit, never multiply Reaſons; for ſince one or two is enough for Conviction, and ſufficient moſt times for an honeſt Mind; to alledge more, what is it but to leave room for Perverſeneſs, and to give the better opportunity for Wrangling?

But above all, in Diſputes you muſt remember to proceed from Words to Senſe; for 'tis in vain to argue, when you do not underſtand one anothers Terms: Nor is it leſs neceſſary in your method to proceed firſt to ſome Fundamental Principles, ſuch as Self-Preſervation, Demonſtration, *&c.* To think of arguing otherwiſe, is weak and fooliſh; and tho one would explode and baniſh the Formality of Syllogiſms, yet if one takes away the method of Reaſoning of clearing firſt Terms, and granting firſt Principles, one had better never ſpeak than argue; for it muſt be endleſs.

I proceed to the laſt part of Logick or Method.

Of Method.

Several Subjects and ſeveral Genius's delight in ſeveral Methods; in which caſe, what

what is cleareſt and eaſieſt to all, is undoubtedly the beſt. 'Tis a fault in Method to give more Labour than Benefit. Method is for Matter, and not Matter for Method. I muſt confeſs, as to general Learning, I wholly eſteem Eſſays, firſt, as by their ſhort and pithy fulneſs, they are more apt and aſſiſtant to a complete Judgment: And, Secondly, as by their looſeneſs, they are moſt ready for Corrections and Additions.

To write too largely of a Subject, ſcatters and diſtracts the Sight, and to write too little of it, leaves determination to a Lottery: The beſt method therefore is to be ſhort and full, to give moſt large and ample general Directions, and to leave the judgment to manage leſſer Corollaries, Particulars, and Conſequences; and as for the advantage of ſuch good Methods, 'tis ſcarce expreſſible; you will not think how gently, and with what eaſe, even the difficulteſt parts of Wiſdom well rang'd, will lye in our minds by it.

And in this one may juſtly ſay of Knowledge, the Diamond or Jewel is not immediately ready ſo ſoon as it is got; it wants poliſhing and trimming, yea, and beautifying, and ſetting at laſt alſo: And even ſo in Wiſdom, the Labour is not inconſidera-

ble, even after it is gotten and obtain'd, by exact Method and Order, to addreſs it, and ſet it out to the beſt advantage.

In truth, Method is not much leſs conſiderable than Matter its ſelf; 'tis obvious every day to obſerve how much deliberate and orderly proceeding, confounds even truth when irregular. Indeed, Method is a ſort of Truth, and Confuſion a Lie, and as generally Men judge of the Cauſe by the Proceedings, by a kind of precipitancy and haſte in Judgment; ſo thoſe truths had need be very bright, that can ſhine and command attention, under the vail and diſguiſe of Diſorder.

As for the form of Method in General, 'tis beſt to purſue the Order of Fact, and to connect all the parts of the Diſcourſe duly; thus to acquaint Men firſt with the Informing, or Explaining part, that they may know the better how, and to what to bind their Attention, and then to proceed to the ſeveral Parts of Diſcourſe, as they beſt agree together; and there to take care that nothing be either wanting or abound, but to make every part of the Diſcourſe agreeable and ſuitable to the Main End.

Of

Of Geneſis *and* Analyſis.

But that you may the better Skill how to form a Subject into exact method, I ſhall here preſent you with the Pattern of an exact *Geneſis* and *Analyſis*; in which caſe, the right forming of a Subject in Diſcourſe, is call'd, the *Geneſis*; and the Anatomy or Diſſolution of it to its prime Heads the *Analyſis*; the Head dividing we call the *Genus*; the Heads divided till they come to Particulars *Species*; but when Particulars, as *Peter, Paul, John*, &c. Individuals.

Notions


Notions.
Real.
Abstracted.
Ideas
Pure
Relative.
Words, Discourses.
Universals of
Particular
GOD,
Creature,
WORLD.
Body,
Spirit.
Substance,
Animate,
Inanimate, as Element.
Vegetative.
Sensitive,
Rational.
Peter,
Iames,
Iohn.
Exanguious.
Insects.
Sanguineous.
Brasil,
Bird,
Fish.
Imperfect,
as
Stone,
Mettal
Perfect.
Herb,
Shrub,
Tree.
Accident.
Quantity
Magnitude,
Space,
Measure.
Quality, and so either
Habit,
Manner,
Natural Power,
Sensible quality,
Sickness.
Action
Mixed,
Simple.
Corporeal,
Spiritual.
Relation,
Private, or Oeconomical in
Possession,
Provision.
Publick
Ecclesiastick,
civil
Judicial,
Military,
Naval.

As

As an Ingenious Author well obſerves, *Algebra* is the Pinacle of Argumentation, and *Analitica* is the Gage of Mens Parts; and, in which caſe, though ſeveral Diſcourſes may be equally adorn'd in being Florid; yet 'tis only by the *Analyſis*, or *Anatome*, that you are able to diſcern the Wiſdom, and the Solid Matter, and Compoſure of a Treatiſe.

Nota, If you would ſee the exact Diſtribution of ſuch an *Analyſis*, through all Subjects, you muſt peruſe Dr. *Wilkins's Univerſal Character*, and *Alſted's Encyclopaidion*, where you have an unſpeakable Variety in it.

Of *ANGER.*

THere is an Anger from Pride, and an Anger from Complexion more excuſable, but ſurely neither tolerable when raiſed to a Paſſion.

The Picture of a full Paſſion'd Anger is a *Tiger* bath'd in Blood, aſſailing, fierce, cruel and inexorable: And can any Provocation then juſtifie a Vice ſo inhumane, and barbarous?

As *Seneca* ſays, Anger appears like ruine, which breaks its ſelf upon all it falls. While the Man in Anger is out of poſſeſſion of his own Mind, he's like the vext Bee, that ſtings all, nay equally the next unconcerned Perſon, as his Enemy: *Animamque in vulnere ponit.*

But above all, Malice and a ſetled Hatred are moſt pernicious. If Anger is able to endanger our Quiet and Safety; What muſt Malice do? Surely a ſetled Anger, or Malice, muſt needs tear up the very Roots of Humane Society.

Beſides, Anger leaves neither room nor mercy for frailty or miſtake. Be there but a poſſibility that the Adverſary is in the right, yet is the Angry Man in a temper

per to consider and do him Justice.

The Scripture says, *Be Angry and sin not.* Learn to turn the course of your Anger therefore, and instead of shewing a bitterness, and an irrevocable resentment of Indignation, learn the Courage to change it to Pity.

Above all, beware of revealing Secret, and of Bitter Words, whether Rayling or Satyr in your Anger; For why should you be perfidious in the one case, and add needless fuel to an unreasonable fire in the other?

Alass! Man is such a touchy thing, and yet so unconstant, that almost all his Passions depend upon his opportunity and temper. To day he bears Abuse, without measure; and, to morrow, every circumstance of Contempt and Reputation whets the Edge of his Resentment.

Undoubtedly therefore, Anger is the Child of Weakness and Baseness. Is it agreeable to a well-ballanc'd temper and courage, and a due resolution, to make even desperate efforts of resentment for trifles?

Women, Children, Sick Men, and Old Folks, we may justly allow them to be Angry, as fit Subjects for the Weakness of Passion; but Men should be above it, and learn to make others tremble, while them-

themſelves ſtand unmov'd: The Superlative Courage anſwers to *Aquila non capit muſcas.*

To be ſhort; Are you provoked? therefore Repeat the *Alphabet*; nay, rather bite off your Tongue, then let him make it a *Billinſgate*-Scuffle for you; not only for the ungenerouſneſs of it, I mean; but when you begin with evil words, Do you know what actions they may lead you to?

Of *MURDER.*

HE that intends to avoid Murder, muſt ſhun violent Anger alſo, or elſe he may ſet his Guard too late. Can you reaſonably expect to ſtop the ſtream, that you are not able to keep within its banks?

The Scripture ſays, *He that hates his Brother is a Murderer.* And you ſee, not without a cauſe; if we once let Vice get the Reins in managing our Actions, Need we wonder that we are to Anſwer for all the Conſequences thereof?

The

The Laws of God and Man allow us even to kill another in our own defence; nay, whether Chaſtity, or a Limb be only threatned; yet even then we are excuſable: But ſhall I deſtroy my Brother for a Blow, or an Affront only?

What though mine Enemy is deſperate in his Malice, yet ſhall I meanly diſtruſt the Providence of God in my Protection, ſo as to kill him for it therefore?

But above all, the Self-murderer is the moſt ſtupidly preſumptuous. What, ſhall I fly in the Face of my Maker, becauſe of his Trials of Patience, and other Virtues, nay, and for which he has Promis'd to Reward me in another World?

What, now that I am as Gold in the Furnace to be tried, will I rather Rebel againſt his Will? nay, and if I do, What can I think my God to be, either Rational or Juſt, and not expect but that as he at firſt gave me a Talent of Life, ſo he will Reſuſcitate it again to an unhappy Immortality for my contempt of him?

The World, I know, has Sainted ſome Self-murderers, as for Chaſtity, and otherwiſe: But can the World excuſe ſuch ſhuffles to the Maſculine Trials of God's

God's Afflictions? Are we to live and die to God, or to Fantome Honour, and Humour?

To be ſhort; 'Tis eaſie and light to die: The Women in ſome Countries burn in Complement, with their Deceas'd Husbands; And what then, ſhall we be leſs grateful to the Lord of Life, who pretend to be of the Nobler Sex?

Of *REVENGE.*

REvenge is to be Rooted out as Wild Juſtice. A firſt wrong does but offend the Law, but Revenge puts the Law out of Office: Surely when Government is once eſtabliſhed, Revenge belongs to none but the Law and God.

And yet the Vice of Revenge ſhall not keep me from a lawful Reſentment; nay, I am as ſtrongly bound to Self-preſervation, as againſt Revenge; and even St. *Paul* would not refrain Appealing to *Cæſar* to Redreſs his Injuries.

So the ſame Chriſt that bid us turn the one Cheek when the other was ſmitten, yet could himſelf Whip out thoſe that defiled

defiled the Temple: And even ſo I, while I bear anothers Injuries, through miſtake or frailty, ſurely I may well chooſe to refuſe to let him ſlave me by it.

'Tis true, Providence can reign in even the furiouſeſt Tyrants, to Protect us, but ſhall that Enthuſiaſtically make me ſurrender my ſelf a Prey to corrupt Men?

But has my Brother, as I have ſaid, injur'd me through inadvertency, or repents? 'tis noble to forgive him; Revenge would equal us, but Pardon makes me Superior; and beſides, is it prudent to rub a Sore to keep it from healing?

So, Does your Enemy Vow to be reveng'd on you? Anſwer him, I Vow I will perſwade you to be better Minded if I can. Whatever others are, Can that excuſe you of your invincible Chriſtian Charity?

To conclude, I will dread Revenge where I have injur'd my Brother; but when I have offer'd him Reparation, I'll force my ſelf through a Chriſtian Magnanimity to Satisfaction and Content, and only be ſorry my Brother has ſo much Malice as to be my Enemy.

Of REFORMATION.

ART thou ſorry, my Friend, that Chriſtians have ſuch Variances and different Ideas? Thou art ſorry then becauſe they are not Angels: for, as we are Men, we cannot but Err; and if we Err, 'tis impoſſible but that we muſt differ. What remains then to Reconcile us, or preſerve Peace, but Charity? Divine Charity! let us follow that therefore, and not ſeem to quarrel with God, becauſe he has not made us otherwiſe. In truth, Were the Apoſtles themſelves ever free from little Animoſities, *Acts* 15. 38, 39.

Think of this therefore, my Friend, and pity Mankind in their Weakneſs; do not enter into Contention, but bear with a Mercy like God's; nor deſpair, but do all that thou canſt to Reform them; nor be angry if they are not exact, for 'tis more than Human to be ſo: Nay, if thy Deſigns miſcarry, be not diſcourag'd, for thou muſt do thy beſt always, and yet expect ſtill that God work his own way. Remember what *Luther* ſaid to *Melancton*, when he was too anxious about the ſucceſs of the late great Reformation, *Deſi-*

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nat Melancton *eſſe rector mundi:* Why ſhould *Melancton* take upon him the Cares proper to God? For though Man may Reaſon even Divinely, yet 'tis only God that can give Conviction, and diſſolve the ſtubborn Heart.

Beſides, as a Rational Man, I may modeſtly give my Advice to Reform the World, as 'tis every Man's Duty, where he lawfully may and can: But I am preſumptuous againſt all the Laws of Nature, if I ſeek to Impoſe it on others. Is the VVorld Corrupt? why, and even my very Knowledge of its Corruption is uncertain: And how dare I then preſume too freely to be its Reformer? I may do well to Pray to God to Inſpire apt Perſons in a lawful way therefore, or elſe I ſin; that with my known weak Performances I encreaſe the Confuſion.

You think what you would enforce thus, may be of uſe and benefit; and it may be ſo; But will you on the hazard of that preſume on all the Conſequences of your Proceedings, and how far you may ſtir up others to diſturb the Peace by it? Nay, ſpeak from your Conſcience, Do not you often vary even in your own thoughts, and with your ſelf? And can you expect then to ſet up a better Sect

than ſome already are? Or if you can, Can you aſſure your ſelf the benefit will exceed the Blood and Diviſions that may be occaſion'd by it?

Alaſs! our beſt and only method to reconcile theſe our Differences in Religion, is, by ſetting up, or impoſing nothing on no hand, but reaſſuming the Antient and Apoſtolick Liberty; more eſpecially a compliance is fairly and humbly to be deſired, where moſt likely, and where there is moſt Judgment; and therefore I may add, that if the Magiſtracy to whom we ought to addreſs in this caſe, and who ought to be the ſtrong Treſpaſs on their weaker Brethren, by impoſing on them, though never ſo innocently, the People will hardly ever be induc'd to a ſubmiſſion to it, though never ſo reaſonable, be it almoſt only for the very Impoſition ſake.

But for Private Reformers, and Quacks in Religion, Who ſhall ſet any bounds to their Giddy Methods? In truth, one may ſay of all ſuch Men, that they have rather Eſſay'd than proceeded in any thing like a Reformation, while the Imperfect Embrio has turn'd to a Monſter in the Womb: Alaſs! the beſt of them have not laid ſufficient Fundamental Precepts

cepts to ſupport or continue it by; and, in truth, when I conſider this, I wonder not that their *Flocks go aſtray*, when even as the *Poet* Sings, *Their Guides themſelves know not the Way.*

Beſides, I have a fair *Syſtem*, ſays one, and a ſecond ſets up another, and ſo infinitely, *&c.* And pray what muſt the State do in this Matter? She is in equal Peril if ſhe diſregard either, and all have an equal right to her Hearing: Nay, one tells her, ſhe is *Jure Divino*; a Second, That ſhe has the Spirit; A Third, The Dominion is founded in Grace; And a Fourth, tranſlates the Supremacy: In ſhort, all would fain make the State a Property, and Reſcue the Sword out of her Hand.

If She accept one, She's Damn'd by the reſt; and if She accepts none, like young Vipers, rather than fail of their Birth, they'll eat through their Mothers Womb: And what then, ought She not to cruſh ſuch Cockatrices Eggs in the Embrio, and confound their Sanctified Treaſons for God's ſake? And ſo, if She ſuffer them to Clamour each other, She's in danger even by that alſo. So that till you can convince us Mankind will never diſagree in Reaſoning theſe Methods and Principles of Reformation ſo apparently againſt the Peace of States;

muſt needs be Seditious and Unlawful, and after that I need not add Irreligious.

You ſay, alaſs! what you do or propoſe has none of theſe Evils in it; you do not think to give any General Diſturbance, or to offend the State: But why do you Write then what She will not bear, and Publiſh Doctrines without Her Licence? Either you Write to be regarded, or not; you are not ſo ridiculous I am perſwaded, as to ſay the latter; if not, can you aſſure your ſelf to Rule all your Followers, to ſay, thus far you ſhall go, and no further? or, if you are ſo ridiculous to think ſo, Is the State bound to believe you, and ſit ſtill while you Sowe your Seeds of Diſcord in her Bowels? No, from a ſmall Spark may riſe a mighty Flame: And they who will not deſtroy the Lions Whelp, may ſtrive in vain when the Lion's Grown.

Beſides, we forget our Saviour's Advice, *That we ought firſt to caſt ought the beam out of our own eye, before we can expect to ſee how to caſt out the mote out of our Brother's*: And hence, methinks, conſidering the Corruption of the World, 'twere hard to expect a Reformation Perfect, *ſemel & ſimul*, eſpecially without the Immediate Power

Power of God; and yet, methinks, we might all have had the Wit in Common, not to be offended at Trifles, and to have Joyn'd againſt the *Roman Wolf*: But alaſs! our New Reformers are Reform'd into as great Errors of their own, and our Corruptions will not let us Unite.

But you will Object then, What, is it never lawful to Reform Publickly, but when the State will give you leave? No, ſurely: And, in truth, Can you juſtly deſire it? Can you value your little private Opinions before the Publick Good? you ſee plainly, that if this Liberty of Zeal be allow'd, it muſt Deſtroy the State: The caſe then is, Which muſt ſtand, Religion or Government? I mean your little Model of Religion, or the State? Surely, as Populous as the World now is, we had better have none of your Religion, than no Government: And therefore if we conſult the Good of God's Creation, we ought rather to omit our little Speculations, than Diſturb the State with them.

Beſides, if every Prejudic'd Reaſoner were allow'd of himſelf to Diſturb the State, and to ſet up a New Religion, Would it not rather Diſtract than Help

the VVorld? But, no, you ſay, you are ſure you are in the Right: No, you are Proud: VVhat! Did you never err? and if you did, VVhat Aſſurance have you that you do not now? Nay more; were you ſure you had even the Standard of Truth; yet ought you not to take this Liberty? Not, I mean, that any Man can reach that Perfection; but to Anticipate all Proud Thoughts, I ſay, we ought to forbear ſuch a Liberty: For what, Might not many Men think they might juſtly leave your Standard Truth, and yet follow your Preſumption.

Nay, and if I undertake to reform Men, and know I can do it but Imperfectly, What do I do by it, but give Offence? *Chriſt* refrain'd Doctrines, becauſe Men could not bear them, though he knew how to Inſtruct them: And what ſhall we Eſſay then to Teach, what not only Men cannot bear, but what we know not how to Inſtruct? I would Reform the World therefore, but I would not put it into a greater Confuſion: I would put my Neighbours Houſe in Order; but, I would not Fire it about his Ears. And what do I do otherwiſe, if I ſo much as Countenance every little Reaſoning to be able Saucily to Diſturb the State? Farewell

well Government! farewell every thing! If this may be allow'd, who ſhall ſtint how high ſuch Liberty may ariſe, and what Effects it may produce? Nay, may be at laſt, even to reſiſt the Government its ſelf, on pretence of unlawful proceſs againſt ſuch Reaſoning, and conſequently to Anarchy?

Nor is it enough in ſuch caſe to ſay, that the State is bound to ſee, that they prohibit nothing but what is unlawful; for as Good and Evil in this caſe is doubtful, ſo the State ought therein to have an entire Power or Liberty given them, or elſe you had as good take all Power from them whatever; when alaſs! in truth, as I have ſaid, 'twere better there were no Printing than no Government; and no humane Teaching, or religious Inſtruction, than no Laws.

Government is the great and only humane Foundation of Religion: To deſtroy Government therefore, or to diſturb it, without a particular Revelation to advance Religion, What is it but to tear up the Foundation for Materials to raiſe the Building? nor is it enough in ſuch caſe, to ſay, that you have a Charity for mens Souls, and that ſuch Opinions are damnable. For pray, how come you to judge ſo

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of Opinions? or what, have you got a particular Warrant to ſhew us, That God has flung all the Care of the World on your Shoulders?

If Chriſt's, or any others Revelation, have threatned the wilfully ignorant or perverſe, yet where is your Warrant either to limit exactly their Damnatory Sentences, or to raiſe new ones of your own? If you modeſtly and peaceably offer your ſenſe in ſuch caſe, you oblige Mankind in reforming them, and they are engag'd to you for your Charity. But if you endeavour either by Might or Calumny to force them, may they not moſt juſtly ask? And why have we not the ſame Right of force on you alſo?

But you ſay, your Zeal to God moves you; Does it ſo? And how are you ſure that it does not move others as well as you? Beſides, that's ſtrange too; Can the God of the World be better pleas'd that you deſtroy his Creation, than that you omit every little Speculation that you think will tend to his Honour? And what do you do otherwiſe, when that you but endeavour ſo dangerous a Work, as thus violently to innovate either in State or Religion, againſt the leave of the Government?

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You ſay, God has wrought Deliverances by ſuch Reformers; ſometimes 'tis true, and ſo he has by Tyrants and Uſurpers alſo: But muſt that juſtify their Methods? or what think you, that God cannot ſtir up Reformers where he ſees good, without our preſumption?

Men ſhould therefore think it enough, that they are ſo happy as to have freedom in themſelves, and thank God that they have the Truth; and if they have a Charity for the World, they ſhould ſhew it regularly, and in Prayers, that God might ſend us lawful & real Reformers; and not thus pragmatically confound us by ſuch unaccountable Preſumptions of their own.

And beſides, ſcarce one in the hundred of ſuch Reformers, but what have miſcarried; and if ever any have got Succeſs in remedying Evils, they have too often promoted new ones, and as bad of their own, if not degenerated again to the firſt State; ſo that at beſt, generally they have done more hurt than the good propos'd. And, thus we ſee how many have reform'd of their own heads, and we ſee the effects of ſuch Reformations, inſtead of reducing the Church to a Primitive Purity; by them they have but rent her into uncharitable

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and ſenſeleſs Diviſions, worſe I may almoſt add, than even Popery her ſelf.

In ſhort, Can I expect to prevent all Corruptions in my ſelf? or if I am ſo proud as to think, I can, am I able to do it in my Followers? if I cannot, therefore before I hazard the miſchief of a Change, let me conſider to what degree of good I can expect to Reform? nay more, may not God be willing, that this Generation ſhould have juſt ſuch a Diſpenſation of Knowledge? and what, ſhall I croſs Providence then, or deſtroy my ſelf to reform Mankind, whether they will or no?

God allows you to reprove perſonal Vices where ever you ſee them provided, but conſiſtent with your ſafety; and ſo national ones alſo, where you are not in danger. But when a Man or Nation becomes ſo unhappy as to turn again, and rent you for your kindneſs, methinks you might rejoyce that you are quit of your Office, in leaving them to reform themſelves. And thus alſo, there is a lawful Liberty for Writers, and there is an abuſe of it; and there is a convenient Liberty of ſuppreſſing Books by a State, and a pernicious one: And thus it is either the misfortune or the wickedneſs of a State to ſuppreſs thoſe Books that might give them good Advice. But if it

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is either, who ſhall call the State to account for what it does?

But to turn the method of mine Argument a little: Am I not preſumptuous to go before God ſends me? And who has requir'd theſe things at mine hand? And indeed, were God reſolv'd to have ſuch a Reformation, might not I as rationally expect he would impower ſome perſon orderly in his Providence towards it, as he has done before, through *Moſes* and *Chriſt*, without my preſumptuouſly going of my own head?

And indeed, were not this God's inſtituted method, Why ſhould God complain, that men came that were not ſent, and threaten them for it, as he does by his Prophets, if it were no Offence? and the common miſſion of the Law of Nature were ſufficient, in truth a warrant that needs no more to confute it, than to conſider: Should every man take the full liberty of it, what a World it would make?

Not that I would mean from hence, Neither that the Law of Nature is not ſufficient to direct every man privately in his Duty: I am not ſo much a Pyroniſt as that comes to neither. Nay, I think, that by the light of Nature, and the common Aſſiſtance of God's Spirit in our Conſciences, we may very

very juſtly take the liberty to adviſe and reprove one another; yea, and more that publickly too, when the Law prohibits not. But as I have ſaid, Shall this general Commiſſion only Authoriſe us to be idle to other things, to teach others, or endanger the Publick Quiet or Peace by it? Surely we need a Warrant from God, like Chriſt and his Apoſtles, as well as a bare Conviction of Conſciences, to proceed thus far?

But you will ſay, this is cowardly, and not to the bravery of a Martyrdom. I ſay, it is: For tho' every man is bound to ſtand to the truth, and confeſs it, even to death; yet no man is bound to preach it, or ſpread it to this degree, till he has a Call to it; nor is it enough to ſay in this caſe, That becauſe Chriſt would not let him be ſilenc'd, that preach'd in his Name, that therefore we may follow him without ſome order; for if God will not deſtroy our Trials, ſo as forcibly to obſtruct us in our Ignorances, yet he does not therefore require us to continue in them.

Thus even Chriſt, did not go about purpoſely to preach publickly, till he had the Warrant and Protection of a Miſſion; nor did *Moſes* or *Elijah* hazard themſelves till God commanded them: And what, would

I ſeem braver than they? Would God have choſen *Moſes*, if his flight for being a Deliverer, had been Cowardize and not Duty? Surely not; and that becauſe the Apoſtles lived and continued in this hazard, was withall, becauſe they were ſent.

In ſhort then, ſhould I not be a Self-murderer to run my ſelf into the fire? and ſhould I not forfeit God's Protection from *Enthuſiaſm*, to arrogate Spiritual Power, and to pretend to be a Guide where I am not? What, can God order me to live by Miracle without expreſs notice? nay, and am not I an *Enthuſiaſt*, to run my ſelf even into the very jaws and pit of Deſtruction, in hopes of his Help, and that even in inevitable Dangers?

And indeed, what has made God let ſo many well deſigning Men be ſacrificed in this caſe, but Preſumption? And if I attempt any ſuch thing therefore of my ſelf, can I expect either to fare better, or have other ſucceſs? In truth, if I do, thus I go of my own Errand, and I muſt not expect the protection of God to bear me out; nor will it be enough for me to ſuggeſt in ſuch caſe, that ſuch an Error is conſiderable, or not; for if we admit that, we admit all; for all Immoralities are equally pernicious, and the leaſt were no more to be born with than the greateſt. Nor

Nor indeed is the Vice of ſuch a ſeditious Practice worſe than the Vanity of it: Am not I an unſtable doubting thing my ſelf? and how can I expect then that I, as the Blind, ſhould be able to lead the Blind? When *I* am commiſſion'd from God indeed, *I* may juſtly preſume on his Warrant, or elſe my Fallibility will make me a Deceiver, tho never ſo ſincere.

It is the real Duty of every man therefore to ſay, *I* will not move an inch beyond private Advice, till God ſhall give me Authority; nay more, no faint Dream or Viſion ſhall impower me, and all the preſumptions of this nature, that *I* have been guilty of before, ſhall remain as Monuments in my Memory, to keep me from the like for the future.

Indeed, may *I* ſay, is it not a ridiculous thing, to ſee a little petty Reformer fond of his trifling imaginations, and really ignorant of the true ſtate and nature of Religion; neither knowing of what nature *Catholick Communion* is, nor what is the guilt either of Hereſy or Schiſm, blindly to run himſelf and others into amaze, that he no more knows how to get out of again, than how firſt he got into it: Alaſs! what a miſerable Spectacle may *I* add it is, when ſuch men take fire into their Zeal, and

and lay a neceſſity, either that they deſtroy the State, or the State them.

But this ESSAY *being on a Subject ſomewhat ſingular, I have thought fit to add a Paſſage of the Incomparable Arch-Biſhop of* Canterbury's, *much to the ſame effect; to confirm it, ſee* Tillotſon's *Sermons, Vol. the 3d. p.* 372.

AND to ſpeak freely in this matter, I cannot think (till I be better inform'd, which I am always ready to be) that any pretence of Conſcience warrants any Man that is not extraordinarily commiſſion'd, as the Apoſtles, and firſt Publiſhers of the Goſpel were; and cannot juſtify that Commiſſion by Miracles, as they did, to affront the Eſtabliſh'd Religion of a Nation, tho it be falſe; and openly to draw men off from the Profeſſion of it, in contempt to the Magiſtrate and the Law. All that perſons of a different Religion can in ſuch a caſe reaſonably pretend to, is to enjoy the private Liberty and Exerciſe of their own Conſcience and Religion; for which they ought to be very thankful, and to forbear the open making of Proſelytes to their

own Religion (tho they be never ſo ſure that they are in the right) till they have either an extraordinary Commiſſion from GOD to that purpoſe, or the Providence of GOD make way for it, by the permiſſion or connivance of the Magiſtrate; not but that every man hath a right to publiſh and propagate the true Religion, and to declare it againſt a falſe one: But there is no obligation upon any man to attempt this to no purpoſe; and when without a Miracle, it can have no other effect, but the loſs of his own life, unleſs he have an immediate Command and Commiſſion from God to this purpoſe, and be endued with a Power of Miracles, as a publick Seal and Teſtimony of that Commiſſion which was the caſe of the Apoſtles, who after they had receiv'd an immediate Commiſſion, were not to enter upon the Execution of it, but to ſtay at Jeruſalem *till they were endued with Power from on high. In this caſe a man is to abide all hazards, and may reaſonably expect both extraordinary Aſſiſtances and Succeſs, as the Apoſtles had, and even a miraculous Protection till his work be done; and after that, if he be call'd to ſuffer Martyrdom, a ſupernatural Support under thoſe Sufferings.*

And that they are guilty however of groſs Hypocriſy, who pretend a further Obligation of Conſcience in this matter: I ſhall give this plain

plain demonſtration, which relys upon Conceſſions, generally made on all Hands, and by all Parties; No Proteſtant, that I know of, holds himſelf obliged to go and preach up his Religion, and make Converts in Spain *or* Italy; *nor do either the Proteſtant Miniſters, or Popiſh Prieſts think themſelves bound in conſcience to preach the Goſpel in* Turky, *and to confute the* Alchoran *to convert the* Mahometans; *and what is the reaſon? becauſe of the ſeverity of the Inquiſition in Popiſh Countreys, and of the Laws in* Turky; *but doth the danger then alter the obligation of Conſcience? no certainly; but it makes men throw of the falſe pretence and diſguiſe of it: but where there is a real obligation of Conſcience, danger ſhould not divert men from their Duty, as it did not the Apoſtles; which ſhews their caſe to be different from ours, and that probably this Matter was ſtated right at firſt; ſo that whatever is pretended, this is certain, That the Prieſts and Jeſuits of the Church of* Rome, *have in truth, no more obligation of Conſcience to make Converts here in* England, *than in* Sueden *or* Turky, *where it ſeems, the evident Danger of the Attempt hath for theſe many years given them a perfect Diſcharge from the Duty in this particular.*

Of WIT.

THE common abuſive Wit, what is it but the crude Digeſtion and Excrement of Reaſoning? What can I call a Talking Thing, when the truth and ſincerity of it's Judgment is gone, but a Parrot at beſt?

To Ridicule, to Droll, to Banter, *&c.* what, are all ſuch Contentious Railleries, either to be commended or us'd for? is the beſt of them agreeable either to Senſe, Juſtice, or good Manners?

In ſhort, Raillery is a falſe Theatre Jewel; and whereas true Wit ſtirr'd up, does Wonders, and becomes as a Cordial to alleviate the Cares of humane Life. Raillery confounds and embitters all.

Beſides, ſuch little pedling Satyriſts can't ſhew themſelves without the company of Blockheads, and yet not but that they will rather ſometimes be ſpeaking evil, even of themſelves, and their beſt of Friends, than not talking.

But are not all ſuch Scoffers then taken deſervedly as common Enemies? nay, and are any more ridiculous than ſuch, to men of ſenſe, eſpecially when they are unmasked,

masked, or as the Player, e're he is in his Diſguiſe?

But as for real Wit, there are undoubtedly many pretty things, which the mind ſearches not, and yet finds in its ſelf; it ſeems they are hidden there, as Gold and Diamonds in the Bowels of the Earth, and which when produc'd, even dazle and enamour all Mankind with their luſtre.

And yet, there is a general Revolution of Wit, that changes its Fashions, as well as the Fortunes of the World; and whilſt all her little Idolaters to magnify themſelves, ſupport her in them, they too often ſacrifice their very judgment in complement to her.

Politeneſs of Wit in general, is a frame of Mind, as always preſents us with things genteel and delicate; and gallantry of Wit, what is it but an eaſy way to pleaſe, whilſt as for its deceits, they are as many and various?

Thus, 'tis not fruitfulneſs of Wit, which makes us find out many Expedients in one Affair; but 'tis rather a darkneſs in the Underſtanding, which makes us lay hold on all that Imagination preſents, and hinders us from ſeeing preſently what is proper for us.

To be ſhort, 'tis the Character of a great Wit, to make a great many things be underſtood in a few words; and in recompence of it, I may ſay, the little Wits have a Talent of talking much, and ſaying nothing.

To conclude, the general Excellency of Wit is in diverſion, and on a ready turn, while its miſchiefs are, that its Delicacy is too often apt to deſtroy the laborioufneſs of Conſideration, and its lightneſs to offend in Serioufneſs and Buſineſs.

Of

Of REWARDS.

GOD has put it in the power of Princes to encourage us by Rewards: Puniſhment and Revenge whets but on one ſide of the Edge of Vertue, unleſs Rewards be added to ſharpen the other.

Nor is it leſs the duty than intereſt of great Men, in ſuch caſe, to beſtow ſuch Rewards duly. Surely, neither an *Æſop* nor *Socrates* ſhould be neglected, if we would encourage Goodneſs and Vertue truly.

You give yourPimp his hire,& he in gratitude, like *Timon*'s Friends, ſeeks thy ruine to be rid of the Obligation; had he any real worth, he would rather ſtarve than pimp for thee: Can he be faithful to his King, that is not ſo to the King of Kings?

So ſurely, to give for a Jeſt or a Trifle alſo, is to be prodigal, and not reward; but alaſs! how often are true Abilities and Merits ſuppreſt, leſt their Luſtre ſhould eclipſe the falſe Lights and Deceits of the World?

Of PEDANTRY.

THere is a common and lazy *Aſilum* in *Learning*, *Ars longa vita brevis*; Mens Judgments are ſo dazled with the Curioſity, the Fine Dreſſes and Excurſions of *Authors*, that they think Learning as bad as infinite; and lazily and ſluggiſhly reſt in a confus'd view, in deſpair of all Perfection. But why? becauſe they know not how to ſeparate the Gold from the Droſs, and to encumber themſelves only with what is really material.

I muſt confeſs my Genius is too hardy to approve of Trifles; and as I hate all Superfluities, ſo ſuch little Formalities have been of no annoyance to me: I have flung aſide all ſuch Embroidery of Science as Nonſence; I cannot bear what cannot be digeſted to uſe; my Reader therefore muſt excuſe my freedom, if I have laid aſide all ſuch looſer Thoughts, as Deluding Chicanery and Speciouſneſs, and preſented him only with the main and ſolid Subſtance. But to proceed:

Among the reſt therefore, 'tis the particular work of this preſent *Eſſay*, to ſhew wherein

wherein ſuch trifling *Pedantry* conſiſts, and that is it I am now to Write of.

Now, Firſt, As the Chief among theſe Diſguiſes may be reckon'd our Terms of Art, the Cant of Learning, that makes Trifles Myſteries, and obſcures even common Sence, the riſe whereof, one may juſtly ſay, is all Hypocriſy; we would magnifie our Reaſoning, and we would rather, like Gipſeys, be ſhrew'd for our Gibberiſh, than nothing.

So for our Diſtinctions alſo; how prepoſterous it is to ſet up Terms of Art paramount to Sence; Terms to Sence ought to ſit like Cloaths to the Body, Uſefully and Ornamentally; but never ſo as to cramp its motion; So, What a Senceleſs thing 'tis to Explicate by Diſtinction that, that is obvious to every Reaſon? An admirable way to reduce Learning to Studied Ignorance and Trifling; but the only courſe to divert the real growth of Wiſdom.

For my part, Words are my Counters, and I make my own Criticiſms on them; ſurely if a Notion make me wreſt a word a little, Terms may well bear a compliance to Arts: If beſides the weight of Sence, you bind an *Author* to the nice and endleſs Criticiſms of Words, you are unreaſonable

ſonable; if my Meaning be good therefore, ſurely you may well enquire a little into my peculiar Sence of Words, and then you leave me a freer liberty for Invention, and to digeſt my Matter.

Nor were even the Teaching of Arts and Sciences in this matter difficult neither, were they but reduc'd from *Pedantry*, a little time would ſuffice; while 'tis the Weight and Formality of our Rules, that not only ruines the Perfection of our Ideas, but obſtructs their Communication alſo. Thus, what but this has made *Cornelius Agrippa* and many others rayl at their vanity in General; not that I think them in the Right neither; for ſurely, that *Abuſus tollit uſum* is a moſt Barbarous Maxime, and we ſhould rather Reform Wiſdom, than fling her quite aſide for it.

So amongſt the reſt, one of the greateſt Blemiſhes of Learning is, that Men have made her ſtoop to Triſles; ſo that when a Man comes and expects to find ſomething, as it were Divine, inſtead of *Philoſophy*, he is entertain'd with their Picking of Straws, Notions ſo idle, and yet ſo particular and ſuperfinely nice, that they ſeem rather deſign'd for petty Jugling-Tricks, to puzzle idle Wits withal, than to be of any real uſe or benefit.

And

And from whence but hence comes that common, but too true Reflection, that the moſt exquiſite Folly is made of Wiſdom ſpun too fine; and we are never made ſo ridiculous by the Qualities we have, as by thoſe we affect to have; and indeed one may juſtly add, that *Pedantry* is the very Plague and Contagion of Learning, that diverts and mortifies all good Parts, with the pretence of aſſiſting them.

'Twere an Heroick Act therefore, would ſome Prince diſſolve theſe Cobwebs in our Voluminous Rubbiſh Libraries; and by a ſelect Committee, collect, perfect, gell'd, and reduce them into a manageable and uſefull form: I ſhould rejoice, could this my little *Rationale* be ſubſervient to ſo excellent a purpoſe: But, alaſs! I am afraid this is a matter we muſt rather range under the *deſideranda ſtudii*, than really expect.

And, in truth, the Fault is rather in the Will than the Underſtanding; alaſs! Men will not reduce their Sciences to Purity, and to Sincerity and Truth, their Prejudices will not let them; they *are afraid of the Light, becauſe their Deeds are Evil.* Our Sciences indeed ought to repair the pure Image of God that we have loſt, and they would too, did we purſue them right; but we

we make uſe of them only to lead our ſelves into greater Darkneſs.

You ſee therefore I have the Fire of the greateſt Charity to ſpur me on herein; nor is there any difficulty to demonſtrate the uſefulneſs of my Deſign: How many ingenious Men would not only have been good Schollars, but exceeding ſerviceable to their Country alſo, were but Learning to be atchiev'd with a due eaſe; whereas, as it is now, in a deſpair, they leave it to a pack of Perverſe and Wrangling Sophiſters to make their ends of it, while Mankind ſuffers equally by their Villany and Ignorance?

Like a good *Phyſician*; An honeſt Man cannot pretend to that Knowledge he has not; while the *Quack*, that knows little or nothing, will Swear you, he is infallible: the one, if you converſe him, ſhall acquaint you, Learning is at her Perfection; whilſt the other modeſtly ſhall let you know, that his induſtrious Labours have found it imperfect; nay, ſo far, that he queſtions almoſt in Conſcience, whether he may uſe the little Skill of his Profeſſion.

So if you examin Men of integrity, the common *Idea* of the *Arts* and *Sciences*, as they now ſtand, is a Sea of Learning, and hardly

hardly ever to be Fathom'd; they'll tell you, Our Books run in Formal Tracks in Queſt of them, but never take care of their full and true Reaſoning; that's a Gulph that few or none have been ſo hardy as to dive after.

And yet even this has not diſcouraged me; *I* have reſolved to hint at leaſt, at the Leading Subſtance of all *Arts* and *Sciences*, not only towards the better compleating a Body of Wiſdom, but that *I* may be the better able to Cenſure what is impertinent in all. *I* hope my *Reader* will excuſe me therefore, if when *I* ſee a Science drawn even Cobweb-fine, *I* enquire her Merits, as what portion of our Memory, or Judgment ſhe really deſerves; and that we may no longer imprudently ſquander away our pains in dividing Fractions, and Atomes to Infinity.

Nor need a Man be accus'd of Satyr, to ſay, almoſt all our *Sciences* are *Pedantry*; indeed *Science* and *Wiſdom* ought to be really one; but as Learning is now degenerated, 'tis as unnatural as uneaſie; and he that will reduce it to its full power and ſubſtance, muſt envigorate it with brevity, and by docking it from its ſuperfluous *Pedantry*.

In

In truth, 'tis the Sphere of Wiſdom only to give a general and clear *Idea*, and a Univerſal Proſpect of the *Sciences*; fully to trace their nice particulars, were not only to be tedious and volumnious, but to cloud your clear and brighter leading Truth; whereas the general and leading *Ideas*, well fix'd, will lead, of courſe, the leſſer Corollaries. When a Prince gives an Ambaſſadour *Inſtructions*, he only gives him General Orders; and even ſo Wiſdom, whom ſhe enlightens, ſhe Teaches General Precepts; and Accidents, as too many for *Inſtruction*, for fear of a greater Confuſion ſhe leaves to Diſcretion.

To be ſhort; Both *Arts* and *Sciences* are then only good, when they are uſeful; when they Anſwer to our Service, and the Circle of Creatures about us; and even as a Watch, though it have Wheels, yet if the Teeth are not fit, and plac'd apt for Motion, is good for nothing: So *Arts* and *Sciences* not diſpos'd for Practice, become, not only a Burthen, but an idle Evil; nay, and indeed, as Piety is the only Rule for *Arts*, ſo, whatever is purely curious, is evil alſo: And what ſhall we ſay then to thoſe, who Write Volumes about Genealogies, and whole Libraries of Notions purely Speculative? Do they not rather deſerve

an

an Houſe of Correction, than a Reward for their Encouragement?

As *Hobbs* well Notes, we have now but one true and real *Science*, to wit, the *Mathematicks*, that begins well, lays down Principles ſure, and proves its ſelf, as it proceeds; and yet not, but that were other *Arts* and *Sciences* manag'd, as they ſhould be, we ſhould not let their Principles neither be ſo precarious as they are; but, founding them on Undoubted Truths, give them a certainty, at leaſt, near equal to Demonſtration.

Nor is this little Cant leſs pernicious in our Languages and Schools, than our *Sciences*; *I* may add almoſt to turn our Reaſon to Madneſs. If *Ovid* does but cry, *Omnia vincit amor*, though the Sence and Words were but worthy of a School-boy; yet ſtreight, by Pedant Spectacles, we are Raviſh'd by an Elaborate and delicate Adage, with a lofty and incomparable ſtile, and purity of Language; nay, and a Myſtery ſhall ſupply the Sence, rather than fail; and, as if the Sentence were deliver'd Perſonally by ſome God, and Mortals durſt do no other than commend it.

And thus alſo, Who can Write a *Poem*, but he muſt ſtreight invoke the mighty Nine

Nine, the Muſes, and by and by, we muſt have ſome Heathen Gods, *Bacchus*, *Mars*, *Vulcan*, or ſome one or other to Agrandize our Stile, when, in truth, the ſurer Reaſon why they are brought in, is not ſo much in Conceit of the Elegancy, but that they are as lazy Topicks to ſupply the imperfection of our *Invention*.

But in Reality, What is it but to drive away Richer Notions from our Heads, to fill up our Diſcourſes with ſuch Formalities of the Furies, as Fatal Sifters, and the Graces, *&c.* we were pardonable, did we do like Hackney-letter Scriveners, who Write all *Epiſtles* in one Form, for that were to confeſs a Downright honeſt plain Sence: but we forſooth would ſtrive to be Elegant, and to Charm the World by our Wits, when, at the ſame time, we ride none but the Hackny-fancies of Thouſands of years ſtanding.

So, our *Gods*, *Victory*, *Muſick*, and ſuch Hieroglyphical Statues and Emblems, are fit enough to ſet out the Great Mock-Prince at *Verſailes*; but to imagine them Learning, or to think to get much out of their Story or Moral, ſurely is an impertinency too great for a *Philoſopher*; or, at beſt, if we muſt value this petty *Sapientia veterum*; Can't we take the Subſtance of the

the Advice, and ſpurn away the little fairy Stories of their Gods.

Nor do I think it a leſs Vanity, though more common, that Men, at every turn, muſt confirm what they ſay, with Stanza's from *Virgil*, &c. to make Men think they are skill'd in the *Poets*; Alaſs! What is my Opinion the better for bringing ſententioully every Man's Fancies to ſupport what I Write? I ſay, let every Man's Work ſtand and fall by Reaſon, and by the meer dint and force of Juſtice, Sincerity, and Truth.

So in *Sciences* alſo; What are your common little formal *Analyſſes*, wherewith they are Patch'd up, but *Pedantry*? And what your little ſet, and cramp Forms in them, but ſo many Myſteries and Blinds, to keep the Underſtanding from Truth? 'tis true indeed, ſuch trifles hardly deſerve to be taken notice of; and yet even trifling, when it appears in Formality and Method, deſerves a Cenſure, nay, and that even to a Ridicule, leſt at Weak times they prevail upon us, and by their meer Speciouſneſs byaſs our Judgments; and yet not that they deſerve to be Carp'd at, or Anſwer'd, ſo much as Laugh'd at.

I have perus'd *Alſted's* long *Enciclopaidion*, ſincere 'tis true, but beſotted to all

the little forms of *Pedantry*: there you have even all Mechaniſm reduc'd to *Sciences*; indeed Arts infinite, and Definitions and Niceties without end: in his Method ſeemingly ſhort, yet too full for a ready recourſe; nay, ſo Voluminous with Diſtinctions, Gloſſes, Philoſophick Notes and Quotations, that to peruſe him orderly, would, at leaſt, require two years Work: And, is this, think you, a fit Body of Wiſdom for uſe?

Nay, I will ſay more for *Alſted*, though he handles all Subjects in General, yet in moſt particulars he is ſo excellent, that I know few ſingle Treatiſes that exceed him, even at their own Mark; but eſpecially in his Rhetorick; and yet for all that, they that can bear *Pedantry* in Piece-meal, will be even ſick when they peruſe his Maſſe of it, though never ſo Correct.

To be ſhort; his heaps of *Analyſſes's*, and his incoherent Florilegiums, would even Diſtract a Man to Comprehend, or reduce them to uſe: I would as ſoon think to reduce the Ocean, as to bring in Order every one of his little Notions: Indeed, a Wiſdom ſo nicely purſu'd in an Angel were ſomewhat, but in a Man, 'tis as if we would try to carry a Mountain on

on our backs, beſides the Impertinency of it in a great many Parts: What, if a Melancholy Genius, Hag-ridden by an Art or Science, dwells, and raiſes Caſtles in the Air on it, Muſt I be bound to follow the Dance of his Frenzy?

Nor would I be thus Uncharitable to quarrel at the Body of Learning, had I not, at the ſame time, eſſay'd to make it more perfect; but now I hope I may be excus'd, that I endeavour to diſplay its giddy confuſion: Alaſs! What a Scene 'tis to ſee? here lies one Man confounded and ſinking into Sceptiſm; another ſatiated like *Cornelius Agrippa*; ſits down and ſpews up all that he has Read again, becauſe he cannot digeſt it: Another Rails at, and Undervalues all, becauſe 'tis ſo Intricate he cannot reach it.

Hence nothing in the World confounds Wiſdom like *Pedantry*; nay, and when Men are once ſeaſon'd with it, 'tis as hard for them to unlearn it, as it is to learn what is Real Knowledge; nay, to root out a rotten Leven of Principles, and to rectifie formal Errors, is more difficult than to dive into Simple Knowledge; Natural Folly is bad enough in Man, but when he has got Letters and Sciences to maintain his Madneſs, his Frenzy is intollerable.

But, alaſs! I am afraid, after all, I Write in vain; Men are ſo bewitch'd to the borrow'd Counterfeit Ornaments of Learning, that when the Devil *Pedantry* is caſt forth, they will be even offended at the Innocent Simplicity of Wiſdom, and ſlav'd to their old Pageantry, they'll not be able to reliſh, even Subſtance, without their old Forms.

Men delight to continue in the Maze they are Educated in, they hate to come to the Light of Truth; So that I may juſtly ſay, this One Accurſed Knot of *Pedantry* has baulked all the Improvements and Amendments of Learning: So that when Men have once laid this rotten Foundation, becauſe they are unwilling to beſtow the pains to New-lay it, as Wiſdom and Folly can never Piece together, ſo they run, like Sheep in a Flock. I have known Men following Meditation, hit of Truth exactly; but Pedants, like Wild-geeſe, follow one another in Trains, for fear of loſing themſelves; the Reaſon is, they have not Truth, nor any other Method to keep themſelves in a Body, but to tread in one anothers ſteps only.

And hence all thoſe that have purſued the Natural Powers of Reaſoning ſincerely, have even done Wonders; whilſt Pedants,

dants, ſneaking Pedants, whatever blind Path the firſt happens to enter, you ſhall ſee Ingenious Men, and even Men of Parts, afterwards make up the Specious Train of Fools.

Nay, and I do not know whether I may not juſtly add, that as ſuch Blunderers wander on, our Learning as we generally have it now, rather corrupts and diſables, than helps or aſſiſts a Wiſe and Active Life of Imployment: and I think, the *Turks* are the only Wiſe Men in this, in rejecting all our petty Sciences, ſince they are clog'd ſo far with Artful Vice.

And, to ſhut up all; Whence but from hence is it, that one cries Learning is infinite, and will trouble himſelf to know nothing: A Canter comes, and will only know *Chriſt*; he Rails at *Archimedes* for Dying in a Study; as if Man were not made to be Charitable and Serviceable to his Country, as well as to Worſhip God; and ſo all have Racked againſt one Rock or other, and not one in a Million has had the Courage to reach after the Haven of a True Humane Competency, or Perfection of Knowledge.

Of PITY.

WHat is Pity, but the ſenſe of our own Miſeries in another Subject; while we lament others, only to engage them to ſuccour us on the like Occaſion: Surely Pity therefore, for the moſt part, is but as a good turn done before-hand to our ſelves.

And thus, alaſs! an Hypocriſy is in all our Afflictions; we lament our dead Friend, But why? we weep for our ſelves; we bewayl the loſs of our Pleaſure, and Eſteem, in the Perſon Deceas'd; So that I may truly ſay of moſt of our Tears, that they fall for them that ſhed them.

At beſt, we are apt to reſpect the Misfortune more than the Cauſe or Perſon; the ſad Spectacle prevails on us, and we Weep as Men Laugh, or Yawn for Company: But, deſerves ſuch a Pity as this then to be call'd a Virtue?

So, ſome Weep to get the Reputation of a Tender Heart, others to avoid the Shame of not Weeping, or to be Weep'd for again, while others aſpire at Glory, through an

an Eminent and Immortal Grief; away with all theſe Deceits.

Give me the Friendſhip that is not ſo weak as to be Soft-hearted, that has a tenderneſs as Laſting as Moderate for me: if *I* Dye, yet let my Friend be happy; Can his Anxiety bring me back from the Grave again?

We can eaſily hear of others misfortunes, when at a diſtance from us; nay, and time abates the greateſt of our proper Griefs; And why ſhould we then, either through VVeakneſs, or Hypocriſy, ſupport that Concern and Paſſion that is manifeſtly ſo unaccountable and unreaſonable?

Of PARDON.

HAs my Brother offended me? 'twas one he took for me; he's misinform'd of me; And, What shall I leave no room for his Misunderstanding? No surely, I will have Mercy to the last: what shall I Condemn, where I am not sure that God does?

Nay, nor is it less Christianly and Generous, than Prudent, to Pardon our Enemy: *Christ* could say, even on the Cross, *Father forgive them, they know not what they do.* And it makes Men Desperate, while we leave them no hopes of Forgiveness.

Besides, Is it not Cowardize, either to have Malice, or seek for Security through Vicious Means? Have I Rivals? I have Society then worthy of my self. Have I Enemies? let my very good Behaviour reduce them to an esteem of me.

But shall we forgive no body that offends us, either through surprize or mistake? Surely, then we shall no sooner forgive our selves than others. St. *Peter* denied his Master, and St. *Paul* was a great Persecutor, and yet both the greatest Apostles.

Cer-

Certainly, God the Prototype may be our beſt of Examples in this. I will have mercy therefore to the laſt, but I will not deſtroy my Juſtice by paſſing by the Injuries I have receiv'd without Repentance; but who ſhall charge his Brother on miſtakes?

To forgive before Repentance, indeed is never to take offence; if ſuch had been Chriſt's Doctrine, why ſhould he have added, *That if our Brother offend us, we ſhould tell the Church of him?* and that if on that he repent not, he be to us as an Heathen or a Publican.

I may add, in this it is to be harmleſs as the Dove, and wiſe as the Serpent, to guard our ſelves from known ill men; and yet, were mine Enemy the bittereſt Villain on Earth, I would not only love him, but truſt him again, were I aſſur'd of his Converſion.

But ſhall I pardon out of neceſſity, or ſave a Murderer to cut my Throat? alaſs! 'tis Cowardize, not pardon, to pretermit without Repentance.

To pardon in general is to encourage Vice; while there are Laws indeed, I will paſs by Revenge, but the leaſt eſcape of due puniſhment is unjuſt; and how can we forgive, where Mankind has the right of

of Vengeance againſt a Villain?

Chriſt bids us indeed, to part with our Coat, and to go two Miles where compell'd one, but to regulate a contentious Claim, and to preſerve Peace, and not to deſtroy either Property or Juſtice.

So the ſame Goſpel that bids us love our Enemies and forgive our Perſecutors withall, forbids us caſting Pearl before Swine, and not flying from City to City to avoid them: But do I fly my Perſecutor, while I repoſe too dangerous a Truſt in him?

To be ſhort, I love my worſt of Enemies; he ſhall not want the common Dues of Humanity from me; nay, and I forgive him too, as to private Malice and Revenge; but I owe to my Self and Family, to ſue for Reparation for the Injury he has done me.

Nay, and if I have Reparation, I have but my own again; indeed, if I ſue for Trifles, I have Malice, and I forgive not my Brother: but in weighty Injuries, I am no more obliged to paſs by my amends, than to truſt him that deceiv'd me again.

Of RHETORICK.

Rhetorick is the Art of ſpeaking delightfully, and pretily tickling and pleaſing mens Paſſions by our Diſcourſe; its Inſtruments are quaint, active, and moving Figures and Modes of Speech, but the greateſt Skill lyes in managing them, ſometimes lowring our ſelves, and ſometimes again raiſing a more lively Imagery to continue always in the ſame ſtrain; be it what it will, at leaſt cloys and ſatiates, if not lulls the Auditors attention aſleep.

And hence, we ſhould have a graceful Embroidery, not a daubery in Expreſſion; the Criſis of an Affection ſhould be gently touch'd, and not over-worded, leſt we corrupt it. The beſt Mean in this caſe therefore indeed were, to intermix Sentences; the firſt material, the ſecond only diverting and circumſtantial; the firſt weighty and deliberate, the ſecond eaſy and voluptuous; and thus to continue through the whole Speech. For why ſhould we pall the edge and ſenſe of what we intend to recommend? and yet even in this I would not be ſuperfluous neither.

True

True Eloquence conſiſts in ſaying all that ought to be ſaid, and nothing but what ought to be ſaid, and in giving every Sentiment a ſeveral Tone of Voice, Meen, and poſture of the Body, which is proper to it: Nay, I may add, 'tis this Agreement that makes good or bad Comedians; and other perſons pleaſe or diſpleaſe us in their Diſcourſe: And thus there is an Eloquence in the Eyes, and the Air of the Perſon, which perſuades as much as that of words; and there is as much Elegance in the Tone of the Voice, as in the choice of words themſelves.

The common Error in *Rhetorick*, is to make every Quirk in Speech a Figure; now the beſt method is, to have a few & choice Figures, Precepts ſufficient to adorn our Speech, and yet not to burden our Uſe or Idea: So for our ſpeaking, a compos'd Diſcourſe by Memory may have a more ſet and formal ſtile than another; but it will want much of the lively coherence of a Diſcourſe deliver'd *Extempore*; the one commands all the helps of Invention which happen during the Diſcourſe, whilſt the other, beſides the inſipidneſs of Formality, quite cutts off all Advantages that of nature.

To

To be ſhort, a Man would no more uſe himſelf always to repeat a Form, than he would to walk with a Staff; when I am either too young or too old, I will ſupport my feeble parts with props: but when I am Adult, tho I will never ſpeak without a condign deliberation, yet will I not too far confine my Speech neither: I will remember my Method and Analyſis, but I will not manacle mine Imagination; I will rather with a generous Freedom, keep it ready againſt any new Emergency.

Of Delivery.

And even ſo for my Delivery alſo, I will not think to excel by Loudneſs; were I in a Diſpute, ſhould I be willing to put the Criſis of my Controverſy on ſcolding, an Expedient excellent for him that is fooliſh or in the wrong, but madneſs in a wiſe or good Man? Indeed, an *Emphaſis* ſometimes anſwers to a riſe and fall in Muſick, and carries a kind of Charm on mens Paſſions, but a continu'd Baulling can have no Original or Sourſe from Wiſdom.

Men are like *Violins*; if you ſtrike the Note right in one, the other immediately anſwers you, and the Affections and Paſſions move together with the Muſick; but if

if you lay too much *Emphaſis* on your Words, and more than the Affection will bear, what do you do but viciate your Delivery to a Cant? A Man may have a zeal without knowledge, as well in Wiſdom as Religion.

By the ſame reaſon alſo, it is not good to be ſhort or abrupt in our Speeches, as *Loquacity* is, like a noyſom *Fiſtula* in the mind; So ſhort Speeches are like Stabs, and ſeem by their fierceneſs and quickneſs too near a kin to fire: Beſides, as by a long Familiarity and deadneſs of Speech, we level our ſelves too much to Cenſure, by abating too far the edge of Men's Reſpects; ſo by a Speech too abrupt and ſhort, we let men anſwer us before they duly weigh the deference and eſteem they owe to us, and the Truths we deliver.

Above all therefore, we ought to keep a Mean in our Diſcourſe, neither to let Fancy run us a-drift from one Subject to another where ever ſhe pleaſes, nor to let our Delivery run a gallop, too ſwift for the care of our Thoughts (like School-Boys that long to be at the end of their Leſſon;) but rather, as we ought to avoid a Poynancy, ſo we ought to regulate our Fancy by Diſcretion, and our Celerity by a due preſence of Mind: Nay, is our Diſcourſe like to be long?

long? 'Tis a pretty skill in Speech to refreſh our Hearers by Pauſes. Such little Reſts revive Mens apprehenſions; and not only give leiſure for their Refreſhments, but pre-occupy a ſeaſon for their Conceptions alſo.

So 'tis of excellent uſe in our Diſcourſes, to condeſcend to the Cuſtoms and Capacities of our Hearers; the Vulgar admire their own Phraſes, and applaud no truth ſo much as what is in their own Dialect; juſt as when we talk to Children, to pleaſe them, we liſpe, and bring down our Voices in imitation of theirs, to perſuade them we are rather going gently to lead them, than violently to force them on with the harſh and manly Voice of Authority; and yet a Voice loud, clear, and diſtinct, is of excellent uſe, where we talk to men of Courage and Judgment.

As for our Method in this matter, I think our old way of *Rhetorick* is well enough: Thus, firſt, to begin and enquire demonſtratively *An ſit*, and when we are fully ſatisfied of the reality and conſiderableneſs of our Subject, and have ſatisfied our Hearers withall, then we ſhould proceed to deliberate, *Quo modo ſit, an bonum facile aut neceſſarium*; and if *bonum, an jucundum utile aut honeſtum*; and after we have done

done this regularly and perfectly, we may boldly ſpeak our judicially, and cry, *Sic ſit.*

Of Perſuaſion.

I ſhall now proceed to Perſuaſion, in which caſe as 'tis moſt ſucceſsful and ſafe to ſayle with the Tide, ſo 'tis a ſingular Art in Perſuaſion, where we find our Auditors Affections engag'd againſt us in what we are about to ſpeak, firſt to plead for a candid Audience, and to ſtay the entring on our Subject, till we have movd a convenient ſtream of Affection in them, to carry and entertain our Diſcourſe: For why ſhould we labour in vain? And indeed, who but one beſides himſelf, is ſo hardy as to engage, when he hath both the Wind of Paſſion, and the Tide of Inclination to oppoſe him?

In truth, one may ſay the Paſſions are the only Orators, which always perſuade, they are a kind of Art of Nature, whoſe Rules are infallible, and which once mov'd, are ſtrong both in Hearer and Speaker; the verieſt fool mov'd to a true pitch of Paſſion, perſuades more than the greateſt Orator without; ſo that, could men at all times command ſuch accidental Advantages of their Paſſions, they would never be without them; but the matter is, we

are

are fearful to do thoſe things in Temper, that in Paſſion we make light of.

But to proceed a little more particularly: to perſuade to a thing unknown, firſt inſinuate your ſelf by things known, and and yet doubtful, and then without *Hyperboles*, relating what you would have believ'd, urge it with a meet confidence; and yet, taking care as you do it, firſt to ſhew a due caution, That you be not taken for a Babler; ſecondly, to ſhew your grounds for your diffidence, that you be not judg'd as credulous; and laſtly, to fix all, yet with ſo meet a confidence, that you be not taken for a Diſſembler.

And beſides this to perſuade, we ought to skill how to lay hold of mens particular Paſſions, and ſo to know to which they are moſt obnoxious: Thus *the Miſer was cured of his Lethargy, by being made jealous and watchful of his Gold*; and thus the *Mileſian Virgins were cur'd of the Humour of hanging themſelves, by dragging the dead Bodies of the like offenders through the ſtreets*; and thus *Selenicus* took away *Womens gorgeous Apparel*, by an order, *that no one ſhould be allow'd to be a Whore, but ſhe that was ſo and ſo dreſs'd, and had ſuch and ſuch Attendance.*

But, if you would perſuade one that is obſtinate, and that neither Senſe nor Arguments can immediately prevail on, ſtreight turn your Reaſoning, and ſeem to follow and admire his Methods, and then by purſuing them on as his friend, run him as at unawares on abſur'd conſequences, and ſo fright him by thoſe Reaſonings in you, that in himſelf he will not admit to be examin'd.

Thus the Mobile in a certain Common Wealth, being enraged once at the Senate, yet voluntarily put themſelves into the hands of a Friend, to be judged by them; and he thereon adviſing the Mobile firſt to chooſe a new Senate for fear of miſchief, before they proceeded to the cutting off of the old one, ſtreight thereby he begun to ſhew them the conſequence of Upſtarts; ſo that they immediately agreed, to continue their old Senate on again.

And yet, as when we have not mens Paſſions of our ſides, we muſt thus by Preambles, Apologies, Preparatories, Mollifiers, and other Topicks of Argument, endeavour to root out the old Biaſs of mens Prejudice, and to implant a new and truer Idea in their ſtead; ſo on the other ſide, when we have mens Inclinations on our ſides, we may avoid this prolixity, and

begin

begin freely, triumphantly, and openly, or elſe, till we have engag'd a party of thought and Paſſion of our ſide, we are imprudent to launch too freely into the Ocean of Diſcourſe.

And yet even in all Caſes, we ought to know, how to limit our perſuaſions too: Thus I would not ſeem too fond, leſt I make men believe the intereſt I perſuade them to, is more mine than theirs, as appears by my concern; and yet I would neither want Fancy nor Vigour enough to expreſs a thing fully, nor to illuſtrate what is more rare and ſingular to the life; but yet then, no more than is fit; for why ſhould I ſeem either ſo intereſted or poetical, as to deaden the Edge of my perſuaſion.

Nay, and tho abruptneſs generally be a Vice, yet ſometimes little hints are of excellent uſe in Perſuaſions; it ſets men to beat out our Notions in themſelves, and they are ever more fond of Bratts of their own Brain than others: Beſides, that ſetting men ſo upon ſuch a Scrutiny, makes them engage in a Party for us, and nothing obliges men more than to let them ſeem to be their own contrivers.

So further, 'tis good to know the force of every Argument and Figure: Thus

for inſtance, a Repetition or Recommendation by Figures and Allegories, can command the Affections, and charm the Paſſions; but only Reaſon without Art, and with Sincerity and Truth, are able to move a durable and ſteady Reſentment and Courage: Indeed, Figures are but for Ornament, and he miſtakes their very end, that makes them Subſtance, or that diſguiſes his Diſcourſe by uſing them too far. Ornaments are to recommend and beautify, and not to blind or deform, if we have not skill enough to apply our Ornaments therefore, we had better neglect them altogether.

But above all Ornaments and Figures in Speech, there are none ſo uſeful as Parables, Fables, Metaphors, and Allegories; when Reaſoning will do no good, when the mind is quite blind and deaf with Prejudices, Allegories and Parables can revive it, and by Paralels confirm it. Thus *Nathan* convinc'd *David*'s ſin in *Uriah*, *and humbled him, and brought him to Repentance*, by the Parable *of the poor man's Lamb*, when the bare ſenſe of the Action alone could never do it.

But indeed after all, as I have ſaid, no *Rhetorick* is like Honeſty, and no Speech like Reaſon; if we have Truth on our ſide, that's

that's all, and enough, if we take but care to illuſtrate that ſufficiently; only this we ought to remember in prudence, to let our laſt Words be moſt forcible, as they are moſt likely to be of the moſt laſting Impreſſion: And indeed, to leave truth and follow Colours too much, is like *Æſop*'s Dog, *by catching at the Shadow to looſe the Subſtance.*

I will not rely therefore on Fancies or Figures of Speech; but if I uſe them, it ſhall be as by the by; but my main Weapon ſhall be clear ſenſe and reaſon; if men have either any judgment or truth, my very Sincerity ſhall force their Attentions; and while Flowers only dally to delight the mind; by a lively appoſite Expreſſion with Notion, I'le even ſtrike to the Quick.

So 'tis an Error in Perſuaſion alſo, to multiply Reaſons, and aim at Conqueſt by Numbers; the beſt arguing is from few Topicks and from general Heads, the retreat of the Diſcourſe the eaſier, and the Management the better; nay, and the Memory and Paſſions of the Hearers are the more eaſily captivated by it, whilſt as for Figures they may be us'd but ſeldom: 'tis better to be regarded for Matter than Form, Reaſon than Words, and yet it is

not convenient neither to let our ſenſe want a ſuitable Dreſs.

Parts of Diſcourſe.

But as it is the misfortune of a great many perſons to make a good Cauſe ridiculous by their ill Proceeding, ſo 'tis good to know alſo, what order is decent in an Oration; and if it be written, to mark it as it proceeds, for the greater clearneſs with your Topicks in the Margent: Nay, and not only ſo, but to be ſure not to neglect the Cogent Topicks of Recommendation, as praiſing your Judges, or at leaſt aſſuring your ſelf, that they have ſo much Honour, that they would not hear you, if they were not reſolv'd withall to give you an impartial Sentence.

And thus in an orderly Diſcourſe, I may ſay, there ought to be five parts: Firſt, A Preface pertinent and ſhort, to open your deſign, and to prepare the minds of the Hearers. Secondly, The Narrative true, & well circumſtantiated to inſtruct them. Thirdly, A Confirmation, and that ſolid, to convince them. Fourthly, A Refutation nervous and ſtrong, to refute all Colours for them. And Fifthly and laſtly, A Concluſion pathetick, and forcive to move them.

But

But if we extend our Diſcourſe beyond an Oration, that is, if we write a Book, then a more perfect Method ought to take place, and we ought to proceed by the exacteſt Rules of a compleat *Geneſis*; our very method ought to be ſo conſpicuous as to ſupply the part of an Index; and every Clauſe, Sentence, Chapter, and part of our Diſcourſe, whether greater or leſs, ought to be fram'd ſo naturally, as to fall into a beautiful Body, and joint its ſelf, ſo as to be able even actually and orderly to force the Readers Conviction.

And when *I* conſider this, *I* cannot but reflect, that had men either any Reverence for themſelves or others, were they cautious of their own Reputation or others Trouble, they would not thruſt out their ſhapeleſs Cubbs upon the World as they do, but would lick them into ſome order before they did it; when alaſs! were ſome Diſcourſes but diſſolv'd to their firſt Principles by *Analyſis*, what would they contain too often? ſcarce a Chapter, nay, or a Sentence to the purpoſe, that the Authors ſeem to be blind, or they could never publiſh what they do.

When you enter their Book, their Title ſpeaks you fair, and makes you fancy they'll perform as well as promiſe; but

when you come to peruſe their Subſtance and Solidity, you find your ſelf fool'd and ne're the wiſer for the Subject; and our Author who has a world of Humour and Fancy, when may be not three grains of Digeſtion, gives you a broad-ſide of Maggots; and if he confounds and mazes your Reaſon by them as bad as his own, he is ſatisfied and is wiſe in his own Conceit, becauſe he is a fool in Company.

I ſhall add no more, but that our Fable and Emblem Writers deſerve no better Cenſure: 'Tis true, an Example or Metaphor occaſionally in Precepts, is of excellent uſe; but 'tis an Elaborate way of making Learning intricate and confus'd, to turn her in purſuit of ſuch laborious and diſorderly Excurſions and Trifles, as far from the clear ſight of Knowledge, as a Cloud, or a Maze, or a Veil.

Of Invention,

I proceed to *Invention* in *Rhetorick:* Now to help that; our beſt Method is, to have recourſe to General Topicks; Examples whereof I ſhall give you as follows.

Topicks Intrinſick.

1. Definition.
2. Deſtribution into parts.
3. Etymology.
4. Conjugates.
5. Kind, *Genus ſpecies.*
6. Form.
7. Similitude.
8. Diſſimilitude.
9. Contraries.
10. Adjuncts.
11. Antecedents.
12. Conſequences.
13. Repugnances.
14. Cauſes { Efficient, Material, Formal, Final, Inſtrumental
15. Effects.
16. Compariſon.
17. Poſſibility.
18. *Bonum* { *Honeſtum.* *Utile.* *Jucundum.*

Topicks

Topicks Extrinſick.

1. Prejudication.
2. Report.
3. Laws.
4. Oaths.
5. Torture.
6. Witneſſes.
7. Scripture.
8. Learned Men.
9. Circumſtance. { Time. Place. and Perſon

Predicamentals, as

10. Subſtance *and* Perſon.
11. Quantity, *and* Demonſtration.
12. Quality ordinary, or not.
13. Relation.
14. Action.
15. Paſſion.
16. Place.
17. Time.
18. Scituation.
19. Habit.

Of

Of Figures.

Figures of *Rhetorick* are either in *Words* or *Sentences*; the Uſual are as follows;

Figures of *Words.*

Metaphor, as *Vir gregis.*
Irony, as *O bone vir.*
Epizeuxis, as *Vicimus, Vicimus.*
Anaphoras, as *Nobis voluptati, nobis ſolatio.*
Epiſtrophe, as *Ibimus, pugnabimus, triumphabimus.*
Epanalepſis, as *multa promittis, preſtare teneberis multa.*
Climax, *hoc animum, animus virtutem addit.*
Epanados, *Non vivo ut edam, ſed edo ut vivam.*
Polyptoton, as *qui memorat, quod ille meminit.*

Converſion.
Complexion.
Conduplication.
Disjunction.
Equality of Cadence Numbers.
Adjunction.
Gradation.
Paranomaſia.
Repetition.
Synonime.
Synechdoche.

Figures

Figures of *Sentences* are,

Augmentation, He Beat him, he Murder'd him, he Crucifi'd him.
Apoſtrophe, as *audite O cali, vos eritis mihi teſtes.*
Conceſſion, as *ſit humilis ortu*, at *eſt probus.*
Correction, *tacebo? Imo loquar.*
Diminution, He Beat him, he Fillup'd him, he Touch'd him.
Exclamation, as *O Tempora, O Mores!*
Interrogation, *Siccine fieri opportet?*
Preoccupation, *dicat aliquis, ſed regero.*
Proſopopeia, as *Egone Sol luceo, ut vos dormientes altum ſtertetis?*
Reticence, as *plus poſſum dicere, ſed de his tacebo.*

Allegory.
Antitheſis.
Communication.
Deprecation.
Diſtribution.
Dubitation.
Ethopeia.
Expolition.
Hypotipoſis.
Imprecation.
Interpretation.
Irony.
Licence.
Preterrition.
Sermocination.
Subjection.
Suſtentation.
Tranſition.

Thus

Thus, you ſee, I have given you here a Catalogue of the more Eminent *Figures* of both ſorts; but I have not given Examples but of ſome few that *I* thought more Uſeful: indeed, whoever peruſes *Alſted's Enciclopaidion*, will ſee ſuch a multitude of *Figures*, that they are not only almoſt without number, but that there is not a Quirk in Speech ſcarce, but what that by one *Author* or other, is reduced to ſome Figure: So that indeed this Exuberancy now ſeems to require ſome Limitation.

Laſtly, For the uſe of ſuch Figures, *I* ſhall only ſay this, one would Read them ſometimes curſorly, as ſo many ſeveral Patterns to form one Speech, and as ſo many Moulds to be commitred to our Memories in Reading, to ſhape our Utterance and Delivery by; but to think otherwiſe, to force our Thoughts juſt to ſuch a preciſe Form, or Cut, is to make them more unacceptable in being unnatural, then all the Ornaments of Art can add to them.

Of JUDGMENT.

WHatever intuitive Knowledge, or Divine Ideal Truth *Adam* had, his Poſterity are forc'd to Plow the Soul for Wiſdom, as well as the Earth for Fruits.

We muſt track Truth ſtep by ſtep, and weigh as well Ideas as Propoſitions to attain her: He that takes Truth by the Groſs, or Jumps into her without a due Compariſon of things, at leaſt knows not in Judgment, whether he is right or wrong.

The true Judgment is *Mathematical*, Reaſon's the Scale, and Propoſitions are the things weigh'd, while Judgment, like Juſtice, favours the heavier Scale.

Where there is moſt Conſideration, therefore there are likely to be moſt Propoſitions, and conſequently the more aſſur'd Deciſion of Judgment; while to Judge without Propoſitions forethought, is like weighing with the Scales empty, and Shooting at the Mark Blindfold.

As for the Errors of Judgment, they are either want of Conſideration, or Irreſolution: The inconſiderate Man leaves all

all to happy Chance; while the Irreſolute is like a ruffled Skein of Silk.

In Truth, Judgment, like an Army, ought to March ſlow, with full Trains of Imaginations, and not a Concatenation of Thought ought to be unconſulted for fear of the Ambuſhes of Error.

To conclude, were *Poets* as happy in holding the Scale, as in their ſprightly and vigorous Sallies of Fancy, *Poets* aſſuredly would have the beſt Judgments, and accordingly make the beſt *Philoſophers*: but our experience ſhews us the contrary, and where they fail.

Of *HAPPINESS.*

FOr all the difference of Eſtate and Quality among Men, there is notwithſtanding ſuch a common allay of good and evil, that all, in the main, are equally happy.

Felicity, alaſs! is in Content and Opinion, not the things we Poſſeſs. Thus 'tis what *I* Love, and not what another Conceits, that makes me happy.

And thus, indeed, what but our Pride makes us Miſerable, and reſtleſly Ambitious? Our great concern, in truth is, to ſhew, that a Man of Deſert is unfortunate.

'Tis not to be diſputed, but the Bleſſings of Health, Wealth and Friends are valuable; But are they comparable in the making of us happy, to Vertue and Content?

The beſt of ſuch Enjoyments are caſual, momentary, and diſguſted by Conſcience and Paſſions; But can any thing rob us of Vertue?

Pleaſures enjoy'd with innocence indeed, are real; But can there be any ſatis-

ſatisfaction with regret, to catch at the baits of Sin and Vice.

Nay, were there no Hell, the *Epicure* ſhould be moderate for his Guſts ſake; ſo that we are doubly bruitiſh, to pall our Palates by Luxury.

The Vertuous enjoy Pleaſures truly, and can thank God for the Refreſhment, while neither Satiety nor Paſſion annoys them.

Beſides, a vertuous Soul, I may ſay, is as a Rock againſt the Waves and Storms of the World, while ſhe looks down with pity on Giddy and Mudling Mankind below.

I want a Coach and Dainties; And what then? Are not Walking and Temperance wholſomer? But Oh, I love Fine Cloaths; And what am I not aſham'd to be ſo like a Peacock?

Prithee Friend tell me; Can thy Gold or Purple keep out Diſeaſes? Or thy Guards, Garriſon'd in Iron, repel bold fears and deſpair?

Virtue, indeed, as ſhe is indifferent againſt ſuch Trifles, ſo is ſhe hardned to evil; Vertue turns all Misfortunes to Martyrdom.

What though mine Enemy Rage? Can he move a foot beyond Providence?

Does he intend to kill me? And can't I rejoyce to be ſo ſoon with God?

Does he torment me? And have I not God and a brighter Crown of Martyrdom to ſupport me? Nay, or can my deſpondency relieve me?

I will allow a Man Groans to relieve his Spirit, and an honeſt Submiſſion to appeaſe his Enemy; But ſhall I ſurrender my ſincerity to him, and give him opportunity to deſtroy both Soul and Body too?

But, alaſs! thou art Griev'd to Dye ſo ſoon; And what art thou afraid to be with God? The Apoſtle could deſire to be diſſolved: And, Art thou, on the contrary, ſo unwilling, as to repine at the call of his Providence?

Surely, faithfully to love God, and obſerve his Laws, therefore as they are the great end of Man, ſo are they his greateſt and beſt Methods to happineſs alſo; and in which caſe, the quicker & ſharper our paſſage in proſpect, the more deſirable; without we think there is no God, or future State, to reward us in what we do and ſuffer.

Of

Of PRESENCE *of* MIND.

WHat good will all the Precepts in the World do whilſt a Man wants his Preſence of Mind, the neceſſary clue to lead him through them.

Surely our Senſes ought always to keep due Centinel, and our Underſtandings as readily to attend their ſummons: Can he Fence well that is not on his Guard? *Archimedes* died for being too buſy to give an Anſwer.

Careleſsneſs and Diſattention therefore undoubtedly are the Daughters of Folly: Certainly the Judgment ought to be in readineſs for every new Object that approaches. I may add, What is Madneſs but ſuch a Debauch of Thought, to a greater degree, and when an Idle Soliloquy disjoynts the whole Reaſoning of the Man?

We ought therefore to avoid all ſuch Violence of thought, as Poyſon; at leaſt the Plow of Thought, Clogs and Cuts but heavily, that's never ſharpned by reſt.

Nay, even for the very unſeemlineſs one would avoid ſuch flurts in Reaſoning; for ſurely 'tis as diſagreeable to others, as pernicious to our ſelves.

And yet after all, certainly there are Diſeaſes in the Mind, as well as the Body; and after our beſt endeavours, our Senſe will ſlacken, and our Styles vary, do what we can: What! Are we not Men?

Of SECRETS.

THe Mind, like the Body, expoſes its ſelf, by appearing naked; it diſcovers its weaker parts, and lies more liable to Injuries; undoubtedly therefore Secrets ought to be embrac'd as Armour, and admir'd as Soveraign Prudence; but yet then, we ought to remember alſo, that we cannot be too wary in them; our Looks often ſpeak as well as our Tongues, and we muſt be careful our Nakedneſs appear not through the little Vail of its Cloaths.

So, though Secrecy and Silence thus be undoubtedly Vertues; Diſſimulation, whether in Words or Actions, is the furtheſt from it imaginable: Diſſimulation is an act with an intent to deceive, a downright Lye; Diſſimulation is the weak art of thoſe, who have not judgment enough to manage a concealment.

As for the difference between Simulation and Diſſimulation, it appears in the Old Latine Verſe, *Quod non eſt ſimulo, diſſimuloque quod eſt*; their Benefits are theſe,

First, They lay Oppoſition aſleep.

Secondly, They leave a room for Retreat.

Thirdly, By their Lying, they draw out Secrets.

Their Miſchiefs are;

Firſt, They ſpoil buſineſs through Fearfulneſs.

Secondly, They barr the Aſſiſtance of others.

And, *Laſtly*, They take away all truſt and belief, while, as for ſecrecy, it has all the Prudence, and none of the Vice of either of them.

But to return; if we would keep a Secret, we are bound, in pain of Indiſcretion, to diſcern who we truſt with it; indeed, How can we hope another ſhould keep our Secrets, if we cannot keep them our ſelves; So we ought alſo to ſtand in Guard, even of our Servants, and not to make others jealous of us, by being too buſy; on the one

one ſide Cardinal *Richlieu* took care wiſely to turn away that Man that he found looking into his Letters; and, on the other ſide, How can we expect that others ſhould not enquire after, and gueſs at our concerns, when we ſeem to buſy in our jealous inquiſitiveneſs at theirs?

But, beſides this General prudence of Secrecy; Secrecy is a Sacred Obligation, even in Diſcourſe alſo: thus, when Two Diſcourſe, they render each other mutual Depoſitors of Thoughts, and which they truſt one another withal; ſo that, let it be that we require Secrecy, or not, in ſuch a Caſe, our Diſcourſe is always as a Pawn, which ought never to be diſpos'd of but according to the intentions of him that truſted it.

And yet the Rule of Secrets ſeems to be this alſo; though what I am told, I am bound to keep as a Secret; yet if I knew it before, that cannot make that a Secret to me, that was none before; though with regard to the Relator, that I make not him the Author, it is, and yet not, I fear, but that this Liberty has been often abus'd; and many that have not known a Secret before, yet have pretended they have, to ſalve their Reputations in breaking it.

But then, 'tis an undoubted Exception from all the Laws and Obligations of Secrecy, when any one acquaints us with a wicked or criminal deſign; for Friendſhip loſes its Obligation in Wickedneſs, and there can be no tye between God and *Belial*; a Man ought therefore to have wit and honeſty enough to diſcern of what he ſpeaks, before he requires Secrecy, or elſe 'tis at the peril of his Imprudence to betray his own wicked Intentions.

To be ſhort, unleſs in caſe of theſe few Exceptions, when we enter into a Diſcourſe with a Man, we begin a Friendſhip with him, and which, at leaſt, includes the Obligation, not to abuſe his confidence; now, though this *Friendſhip* continue but for a Minute, or for an hour, year, or years, under greater or leſſer Truſts, yet the Obligation to Secrecy is ſtill the ſame, and all one, whether in an hourly, or a perpetual *Friendſhip*.

In truth, a good Chriſtian is not only no Man's Enemy; but in this, he loves all Mankind equally; that he ſhews more kindneſs to one than another, is from the Providence of his Aſſociation, his outward Compact, or Friendſhip; but this general tye of Humanity to Secrecy, is, what nothing can diſpenſe with in us.

To

To attain Secrets.

As for the particular Methods to obtain Secrets, there are ſeveral: Thus ſome have gotten them by frightning with a contrary dangerous deſign; and thus the Prieſt that would know whether ſuch a man frequented the Church or not, got it out of him by accuſing him of a Contempt of the Service.

So have you employ'd Informers to find out Secrets; and would you know whether they deceive you or not? employ ſuch as can have no manner of Acquaintance with each other, and then in what they all agree, you may be aſſur'd, they are in the right.

Some have attain'd a Secret by pretending, they knew in part of it already; and thus men to ſave their own Bacon, jealous of others treachery, have been the firſt Informers themſelves.

Some, when they have not been able to attain the Secret deſired, have fiſh'd for ſome other, and by that tempted the perſons Friends, as by Tokens to reveal the other: And thus the *Grand Seignior*, by *asking a Priſoner when he lay with his Wife laſt?* by that as with a Token, drew the Confeſſion of the Priſoners Guilt from his Wife.

Nor

Nor is that other Method leſs certain of obtaining a Secret by a Secret, for men when they think they have poſſeſſion of others Secrets, preſume that they have ſo much advantage of them, that they may ſafely truſt them with their own: And thus by Diſſimulation and Trifles, ſometimes the weightieſt Matters have been diſcovered.

Sober men you may fathom by obſtinate and reproachful Controverſies; by which means their very Paſſions will open them, and as for their Tempers you may know them by what they were at School; but as for Drunkards the only way to fathom their Speeches, is to examine them by their other Frolicks, whether they have not been for a conſtancy foul-mouth'd or Lying, *&c.*

So, to know whether a ſuſpected perſon be guilty or not; do but charge him with things falſe and true at the ſame time, and you ſhall ſee it quickly by the different manner of his Vindication; for as ſound ſleep, a compos'd mind, & careleſs behaviour, are great preſumptions of Innocence; ſo you will eaſily diſcover him as not concern'd at the fictitious Forgery.

A King of *France* being willing to deſtroy a Treacherous Noble that was in company with him among others, if he could

could get the conſent of the reſt, put forth the Nobles Treachery in a Parable like *David*'s *Lamb*; whereupon underſtanding all their Reſolutions, he made the Application of it as it were by all their conſents upon the Lord that offended him.

And now I have wrote thus much about the Diſcovery of Secrets, I ſhall add a little alſo about the management of them, and occult Writing, and conclude.

Occult Writing.

If to be Secret be lawful, which indeed the ſtricteſt Moraliſt and Religious cannot deny; for, in truth, Secrecy is one of the conſiderableſt Branches of Wiſdom, and we are taught *to be ſubtle as Serpents, as well as harmleſs as Doves:* If Secrecy I ſay therefore, be not only lawful, but a Vertue, beſure unſearchable ways of Writing muſt be of excellent advantage, ſince by ſuch occult Writing, we can communicate Secrets to whom we pleaſe, and conceal them from every body elſe.

Now to enumerate the ſeveral Methods of ſecreting our Senſe in Writing, were a work as frivolous as endleſs: I take it therefore for granted, that if I deſcribe ſome of the beſt Methods, and leave them to be improv'd,

improv'd, alter'd and chang'd by every man's own invention, 'twill be far better than to tire him with all particulars; for when once the Myſtery of an Art is unravell'd, there is no difficulty to copy it a Thouſand ways by our own Invention.

Some make a new Alphabet, and alter only the Characters of the Letters, as ſuppoſe I wrote Engliſh with *Arabick* Letters, not underſtood in this Country; others alter only the ſignification of Letters, and uſe the common Characters, as ſuppoſe I ſhould all along write *a* for *b*. *b* for *c*. *c* for *d*, *&c*.

Thus for Example, were I to write the word (*and*) it muſt be by *z mc*. for *z* goes for *a*. *m* for *n*. and *c*. for *d*. being all the immediate Letters before them, and conſequently ought to take their places as ſo; but this method is eaſily diſcover'd by the *Vowels* and *ſhort Words*; and yet it may be blinded too, by inſerting inſignificant Letters, and multiplying the Characters of the *Vowels*.

Some will invent a peculiar Cant like *Fipſeys*, which is indeed like making a new Language; others will cover their deſigns in a dark Metaphor; as ſuppoſe I treated of a *Common Wealth* of *Bees* to reflect on Government, or cited ſome anitent Hiſto-

rical

rical Paſſage to repreſent the preſent Scene of Affairs, and the correſpondence between them: And this is the method us'd by the Prophets in Scripture.

Some will write with common Letters, and in common *Engliſh*, but alter the placing of the Letters; thus ſuppoſe I wrote *Moſes* ſaid, I write the *Odd Letters* in the firſt word, and the even Letters in the ſecond; and ſo it will be *Mſſad Oeſi*; and ſo I go on with every two words till I end what I write.

Others diſpoſe every 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12. ſucceſſive Letters, according to a Table of Chimes for Bells, and then divide them into words at their pleaſure; and after all to make it the more intricate, you may diſpoſe the words in Sentences by the Rule of ſuch Chimes, as you did before the Letters in the words; ſo that without your Key, the Table of Chimes, 'tis impoſſible to read what you write, ſince at this rate by double Chimes you may vary your Letters a Thouſand, nay, I may ſay, Ten thouſand ways, if you pleaſe.

But all or moſt of theſe ways are imperfect; for as they cannot but infallibly breed a jealouſy and ſuſpition, ſo many times they are as miſchievous and dangerous, as if they were reveal'd: And therefore thoſe methods

methods of Secret Writing are moſt beneficial, that caſt a Blind before Mens Eyes, and by giving them a fair and ſeeming Senſe to read, take away all Imagination of their being a Secret couch'd under it.

Thus ſome will write you a common and civil Letter, but do it by the Key of an Alphabet of *Synonemas* for every word; ſo that when you examine it by your Key, every word in the Epiſtle ſhall give a Secret Letter, which being collected in order, ſhall give you a ſecret Sentence; but if you read it in the ordinary and currant ſenſe, you ſee a plain familiar Letter, without either doubt or difficulty in it.



Some

Some again will write by Muſical *Notes*, and ſo make love by a Song; thus the words ſhall be what you pleaſe, but the *Notes* ſhall carry the Secret: For in this caſe the ſix Spaces or Lines ſhall ſignify the Letter you deſire to write, according to your pleaſure; and the *Notes* of time which ſhall diſtinguiſh them, being Four,

make juſt 24. the Alphabet, being multiplied by 6. the Spaces, as above.

Note, You may prick your *Notes* or put them on the Line or Space at your pleaſure.

Others, will make the firſt word in the firſt line; the 2*d*. in the 2*d*. & the 3*d*. in the 3*d*. *&c*. to contain the Secret, while the other words in the ſeveral lines are ingeniouſly contriv'd, with the ſignificative words, to make a good and common ſenſe for the diſguiſe ſake.

Others will cut Papers in Figures, and then all that is not wrote within the compaſs of ſuch Figures, is ſuperfluous; others will write what they would have read with Black Ink, and reſerve the Secret to be written in a by-place or corner of the Letter,

ter, with a white Ink, *&c.* others again will refer through Numbers to the Letters, or Words in a known Page and Line of a particular Book, and ſo endite.

But in ſhort, the beſt and leaſt ſuſpitious way, is to reduce your Secret to one or two words, and then having ſeveral Keys to write it by, to intimate to your Friend by what Key you write, by the manner of Writing your Name: And thus you may make a few ſuch Letters blacker or bigger than ordinary in ſeveral lines, or make ſeeming accidental Blotts, and ſo diſcover your Senſe.

Of

Of COLLECTIONS.

SUrely, it can avail us nothing to quote Authors in Catalogues, and to raiſe large *Folio's* with Recitals. What is Wiſdom, if too long for uſe and recollection? or what are Precepts good for, when ſcatter'd in Libraries?

Good Precepts 'tis true, are like Rocks and Anchors to the inſtability of our Thoughts. The perfection of Vertue indeed, conſiſts in the Uprightneſs of the Will; but what is the Will without an Underſtanding accordingly?

Nay, what will the moſt excellent Underſtanding avail us, without agreeable Precepts, and thoſe ready and at hand? The beſt of us doſe, dote, and ſlumber at times; and among huge and numerous Volumes, where ſhall we find what we want, unleſs in the *Meridian* of our Reaſon we ſtore up Precepts for Old Age?

Alaſs! we have ſeen the force of an *Extempore* ſtrain, in its imperfect Eſſays towards it, often enough; we ſee how far the Waves of proud Fancy can reach; nay, we are not ignorant even of what *Enciclopaidians* can do.

But what! Can a little whifling Treatiſe command Reſpect? Surely, a Body of Philoſophy and an Army of Thoughts much more; nay, what is even a Library, but an undigeſted Rubbiſh, to pure and ſelect Precepts?

Has man leiſure to peruſe or purſue every current of Thought nicely? Surely, he cannot even ſurvey all the Books that are, and are not the Extracts and Spirits of Thoughts then, far more eligible than your flat and endleſs Corollarys.

No doubt, a general Body, if ſo prepar'd, were of admirable uſe, the Univerſal View would clear our Proſpect, and lead and direct our Notions and Actions; nay, and Error and Vice would appear through their diſſonancy to the whole Body of Knowledge.

To conclude, Reaſoning like figur'd Silks and Cloaths, is only truly to be judged of in the whole piece, while the compoſition of our Precepts, like a Gariſon, ſhould be for ſtrength, and uſe only, each place defending its ſelf, and defended by another.

Of

Of PRECEPTS.

THere are ſeveral methods to Vertue; but ſurely Precepts excell all. Can an Harrangue make you good; and why not the Precept in ſhort?

Examples are lively 'tis true, but time alaſs! will allay all their Emulation; while as for the cloſe Reaſonings of Precepts, can they ever fade?

The Man's a falſe Proſelyte that does not love Vertue for Vertues ſake; and are long Examples then comparable to brief and wholſom Precepts?

What avails it, as I have ſaid, to have Volumes of Cautions one knows not where to find? By Precepts I will ſtore up Wiſdom againſt Age; nay, I will fortify my Vertue by Reaſons impregnable, the Quinteſſence of Wiſdom.

Our firſt Thoughts are too crude for Wiſdom; Nature does not give Vertue: And 'tis a kind of an Art to become good. Nay, without Precepts our Wiſdom is bruitiſh, and our Vertue, Conſtitution and Inclination, not judgment.

While petty Vertues ſink in their Trials, Precepts will level every wrinkle that di-

ſturbs the Tranquility of the mind.

Pure Precepts will ſmell ſweet, when the little Guſto's of Fancy ſhall fade. I know the World love to hide their Vices under the broken Fragments of Morality; but are not wilful Ignorance and Diſobedience equal, as well in Morals as Divinity?

Beſides, Can any thing excel good Precepts? or is any thing more deſirable? Nay, is not Wiſdom the Unchangable Good of God himſelf?

True Precepts will compoſe thy Spirits beyond Muſick, and lull thy Paſſions aſleep. True Precepts are a perfect Antidote to Vice, if thou but uſe them duly.

The true Philoſophy is clear and ſelf-evident; it leaves neither Difficulties nor Scruples, but chears the Mind, enlightens the Underſtanding, and confirms the Courage, where e're it comes.

Some admire Precepts; but why? they want Variety and Change. Alaſs! they want but diverting Strains: True Precepts are one, and eternal.

Can true Vertue be ever out of faſhion? Surely then, 'tis a defect in God, that he is not vicious for Variety; if not, I will not be giddy in my Precepts, leſt I become giddy in my Morals alſo.

In

In truth, Is Vertue ſuch a Trifle as to be ſacrificed to Novelty and Curioſity? or am I ſo wretched as to think ſo of her? No: let her be as unchangable in my Breaſt, as ſhe is pure and chaſte in her ſelf.

Neither Reading nor Meditating, neither Study nor Diſcourſe, neither Paſſion nor Zeal, therefore ſhall give me that advantage, that I will not ſecure by Precepts; but then to perfect, not to change my Vertue.

To conclude, I may add, 'Tis even ridiculous to ſee what ſlight Paſſions can diſcompoſe us, when Reaſon does not Rule. Surely therefore, good Precepts are as Armour, and the only way through which to attain the Perfection of our Nature.

Of SINCERITY.

I Am ſorry, I may ſay too often, our heart by habit is apt to cheat our Reaſons, while our Sincerities become but as a more curious Art, to draw a Religious Reſpect to what we ſay.

The true Sincerity is good without a witneſs, and can love unfaſhionable Vertue? The true Sincerity never fails: Is it frail? yet at leaſt it keeps in the Track of Vertue.

A pure Integrity has no Reſerve; ſhe dreads not the Scrutiny of the beſt of men; ſhe will not do evil even that good may come: her Loyalty for Goodneſs can ſerve her without either Livery or Dower.

Wilt thou be good therefore? let no Temptation impurify thy Will: or if thou wouldſt be wiſe, let not the leaſt Error blemiſh thy Judgment. Is a Caſtle ever eaſier maintain'd, than when without Breaches and Diſunion!

Alaſs! the exactly Sincere is ſo between God and himſelf only: the World has but the Colour of Integrity; The true Sincerity would not be hired from the Paths of Vertue.

How

How earneſtly do ſome men ſeek Excuſes to be corrupt? But can we ſay, that man is good, that does not wiſh and endeavour to be better? Surely, God and Vertue elect by our Wills, and not by our Powers or Actions.

Pure Vertue is even in the bottom of the heart: Chriſt ſays, *He that luſts after anothers Wife commits Adultery with her.* Indeed, why ſhould I tantalize my ſelf ſo with Luſts, did I not love the Temptation?

When I reflect on the integrity of *Seneca* and *Marcus Antoninus*, and other *Heathens*, methinks I am aſham'd to hear corrupter Chriſtians ſay, *That ſuch Divine Men are damn'd.*

Are we the better for knowing or believing only? and, Why not the Devils alſo, who tremble with it? Are we rich in grace? alaſs! we forget that God accepted the Widows Mite.

To be ſhort, the true ſincerity will even in this life benefit us; it leads us to Truth, and it gives us credit; nay more, 'twill add us reſpect alſo. 'Twas Chriſt's ſincerity that made him ſpeak as with Authority.

Nay our ſincerity will benefit us, tho in a miſtake: Thus what but Integrity could

bring St. *Paul* from the greateſt Perſecutor, to be the greateſt Apoſtle.

Surely, both Piety and Vertue lye only in ſincerity; if Action without Intention were valuable, we ſhould even make Bruits vertuous alſo. And if any thing be Vertue, or there be any Vertue, 'tis mixed with ſincerity; for Sincerity is really the great and only Touchſtone both of Religion and Morality.

Of

Of VOWS and OATHS.

ALl Vows, of that which is unlawful, are void; Nor availes it in ſuch caſe, whether the thing Vow'd be a greater or leſſer evil, ſince nothing can oblige a Man to what is really evil: 'tis as unlawful to tell a Lye to fulfil an Oath, as it is to Murder a Man: And as it is impoſſible that God ſhould love to have ill done, ſo it is impoſſible that he ſhould engage us to it, purely becauſe we have Vow'd or Promis'd it.

I may add, the Nature of Good and Evil, ſtill remains, notwithſtanding the influence of any Vow, Oath, or Promiſe whatſoever, and is in the eye of God and Reaſon only Obligatory; and therefore according to Scripture, and the beſt Caſuiſts, it is, that it happens, that the Vows of a Servant, or Wife, may be good in part, or void in part, as conſiſtent with their Prior Duty; and ſo alſo where there are two Oaths, the Prior ought only to take place.

And, in this Caſe, that the Superſtitious Notions of Vows and Oaths have been wrong, ought not therefore to make us to follow them: 'tis true, in the Reformation, we ought to preſerve Piety, and not to con-

contemn what is really Sacred; and yet we ought to examine matters ſo ſincerely alſo, as not to leave our ſelves partial, blind, or confus'd in the Search.

What ſhall not a Man pay his Debts, becauſe he has Vow'd he will not? And muſt a Man Starve, or Murther himſelf, becauſe he has Sworn it? This were for him to ſet up a New Law in oppoſition to God's Sacred Law of Nature; and, by Artifice, to ſubvert the moſt holy Will of God: And thus I may add alſo, Humanity and Charity are as great Debts even as a Bond; and therefore if I Vow not to pull off mine Hat to another, that is even void alſo.

Upon this therefore, I conclude, that no Vow can change our ſtate, or bind our liberty; to confine our ſelves againſt a proſpect of Good, is an ill; and it is the only power of a Vow to bind us to a known Duty, from a known Evil, or in a thing indifferent; nay, if any thing be indifferent, if the confinement fret us to the injury of Body or Mind, from that inſtant it becomes ill, and ceaſes to obliege us as not indifferent alſo.

And thus a Vow may engage me to the greateſt ſelf-denial, ſo as conſiſtent with my duty, but not to the leaſt evil, though

though even but of imprudence: A Vow to fling away my Wealth into the Sea, is void; but I may well Vow all I gain to the Poor, and yet even then *I* muſt reſerve me Maintenance, and beſtow it with Diſcretion.

So I may bind my ſelf from Wine and Fleſh; but if ſo, their want impairs my health, I muſt uſe them: And ſo I may bind my ſelf from going into the Country, till my Health, or a better ſervice from God and my Country require it; but I may never thereby obſtruct the advancement of any greater Good or Talent: And ſo, though I Vow to go to *Rome*, if I cannot propoſe ſome good by my Jo urney, the imprudence of it makes it void, in idly neglecting my Buſineſs; and ſo alſo, though it were but to go half a Mile, the evil is the ſame.

So alſo to ſerve a Man's Country in the beſt imploy he is capable of, is every Man's Fundamental Duty; and to neglect it, is to bury our Talents: For any Man therefore to Vow ſuch a Vow, as engages him from his beſt capacity of Serving his Country, as to lead a Monks *Life*, *&c.* is of it ſelf unlawful, and, *ipſo facto* void, as it forbids an apparent Duty, and renders us little better than Drones in the Commonwealth we live in. Nay,

Nay, and ſuch breaches of Oaths and Vows, in ſuch caſe, like that of *Corban*, are no ſin; that we need not fear not to keep them, they being of themſelves void; the raſh making of them indeed was a ſin, but they have not the guilt of a black and wilful Perjury, as the World too often miſtakes, but rather a raſher reſolution only in them.

A Falſe Witneſs is guilty of a wilful Contempt to God, and Injuſtice to Man: but, in this, we have nothing more to repent of, then that we called God too lightly to Witneſs to a Reſolution not well weigh'd and underſtood: And, if this were a ſin, How could the *Jews* leave their Vows to the Law on *Chriſt's* Converting them? Or how can the Husband break his Marriage-bond, by Divorce, as even *Chriſt* gives leave for Adultery, and be guiltleſs?

So, if I make a Vow, it does not bind mine Heir; Or if as an Officer, it does not bind me as a Private Perſon; So, Are you a Prince, and would you know how far Your Parliament-Oath engages? all the Power not transfer'd to You remains, the Law of Nature makes all States compleat in themſelves, though by Compact it may be limitted.

So.

So alſo, as 'tis impoſſible to think of all neceſſary Conditions, as Life and Capacity of the Parties, *&c.* ſo we muſt have an Implicite regard to ſuch Conditions, in whatſoever Vows we make; and yet on the other hand, *Chriſt* Teaches us, That though I Swear but by my ſelf, yet am I as much bound, as if I Swore by God; ſo though I Swear by falſe Gods, yet my Obligation to Verity and Sincerity is ſtill the ſame.

But to return; Though there may be many things that may thus make a Promiſe void, although confirm'd by an Oath, witneſs Adultery in Marriage, *&c.* yet Juſtice, in many Caſes, will bind a Promiſe much ſtronger than a Vow, becauſe of the Expectance and Dependance thereon, and it's neceſſity in Commerce and Converſation; and yet little pety and deliberative Promiſes to ones ſelf only, as, I'll go to *London* to Morrow; or, I'll buy ſuch an Horſe, have no Obligation at all, but leave the Speaker free to his diſcretion.

So alſo a Mutual Promiſe is not valid till accepted; and yet even ſo, I am bound ſteadily to my offer as a Propoſer; but if Matters after change upon my Promiſe, and before acceptance, I am not then bound

bound, till you make my firſt Terms good: Thus if a Perſon be offer'd, and I accept to Marry, if ſhe fail me, I am Releas'd of my Promiſe; if not, I muſt ſtand to it: And thus God reſolv'd to deſtroy *Nineveh*, when, on their Repentance, he Revok'd their Sentence.

Further, I am bound by the Promiſe of my Ambaſſadour, Deputy, or General, to the utmoſt of their Commiſſion, and that though againſt private Inſtructions; and yet if by their Commiſſion I leave them the Power only to Treat for me, none but the Sponſers are engag'd beyond expreſs Order; ſo I am bound, by my League, though even to an Heathen, ſo far, as to preſerve him: But, as wicked Leagues are void, I may not fight for an Heathen to deſtroy Chriſtians, for that is to add more ſin to raſh Swearing, like the Death of *John* the Baptiſt to *Herod*'s Fooliſh Oath.

So alſo, no Promiſe can engage me againſt Self-preſervation; 'tis not lawful for me to lay down my Life even to ſave my Friends; I owe my Life only to God; and yet I may joyn with my Friend even to Death in a good Cauſe; but then I muſt Martyr for the Cauſe of God, and not my Friend: So, though I Promiſe to go a Journey, yet *I* may not go if there happen

happen a Dangerous Tempeſt at the time to endanger my Perſon.

But indeed, a Man has generally little need to add all theſe Cautious Limitations to Promiſes; we are too apt *to promiſe according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears*, without theſe Encouragements; but ſurely, in truth, all our Promiſes, whether confirm'd by Oath or not, ought to be equally Sacred: and though, in one Caſe, we are in danger of Perjury only; yet ought not that to beguile us into a conceipt that a Lye is of a weaker Guilt; and yet not but that tho' I may neither Equivocate, nor ſtrain the Words, I promiſe, or declare, if they are propos'd me knowingly doubtful, I may juſtly take them ſo.

Where ever therefore we have made Promiſes, and we have reaſon to Judge them faithful with whom they are made, we ought ſtrictly to obſerve them; but when they are made with perſons falſe, either by Practiſe or Principles, they are void, though confirm'd by Oath, as being contrary to the moſt Sacred Law of Self-preſervation; and yet, in ſuch Caſe, I offend God, by Treachery, indeed Black Perjury, by offering to engage my ſelf falſely where I cannot.

Thus

Thus, for Inſtance, 'tis impoſſible to make a League with a *Papiſt*, who cannot onely, by Principle, Swear what he intends not, but diſengage himſelf from Oaths by Equivocations, or otherwiſe, at pleaſure; for, as Leagues and Promiſes are mutual in their Obligation, and are otherwiſe of no force; ſo is it impoſſible that there be Faith Oblig'd to, with ſuch Men; and if there be any Method therefore to make Agreements with them, it muſt be by Securities and Hoſtages; witneſs the late Perſecution in *Savoy*.

So alſo, if a Man has been known to be falſe to his Promiſe by practice, or otherwiſe, no Mutual Obligation can tye us to Fidelity with him; and yet even then, if there be no danger of Life, but only of ſome Temporal Damage, and I make a Single, not Mutual promiſe, I am bound to Fidelity. So in a Mutual promiſe, if the falſe perſon has actually perform'd his part, without he give me a Releaſe, and then I am Diſcharg'd, though on Oath.

Of CENSURE.

THe better to deliver what I have to Write concerning *Cenſure*, I ſhall diſtribute my in Diſcourſe into Four Parts; The Firſt Part of my *Eſſay*, to ſhew the Nature of *Praiſes*; The Second, to ſhew us what *Contempt* is; The Third, to add a few Words concerning *Libels* and *Satyrs*; And, the Laſt, to add ſome Reflections on all manner of *Raſh Judgments* and *Reports* whatever: But Firſt, as for *Praiſes*.

Of Praiſe.

We Cenſure others to be Commended our ſelves; and, in truth, it is rather to exalt our own Judgments, than the Merits of thoſe we Praiſe, that we enlarge in their Commendations; ſo that at the bottom we Praiſe our ſelves, when we would ſeem to Praiſe them. In plain terms, one might almoſt conclude, That neither Vice is blam'd, nor Vertue commended, but out of Intereſt; and, that for Intereſt we can admit any Praiſe: and ſo alſo, the Modeſty which ſeems to refuſe Praiſe, is

indeed, nothing elſe but a deſire to have it in a way leſs viſible, and more delicate.

Thus alſo we do not love to give Praiſes, nor do we beſtow them but rarely, except for Intereſt. Indeed, *I* may ſay, Praiſe is a conceal'd and delicate Flattery, that ſatisfies differently him that gives it, and him that receives it; the one takes it as a Recompence of his Merit, and the other gives it as a Mark of his Equity and Judgment; and yet Praiſes have at leaſt this good, that they ſerve to fix us in the Practice of Virtue; and the Approbation that is given, to Wit, to Beauty, or to Courage, at leaſt augment and perfect them, and make them do more than they were able to have done of themſelves.

But, beſides this, ſome Men too often uſe poyſon'd Praiſes, and which ſhew, by a ſide-glance, the Faults of thoſe they Praiſe, and which they dare not to diſcover otherwiſe; thus they exalt the glory of ſome, thereby the better to leſſen that of others; and give Men a little Commendation, that they may be the better able to Accuſe them alſo.

And thus it happens ſometimes, that there are Praiſes that Reproach, and Reproaches that Praiſe; and yet there are few people that are wiſe enough to love the

the Reproof which does them good, better than the praiſe which betrays them; and yet they ſhall refuſe praiſe too; but yet then 'tis as with a deſire to be doubly prais'd.

Upon the whole, he that always praiſes me, is undoubtedly a Flatterer; but, he that ſometimes praiſes, and ſometimes reproves me, is probably my Friend, and ſpeaks his Mind: And yet in ſuch caſe, did we not flatter our ſelves, others would do us no hurt; but, when Men take ſhelter under the Arch-flatterer ones ſelf, then it is that they injure us.

And as Men are thus apt to be fond of praiſes, ſo are they no leſs inclin'd to be avers'd to contempt: In truth, I may ſay, nothing makes Men greater ſlaves than Mockery; yet not but that Flattery is more dangerous than Contempt, though leſs acceptable: Contempt at leaſt keeps us in the Methods of Plain-dealing; whilſt Flattery carries multiply'd Miſchiefs in it, and not only cheats and cozens us, but eats out and deſtroys the very fountains of Truth in us.

To be ſhort; Well might *Auguſtus* lament for *Varrus*'s death, becauſe, ſaid he, *I* have none in my Country that dares tell me Truth: And, if any thing upon

Earth can make us miſerable, ſurely it muſt be to be fool'd and cheated by the falſe Lights of flatterers: I do not mean your little common flatterers, that ſeek no deeper than into a few General pleaſing Attributes only; but your Arch-flatterers, and ſuch as are too common in Courts, and who, perverting the whole courſe of Sincerity and Truth, aim at nothing elſe but ſcruing up all things, juſt to pleaſe and delight the party Courted.

Of Contempt.

But on the other ſide, as for Contempt, one may ſay, the Rich and the Poor have the ſame appetites and paſſions, only differently expreſs'd and diſguis'd; and all people, nay even the meaneſt, are alike impatient of Diſcountenance or Contempt, be the perſon never ſo great from whom they receive it.

Nay, and we all agree further in this, that we are more impatient to have our Underſtandings reflected on, than our Manners; and we can better bear the imputation of Vice than Folly; the reaſon is, we value our Credit and Intereſt more than our Honeſty, and we had much rather ſave our Eſtates and our Pleaſures, than our Souls.

But

But indeed, had we courage enough to be wiſe, we ſhould regard Reſentments only from their Reaſon, their Depth and Weight, and not from Popularity and Opinion: Now, ſhould we do ſo, I ſay, not only our greateſt concern would be at Vice and Sin, when they reproach us, but, as 'tis evident, that Contempt, Scurril and Laughter, are but as the Froth of Reaſoning, and have no other bottom, but Vanity and Folly; ſo they ought not to be regarded in no ſort, but as the effects of Weakneſs, and want of Judgment.

Wiſdom bids us be Charitable, and bear with others; nay, and not only ſo, but aſſiſt them in their Infirmities: How contrary then muſt this Malitious Reſentment of Contempt be, which Delights and Rejoyces in others Misfortunes, and endeavours all it can, to advance them?

Beſides, Contempt is a ſet, ſtubborn, and reſolute averſion and hatred: Now, I ſay, as this can neither with Juſtice or Charity be paid to any thing but Vice or Sin, ſo we are unjuſt to give it to any thing elſe: And hence, What though a Man be Vicious, and his Crimes deſerve all the Contempt in the World; yet his Perſon, and as he is our Brother, he rather deſerves our Pity?

And, in truth, we are Raſh Fools to hate any thing that God does not; he only and wholly ought to be the ſtandard of our Affections; and beſure as he neither does nor can hate us for our Misfortunes, as indeed it were to hate us for being his very Creatures to do it, and which is impoſſible; ſo the only occaſion of his contempt of us, is our Miſaction, and our Aberration from his Law; and yet even then alſo he has Mercy: and we, if we will be like him, ſurely ought not to be without it.

Nay more; Is any one weak and fooliſh, 'tis my poſitive duty to pity him, and, in Charity, where I can, to adviſe him, much more not to deſpiſe him? So, Is there any one Wicked, 'tis my duty to Reform him, and not harden him by Scoffing at him? And, indeed, *Chriſt*, by his Example, ſhews us, That we ought to Pray for, and Adviſe, not only our Enemies, but our Murderers alſo. And, With what Arrogance then ſhall we preſume to leave our Stations, as Creatures I mean, in continuing in invincible Brotherly Love; and, to take upon us, like God, through a raſh and peremptory Contempt, to Judge, Cenſure and Condemn, as our little Fancies ſhall lead us?

Of

Of Libels.

But, above all things, in this matter, our Perſonal Satyrs and Libels are the moſt Pernicious, the moſt Vicious and Uncharitable: I might ſay, nothing deſerves Satyr, but Sin and Satyr. And if a Man would ask the Queſtion, When a Wicked Man moſt reſembles the Deſtroyer of of Mankind? 'Tis when he is Maliciouſly dipt in the Barbarous Guilt of Satyr, and flinging Fire-brands about him, to the Diſtraction and Confuſion of all he Converſes.

Nor know I any Remedy againſt this Peſt, but ſuch a ſcorn and contempt as it deſerves. Some have preſcrib'd Humility; and ſay, a Flint is eaſieſt broke on a Feather-bed: Others, to avoid it, like Sir *John Sucklin*, have Laugh'd at themſelves firſt; but, my ſenſe is, they deſerve none of this care. What a Waſp, a Child, or a Fool ſneers at my Actions! and he underſtands no more a true Reaſon for his Cenſure, than a Parrot; only he is well-skill'd at the Elegancy of Rayling; and, for prevention, cries Blockhead firſt.

And, hence it is as a Secret belonging to the Wiſe, to give full liberty to the Malice and Envy of ſuch, the baſer ſort, and to let them vent themſelves in Calumnies, and falſe Reports; ſo that when they have ſpoken very ill of brave and worthy Men, at length finding their own Reputation and Fortunes to lye at ſtake, for fear of Revenge they may be brought to forbear.

And, indeed otherwiſe, the only Remedy againſt Satyrs and Libels, is a Contemptible Silence: Nor can you half ſo much vex their Authors, by a Witty Retort, as ſuch a Neglect: By the firſt, you at leaſt acknowledge their Power, and you may be ſure they will not be without hopes or endeavours to be even with you again; for, they have ſeldom that Charity as to forbear abuſing you, while, by the latter, you ſhame them, and irretrievably condemn them as *Billinſgates*.

Upon the whole, our beſt Leſſon that we can learn from hence, that I ſee, is to know the true Value of Contempt, and Reputation: Now, as the only benefit of a good Name therefore is like Cloaths to defend us from outward Accidents, and the only real miſchief of Contempt, the Impediment of our Affairs; So, Why ſhould we value it further? Alaſs! What

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is a Name when we are dead? were it not to advance our Children and Posterity? the Honour otherwise that is not paid us in person, vanishes into idle Air: And what, tho' our Names remain, our little tickling and fond *Vain Glory*, which is the only itch we aim to satisfy, perishes with our persons.

Of true Satyr.

And yet after all, not but that there is a Satyr as excellent and profitable as innocent; a true *Juvenal* shall lash men out of Vice as fast as ten serious Sermons; but then withall, it ought to be against Things and Causes, and not Persons; against Vices and Errors, and not their Subjects or Professors: Thus, like *Elijah*, we may innocently droll at *Ahabs* false Gods, and say, *they are sleeping, talking, or gone a journy, and therefore they cannot hear us; while our Charity at the same time, shews all tenderness for our Erring Brethren, and that we are ready with him even to a Miracle, if in our power, to reform them of their Errors*: But otherwise, who can write or speak *Satyr*, and be guiltless?

And just so in our ordinary Writings also, when we take care to give all the Dues of

of Charity to our Brother; 'tis a modeſt ſheepiſhneſs not fully to reſcue Truth from his Clamours; Vice and Errors deſerve their true Characters; and 'tis falſe Reaſoning, not genteelneſs, to ſpeak eaſily and ſmoothly of Wickedneſs, to ſooth men in their Corruptions: Give me the man that dares give all Subjects their proper Colours; I hate the ſtile that nautiates with too many broad Words; but the mincing *Frenchify'd* ſtile that Complements all things, and ruines the Partition Wall of Truth, what is it but lying and impertinent, in that it wants the true and opportunely life of *Satyr* in it?

I might add, to what end do we let ſuch harſh words paſs like current Coyn amongſt us, if they have not perfect Ideas? if they are Chimera's, in God's Name, let us fling them quite aſide; but if we muſt hate the word Poyſon for the thing, if we muſt not ſpeak a word that is not Alamode and Agreeable, for fear of grating dainty Ears, let us alſo for the ſame Reaſon, neither ſee nor converſe, leſt we meet with thoſe very Objects themſelves that are more diſagreeable. In plain terms, theſe finical Sir *Courtly Nice* Wits want Judgment, not Elegancy for their Apology: Alaſs-a-day! we muſt not ſpeak out broad Vice and Whoring,

Whoring, for fear of touch ing their guilty Conſciences.

This I grant, I would not rip up unknown Vices, leſt their very Repetitions ſhould breed Contagions : In that indeed, there is ſome Vertue in being modeſt and obſcure in our Diſcourſe ; but in known and every day practic'd Crimes, to loſe the vividneſs and force of half our Notions, by a tedious circumlocution,and beating of the Buſh; is in plain terms, no other than a mean and cowardly ſneaking to a worldly falſe idea'd Honour, a gilding the way to Hell, and right Devil-Advocate like, a means to deſtroy all thoſe true Ideas of Horrour, which genuinely and naturally quadrate to the ſetting forth of the odiouſneſs and deformity of Vice.

If any one think I write too bitterly in this caſe, let them know, I think, even this very ſheepiſh Inſipidneſs as great a Vice as reigns in our Age; and let them not wonder then, that I treat it accordingly : Our Saviour, and the Apoſtles, and Prophets of Old, treated their Generations of *Vipers* in Stiles anſwerable to their demerits; but we forſooth are afraid, in genteelneſs to own their Whore of *Babylon*, as Monſieur *Jurieu* well reflects ; tho' all the Scriptures require it at our *hands*, to brand her for her *Fornications*

Fornications and *Adulteries*: But let ſuch Cowards and Lukewarms (that the holy *Revelations* ſufficiently threaten) do what they will; for my part, I ſhall always condemn *Vice* and *Sin*, in as groſs and harſh Characters as the monſters deſerve. To me 'tis no wit either to lye, or write inſenſibly; and what do we do elſe, when we do not pourtraicture all the things and notions we treat of to the full life?

Should a *Painter* draw the Picture of a *Bear*, and omit his Claws, or his Brawny Muſcles; or ſhould he Decipher a *Tiger* like a *Lamb*, or ſlim the *Wild-Boar* to a *Greyhound*, and omit his Tusks? Should we value the Pictures for their inſipid genteelneſs? No: the grace of the *Bear* were in his Terrour, the beauty of the *Tyger* in his active Fierceneſs, and the whole Life of the *Boar* in his Horrour and Deformity: And even ſo in the Pictures of *Sin* and *Vice* alſo; 'tis all the Art in a true Moraliſt and Religious, exactly to delineate their Tusks, their Claws, and their Jaws; nay, 'tis the object of Elegancy, to be nice in thoſe Parts; and not to be afraid to diſplay them for fear of offending ſilly Women, weaker Men and Children.

The *Vulgar* indeed, like unskilful Dawbers, ſpoil this Liberty, and are ſo bewitched

to

to painting *Bears* through their Malice and Railing, that they can hardly draw a Man without ſome Beſtiality; either they add Claws to him, and make a Beaſt of Prey of him, or Gay Feathers, and turn him to a Peacock, or add him a Tayle, and turn him to a Monky: But what! muſt their Blunderings make us paint nothing but Beauties, their Deformities make us deal in nothing but Angels? Surely, after all, and in all caſes, the true good Picture anſwers the Life, and neither Humour nor Fancy can change their Natures; and, if on the one ſide we will avoid the *Billinsgate* Colours of the Mob, on the other the Proverb, *Stulti dum fugiunt vitia in contraria current*; will certainly hit us, if we do not draw the *Owl* and *Batt* to the life, as well as the *Dove* and *Eagle*.

Of Raſh Judgment.

But to return, and proceed a little more particularly to falſe Judgments and Reports.

Moſt people ſee nothing in others, but the Repute that they have in the world, and what their Fortune merits; and yet they are as confident in their Cenſures of them, as if they had Windows into their Hearts.

Hearts. Indeed, we are perfectly known only by our Friends, and yet our Enemies and Strangers will judge us moſt, and who know leaſt the truth of what they Cenſure.

And one might ſay in ſuch caſe, our readineſs to be evil without examining, is pride and lazineſs in a Medley. We would willingly find perſons guilty, but will not give our ſelves the trouble to examine their Caſes: But alaſs! had we no Faults in our ſelves, we ſhould not be ſo apt to obſerve them in others: I may ſay, we are naturally apt to diſapprove in others what we think in juſtice, others may diſapprove in us.

To cure this raſh Judgment therefore, I may add, We ſhould take care as well to rectify our own Faults as our Reaſonings: In our Reaſonings we ſhould be rather ſlow to ſpeak, and conſiderate, than fiery and precipitate. In our Errors, ſhould we but have perpetually *Memorandums* of the Failings of our ſelves before us, we ſhould not be ſo apt to have ſo little mercy for others; but alaſs! we are neither ſo juſt as to reflect on our own Faults, or the Excellencies of the Perſons we would condemn.

And hence indeed, I may add, were our principal

principal Quarrel at Reports for the Injuſtice of their raſh Cenſure, and not from Self-love, we ſhould be equally cautious and concern'd at their Injuſtice to others as our ſelves; but really our general Grievance is, when our ſelves are the Object of them; and ſo in truth, all our Judgment of them is partial.

Nay, and we are the more concern'd at ſuch raſh Cenſures, as if we fancied our ſelves the only Objects of them; and whereas indeed, we are not: but all the World in general, are apt to judge by Appearances; and whoever has ſuch and ſuch Appearances, or where ever they happen, juſt ſuch a Cenſure follows, whether in our ſelves or others, of courſe.

So that, I may ſay, till we can hope to rectify this common, but unjuſt Judgment, by Appearances, and which to me ſeems next to an impoſſibility, we had as good fancy, that common Robbers had a particular deſign upon us, that meet us, & rob us, with all that they meet in ſuch a Road: For juſt ſo Men cenſure ſuch and ſuch, that they find mark'd with ſuch offenſive Qualities.

Nay, and it is even Ridiculous therefore to expect to be the only Perſon the World will ſpare, ſince Chriſt himſelf was not priviledg'd

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priviledg'd in this caſe: Can you walk the Streets and not expect to be daſh'd? Surely, if ſuch Judgments can put us out of Humour, we ſhall never be pleas'd.

So alſo, ſuppoſe that any man tell thee of ſuch a Cenſure; what is it, but that a whiſper is reveal'd to thee, and a giddy Report Publiſhed? for thou art beſide thy ſelf, if thou expect there ſhould be no Cenſure of thee; and if ſo, no wonder that ſome of them happen to be Publiſh'd, of thee, and to thy diſadvantage.

And beſides, do we expect an Univerſal Love? we are unjuſt, and there is none of us that deſerves it; nay, and as there is nothing more free than Love, ſo we ought not to pretend to purchaſe it by Complaints and Reproaches, but Love and Complaiſance: Nay, and ſuppoſe we deſerve not this Love, yet would we put a force on Mens Paſſions, and make them to love us whether they will or no?

Nay, and indeed ſuppoſe we really deſerve to be lov'd of Men, but ſome light appearances make them Cenſure us, we ought rather to complain of their weakneſs and lightneſs, and of the frailty of Humanity than of their Injuſtice; 'tis not he that miſtakes, but he that wilfully Cenſures wrong, that is Unjuſt.

Beſides,

Beſides, ſome love us not ſo much that we deſerve their Love, as that they fancy an Idea we have ſuch Qualities as they eſteem amiable, and which poſſibly we have not: Suppoſe then that Truth were ſetled in Cenſure, we ſhould loſe as much Love as Hate; for Mankind is giddy and unſteady, and has not ſet the ſure grounds of Piety and Vertue for their Cenſure; for indeed thoſe Qualities are only really amiable, and all other Friendſhip unſtable and fleeting.

But to proceed, if ſuch raſh Judgments and Cenſures of any ſort really injure us, 'tis more that they join with our imagination, and by them affect us and diſturb us, then that they have any real Power in themſelves; alaſs! in themſelves generally they are but Air, and their Love and Flattery is more hurtful than their Spite and Miſchief; for that too often poyſons our hearts with a mortal ſweetneſs; while as an indifferency leaves our Journy toward God with more liberty.

And beſides, if others are faulty in their Cenſures, their injury is to themſelves and not to us: It deſerves our pity, not our complaint. When we do our Duty to others, we do it for God's ſake, and fruſtrate our ends; when we expect our Reward,

ward, and return from Man, we ſhould be glad, that God gave us the opportunity therefore; and we ſhould dread a recompence from the World, leſt our hearts ſhould accuſe us, and ſay, *This was not done purely for God's ſake.*

In ſhort, when you are charitable to the poor, Do you expect they repay you? and ſo, when you are charitable to the Slandered, to the poor in Fame, muſt he return your Complement? Well may God, may I ſay, puniſh us by their ingratitude, when we ſo baſely tranſlate the true end of our Actions from himſelf to his Creatures; and indeed, what Fools are we to value a Complement and a Trifle, before the great Rewards of an All-ſufficient God.

Of Reports.

Therefore, *I* think, that by this time, we may very well conclude that.

Laſtly, As for Reports, 'tis a common, but grievous Error among Mankind, that Juſtice ſhould let Mens Tongues looſe to a full liberty, in reſpect of them, more than in the more ſolemn diſtributions of *Meum* and *Tuum*; whereas certainly, in truth, and if Men would but duly conſider their Duty, they would find, that Juſtice and Charity engage them equally in Reports as in Commerce.

And

And thus, ſuppoſe any perſon of Credit inform'd me, that ſuch an one was a Cheat: I ſay, I have no Title hereby to condemn or call him ſo, no more, than to hang a Fellon through common Fame: and yet I may juſtly refuſe thereby to give him any great degree of Credit; nay, and to indempnify my Friend from him, I may acquaint him with the juſt grounds of my Jealouſy, but then it muſt be to preſerve his real intereſt, and not malitiouſly; and therefore, I am bound in Juſtice not to add to the Story I have heard.

Nor is it a leſs Vice in Reports, to commend wicked Perſons more than they deſerve, than to defame and blemiſh the Reputation of the Innocent; for thereby we Authorize and make an Example of what is abominable: And ſurely, nothing can be more pernicious than ſuch a Courſe! Thus we ought not to praiſe the Devotion of a Man that is a known Cheat, nor the honeſty of a Robber or Pyrate: Can we aſſure our ſelves how far the influence of ſuch our Commendation ſhall extend?

But to ſtrike at the Bottom of Reports; Did we proceed with Juſtice, we ſhould do like Judges; and not condemn one ſide, till we have heard t'other, till we have ex-

amined Witneſſes and Proofs, even ſcruplouſly on both ſides. I am ſure, no man but would think himſelf hardly us'd with other Meaſures in a Court of Juſtice; and why not in Reports alſo, when we preſume with confidence to affirm groundleſs Scandals of one another?

I may add, How often are the Senſe and Coherence of Men's Words wreſted, quite contrary to their Primitive Intention? And who is more apt for ſuch an Injuſtice than a captious and idle Tale-bearer? So, how often are the beſt and faireſt Actions repreſented even as Vices? And if ſo, What care can we take ſufficient in our Cenſures and Reports? or what real value can one place on Reputation, when one conſiders the Inconſtancy and Injuſtice of the World?

To conclude, When Reports therefore are faulty of us, we ought rather to pity the World in their Weakneſs, than to be angry at them: For is it not a ſpectacle full worthy of our Compaſſion, to ſee men love to ruine one anothers Reputation? and if they entertain an eſteem of any one, 'tis as it were againſt their Wills, and in ſpight of them, and they are glad of every little Scandal to blemiſh the fair Character.

Upon

Upon the whole, defame not good perſons, tho' for accidental Blots in their Actions, in juſtice to the reſt; and for evil perſons, tho' never ſo mean, do not too eaſily defame them, in juſtice to thy ſelf, and leſt they be reveng'd upon thee, remember *Æſop*'s *Beetle could fling down the Eagles Eggs*; and though 'tis true, Innocence is a Breaſt of Steel againſt Malice and ill Fame, yet only in our own Conſciences; for it will not preſerve us from outward Miſchiefs.

Of POETRY.

THE Traffick of Poetry is but in the froth of Reaſoning, and the colours of Morality. I muſt confeſs, for its Light and careleſs Touch to the Mind, like Muſick, 'tis an excellent Recreation ſometimes; but for any Man to ſet his Genius upon it, is to Trade in Cockle-ſhells, and to catch at meer empty Noyſes and Shadows.

Give me the Diamond that is true *Brilliant* cut in its ſelf, and that needs nothing of the *Golden Caskanett*, to ſet it off, or adorn it: I may ſay, 'tis a kind of Whoring of true Wit, to dreſs it in Poetry; and if a true Poet hates to ſee the Plot, and turn of his Play ſum'd away by *Opera* into Shew and Noiſe; much more may genuine and vigorous ſenſe, ſcorn to be cramp'd and manacl'd by Verſe, for the ſake of a little paultry Rhime and Metre, to ſet it out with.

And to me therefore, it appears no other, than a Reflection on Mr. *Hobbs*, who would otherwiſe ſeem a Philoſopher

to

to tranſlate *Homer*; not that I would ſo much undervalue *Homer* neither, as the imployment of his Judgment, and that he ſhould ſquander away ſo much time in a meer Diverſion, and the endleſs gingle of Words.

Would you know why Poets are poor; I think it is their due Reward; for when men weakly are too much enamour'd with Butter-fly Fancy, 'tis fit, as a piece of natural Juſtice, that Poverty, as an arm'd Man, ſhould come upon them, and force them to Reaſon, and to worldly and heavenly real Cares to imploy them better.

And yet, to ſhew the Vanity of Mankind, 'tis wonderful to ſee how they are bewitched to the Charming Rhymes of Verſes; but more eſpecially, if they are *Satyr*, men are naturally envious, and love to admire themſelves, chiefly in the degrading of others: And hence 'tis, that you ſhall find a Lord *R*------- malitious Wit, cry'd up for a Miracle, when may be a fifty times greater or diviner in a good Man, is ſcarce diſcernable.

But above all, what infinite Lies and Fables our Poets, Ancient and Modern, have fill'd the world with? Who can end the Stories of their Gods, their Ryots, and Metamorphoſes, *&c.* the moſt pernici-

ous means in the Debauch of the Old Heathen Morals; and ſo even now, Who looks into a Poem and expects truth? And alaſs! What is it but our common Plays and Poems that paint Vices for Vertues, and turn even the Devil to an Angel of Light?

And what, ſhall we call theſe Poets *Prophets* then? No: if their Rage be inſpir'd them, 'tis by the Devil; if they deal in Hiſtory, they ſophiſticate it; or if in Morality, they rhodomontado it: So that in truth, Poetry may very properly be call'd *Vinum Dæmonum*, and deſerve no manner of reſpect with men of Judgment; for tho' the Subject be good and pious, yet who delights to ſee it ſtrain'd beyond truth? Surely, Poetry when it is exceſſive, deſerves rather to be called a Madneſs than an Art.

As for the Laws of Poetry, 'tis idle to ſet fixt Forms or Bounds for Rhymes or Metre either, ſince the only Rule for Poetry, is the adding the Delight as it were of Chyming Words to the Senſe; nay, and that may be as well without Rhymes as with. Witneſs *Milton*'s *Paradiſe Loſt*, and the *Latine Poets*, or without ſet Metre, as *Horace* and *Cowleys* Pindaricks, or indeed, any other way whatſoever.

And,

And, ſo as to the Feet of ſuch *Meter*, whether *Dactils*, or *Spondees*, &c. and as to the bounds of ſuch *Meter*, whether *Jambicks*, &c. the ſearch is both idle and endleſs: Indeed *Alſted* reckons up no leſs then 124. ſeveral Feet; ſo that Cuſtom is only able to limit them, and Pleaſurableneſs is their greateſt Excellency. Smoothneſs even in Oratory is neceſſary, that its Roughneſs may not interrupt Attention; and more even in *Poetry*, is idle.

So, What ſhall I ſay to our ſeveral ſorts of *Meter* alſo; your *Acroſticks*, your *Anagrams*, and an Hundred other little Bawbles; as *Ecchoes*, *Riddles*, *Meter*, compos'd in the ſhape of *Pots* and *Crowns*; ſo your *Verſes* that are to be Read backwards, and that contain the Year of the Date in *Roman Letters*? Are not theſe endleſs and innumerable Trifles, and fitter for a Toy-ſhop, than a Wiſe Man's Head?

So alſo, What a ſputter we have to know the Long, and the Short of a Syllable! forſooth, we muſt have Whole Volumes for the ſake of ſuch a Trifle: So, What a Noiſe we have to know the due Bounds of a *Poetica Licentia*, as if there were ſome Myſtery, or Divinity in the Impertinencies of *Poets*; *Riſum teneatis amici*?

And

And yet after all, not but that *Poetry* not abus'd, may be both pleaſant and uſeful too, in its time; but then it ought preciſely to follow Truth in Story, and not be cramp'd in the *Meter:* To be ſhort, the two great Faults, in my Senſe, and that generally deſtroy the Air of moſt *Poetry*, are, when Men either cripple it with too Nice Rules, like *Ariſtotle*; or, in ſtead of preſenting us with an even current of Thought in it, patch it up to us as with an endleſs Fardle of *Fancies*.

Of

Of Preface and Dedication.

OUr common Preface-makers tell us, That a Book without a *Preface*, is like a Face without a Crevat; But, ſuppoſe a rugged *Spaniard* is avers'd to this little *Alamode de Paris*; I hope the true *Engliſh-man* will not refuſe to Converſe with him therefore.

Juſt ſo, if the *Preface* be the *Crevat*, ſurely *Dedication* is the *Beaux-ſtring*; and the Man is as no Body, that cannot proſtitute himſelf Genteelly and Delicately to Rhodomontade and Flattery in it.

In plain terms, Men uſe their Books like Begging-paſſes, more to procure themſelves good and eaſie means by the way, than to haſten themſelves really to the truer ends of Life by them.

So our Dedications alſo run in a ſtrain, as if they were to beg a Protection to our Books; but alaſs! conſult the Authors real Sence in the Matter, and he'll tell you, he has rather done an honour, than expects ſuch a favour by it.

I won't ſay, That all our Prefaces and Dedications are Compos'd of ſuch a Medly as this; but ſurely too many of them are

ſo

ſo impertinent, and ſo luſcious, that the *Authors* have often ſpoil'd a good Book by them.

The Zealous *Puritan*, that will not ſo much as Smoke a Pipe of Tobacco without a Grace; yet, when more ſolemnly he comes to make a Publication to Inſtruct the World, his Intereſt ſhall make him Sacrifice all his Cant to ſome profitable Brother or Siſter.

God ſmote *Herod* for taking the Honour of his own Speech to himſelf: Alaſs! we are infinitely more Arrogant than he. We Dare ſo great a Property in ſuch our Glory, that we can preſumptuouſly transfer it to another; 'tis well we live not among the Primitive Diſpenſations of Judgments.

What a delicate medly it is; a Book full of Raptures of Devotion, and a Dedication as vile and wicked, as Unmanly and Ungenerous in its Flatteries.

Did you approach, by a gracious permiſſion, the Preſence of a King? And would you be ſo Sawcy, as to make the Noble favour and honour done you, only the occaſion to Complement ſome little petty Courtier before him?

Much

Much more, dare you appear in the Preſence of the King of Kings, in ſolemnly preſuming to declare and deliver his Laws, and at the very Footſtool of his Throne, preſume to exalt the Merits of any Mortal Man?

Surely, if e're we take God's Name in vain, 'tis then; and when we rob the Divine Majeſty of a ſuitable Reverence; But who has the loſs by it? And who ſuffers by our bringing the Sacred Deity into contempt? ſurely our ſelves: If we reverence him not duly, 'tis we ſhall ſuffer for it: Alaſs! he himſelf ſtands in need of none of our honour.

Some Heathens have never deliver'd the Name of GOD but in Great Letters; nay, others have never Printed any other Word in the ſame Line, leaſt the haſty Reader ſhould heedleſly paſs it o're; but, Can this be to the honour of us Chriſtians, who thus care not how we treat him?

Were we to Write the Life of *Alexander* the Great, and after ſome ſingular Praiſes and Encomiums, ſhould Dedicate it to ſome illuſtrious, over-grown, and ſingularly well qualified Mouſe; Would not this redound, by way of Matchleſs Honour, to *Alexander*?

Every

Even ſo, when we treat with the Great God of Heaven, Is it decent to magnifie even Princes in his Preſence? nay, Is there any Parity between Finite and Infinite? and the diſhonour to God and *Alexander* in ſuch caſe?

Surely, all our private Dedications are, at beſt, but an Injuſtice to God therefore; but ſuch as theſe a manifeſt Contumely to him: VVe ought not to Name the Name, much leſs to treat any thing relating to the Divine Being, without the greateſt ſence of his Majeſty.

VVhen we Name therefore the Inviſible, Infinite and Eternal Maker of all things, Is it ſuitable, even to Aggrandize the whole Earth in his Preſence? and to whom the whole Globe is but as a drop of the Bucket?

VVhen we deliver his Truths, Is it ſuitable to any ſence of Providence to crave the Protection of any Man on Earth for them? Good God! How great is the vanity, as well as the Impiety of theſe flatteries?

He that alone endures for Ages, that diſpoſes of Kingdoms at his pleaſure, and in whoſe hand, are, and have been all the Mightieſt Men upon Earth; Needs he an Aſſiſtant, leaſt his eternal

Will

VVill ſhould fail? And, if 'tis not his VVill, VVho ſhall ſupport it?

To be ſhort; I wiſh what *I* VVrite could Perſwade Men to a more truly Religious frame in this Matter; if not, I yet ſhall be content, that I have done my duty in VVarning them, and to the VVill of God be left the Succeſs on it.

But, for my own part, I declare, were I either to loſe or gain the *Indies* by ſuch Methods, I would ſooner burn my Self and Papers, than ſtoop to ſo mean and corrupt a Practice.

I will not ſay, that like the Apoſtles, we may not juſtly write *Epiſtolarly* to a *Church*, or Brother; for certainly, ſo long as we preſerve the due Decorum of Decency and Verity, that muſt be moſt Innocent; but ſurely, whatever exceeds that, muſt ſavour either of Vanity or Evil.

Of STUDY.

STudies ſerve either for Delight, for Ornament, or for Ability; for Delight in Retirement, for Ornament in Diſcourſe, and for Ability in Judgment, and Diſpoſition of Buſineſs; and yet to ſpend too much time in Study, is ſloth; to uſe them too much for Ornament, is Affectation; and, to confine our Judgment too preciſely to their Rules, is Formal and Pedantick.

And thus likewiſe, Reading makes a full Man, or copious Notion; Conference a ready Man, and a temper Converſable; and Writing an exact Man, or a Complete Idea. Indeed, there is no ſtond, or impediment in the Wit, but that may be wrought out by fit Studies: And if there be any knot, that I cannot by Study work off at one time, Meditation ſhall do it at another.

But he buyes himſelf but a melancholy ſlavery, who Studies more than neceſſary: Now, ſuch our neceſſity appears by this, either in attaining agreeable accompliſhments, or in preparation for buſineſs, or in a Charitable inſtruction of

our

our Brother: But rather than Study beyond theſe ends, we ought to confine our ſelves even to ſet-hours, and to times and ſeaſons.

To be ſhort; Crafty Men contemn Studies, as the longeſt way about, and, as true Wiſdom is too laborious for them; ſimple Men admire them, as it is their very Exaltation to be in Wonders; and Wiſe Men uſe them: they perfect Nature, and are perfected by Experience: for Natural Parts, like Natural Plants, are the better for Pruning and Grafting.

The Method of Study.

But, as we love to do nothing in vain, and are not willing to beſtow pains, where it will not make us any return; ſo, no Prudent Man will venture on any courſe of Study, till he has firſt throughly ſetled the exacteſt Meaſures of his Method.

And thus, if you Read, obſerve nicely to do it deliberately, chooſing your times, when you are not likely to be diſturb'd; but, above all, be ſure to maintain a continued and ſteady apprehenſion in whatever you do; and whenever you find that diſturbed, or deſtroy'd, never diſtract your ſelf further, but ceaſe Study, leaſt you loſe

as much in the Confuſion and want of Method, as you get in the Quantity.

Indeed, I may add, to Study more than four or five hours a day, except it be purely in Copying Writings, is too much; it precipitates our Judgment, and ſowrs our proceedings; And, what Improvement can you expect then, when as you increaſe in the Maſs, you loſe in the Digeſtion; nay, and may be, for want of Conſideration, indiſcernably engage your ſelf in nothing elſe but Trifle's.

Nay, and beſides, What is it that makes our Studies uneaſie to us, but when we are thus careleſs in Examining their Circumſtances? if we are too violent in them, well may we be confounded and fatigued; and if we thoughtleſly ſet about them, in the midſt of Interruption, Can we juſtly charge it on the Nature of Study, when we complain of its uneaſineſs?

So in Reading, Can you think that when you gallop over a good *Author*, you do not flatten him, and loſe half his Life and Subſtance? ſurely you do: Alaſs! if you intend to be a Student to effect, you muſt learn to purſue your Subject with Patience, and Diſcipline your ſelf to a laborious conſtancy; but, above all, if you intend to Study much, riſe early, and have time

time before you, For why ſhould you impair your Health by it for want of Exerciſe?

Nor be diſcouraged, that thou canſt not ſucceed in thy Studies immediately, or at the firſt engagement; if thou aimeſt at Perfection, thou muſt not Muſhroom-like, think to ſpring up in a day, no, nor a Year; no, alaſs! thou muſt cut thy way even through Mountains of Errors and Prejudices: And, though thou mayſt patch up a Cottage in an hour, yet a beautiful City of Thought, a new *Rome*, fit for an Humane Soul to reign in, is not to be hew'd out of the Rocks, rear'd and adorn'd in a day.

And, in this caſe, had the World been as diligent in a ſincere and impartial Meditation, as they have been in their Pedantry, I am perſwaded that by this time, Knowledge had been Quadruple to what it is; not that I would have Men wholly fling aſide all former helps neither; but I would have them make their Reading as ſubſervient to their own digeſtion; for my part there's nothing that I have either receiv'd or borrow'd, that I have not reduc'd to my own Method and Diſpoſal.

Hence ſome Books are to be Taſted, others to be Swallow'd, and ſome few to be Chewed and Digeſted; ſome Books may be Read by Deputy, that is, by Extracts: But, in all our Methods we ought never to Read, to Contradict and Confute only; nor to believe, nor take for granted, nor meerly to find Talk and Diſcourſe; but duly to Weigh, Conſider, and Digeſt alſo.

And, in this Caſe, I may add, that, as an ill Stomach craves for more than it can digeſt, ſo 'tis an irregular Student that Reads more than he Conſiders how to Command: and, as he that in ſuch caſe, eats more than he Digeſts, breeds Humours; ſo, ſurely, I may as juſtly add, that a Reader, beyond the true Capacity of his Comprehenſion alſo, breeds Errours. And, to carry the Simile a little further.

As the ſoundeſt Meats prove the beſt nouriſhment, though they are often difficult to digeſt, ſo the Intricateſt Notions commonly prove the Students beſt Informers, though for a little time they may amuſe his Conception; for, as Marrow lies in bones, ſo Valuable Secrets lye generally wrapt in Difficulties; beſides that, any one Difficulty left unconquer'd, is enough

enough to cloud and confound the whole Idea of our Studies and Notions that follow it.

As for Collections in Writing, and without which, to Study by Reading, is but to try to fill *Proſerpina*'s Seeve: Think firſt with your ſelf, what will be really material and ſubſtantial in them; and learn to diſtinguiſh Dreſſing from Subjects, and Ornaments from Things; the firſt may be Abridg'd, and Compris'd in ſhort, while the latter is various, nay infinite, and conſequently impertinent: Thr firſt is the compoſure of ſolid Judgment, the latter but the Froth and Wantonneſs of Fancy.

As for your Method in Collecting therefore, let it be clear, ſhort, and well-advis'd; clear, that you may make an eaſie recollection, and eaſily continue your courſe; ſhort, that you may not beſtow more pains in Shadow than Subſtance; or Method than Matter; and well-advis'd, that you may proceed without Repentance, and that you may not be perpetually imploy'd in laying of New Foundations, but be able cheerfully to build your Superſtructure on.

For my part, till I purified thus my Method, the more I ſtudied, the more I was confounded; but thus I have not only preſerv'd my Idea entire, but one part of my Study has help'd the other, while my whole Body lies eaſie for me, either for Correction or Improvement, and as hereafter I ſhall ſee occaſion. But beſides this, we ought to conſider to keep our Studies within the bounds of a due Limitation alſo.

The true Limitation of Studies.

And thus, firſt, we ought to limit our Studies to our uſe, and to fit them to ſupply our defects; Thus Hiſtories will teach us Wiſdom, through Experimental Precepts: *Poets* will make us Witty, but Light and Flaſhy; the *Mathematicks* will make us Subtile and not Credulous; *Natural Philoſophy* Deep and Reaſoning; *Morality* Grave and Good; And *Logick* and *Rhetorick* will teach one Faction, and make one able to Contend.

Hence alſo, if a Man's Wit be wandring, let him Study the *Mathematicks*; for if in Demonſtrations he go never ſo little aſide, he muſt begin all again; ſo if he be not apt to diſtinguiſh, Read the

the Schoolmen; or if he be not apt to beat our Matters, or to call up one thing, to prove and illuſtrate another, let him Study the *Lawyers Caſes*, and ſo every defect of the Mind may have a ſpecial Receipt.

So if he be apt to be Idle, let him borrow the Books he is to Study, for a time, and that will make him either diligent, or want; nor let him, in Studying, only Meditate or Read, for that is but to ſee his Face in a Glaſs, and to leave fleeting Characters in the Memory only, and that will inſtantly be blotted out; whereas by Writing alſo we draw a more laſting Picture.

So likewiſe Reflection on Converſation is far better than crude Books, and too much Reading; in Truth, one may ſay, Not only that Book-learning is commonly too Pedantick and Formal to benefit; but indeed, that Books, in themſelves, are almoſt as idle as infinite; and ſo that, in Truth, 'tis a matter greatly worth our examining, how far to Study, and what to Read; and alſo, what to fling aſide as ſuperfluous.

And thus the knowing what's fit to be Studied, ſaves half the pains; and, in ſuch caſe, juſt enough in Charity and Neceſſi-

ty is ſufficient: We are not here to get Knowledge for the other World, as ſome idly have imagin'd; our ſincerity indeed will ſtand us in ſtead there, but our knowledge not in the leaſt. Alaſs! the Preſent ſtate of our Nature and ſences is Probationary, and not to laſt.

Before therefore we deſcend into the ſeveral branches of Humane Learning, it were the higheſt prudence firſt to diſcern between Knowledge, profitable and uſeleſs, curious and ſolid; and in which caſe, in general, as I have ſaid, 'tis equally vain and fooliſh, to think to arrive at a nice perfection of Wiſdom, the prerogative of God; and we ſhould confine our ſelves therefore, as well to what is rationally within our powers, as to what is uſeful.

And thus the Philoſophers Stone, ſuppoſing it acquirable, yet it were both lazy and an uninduſtrious encroaching on the publick propeſty to attain it; and therefore, deſervedly puniſhable by Laws. And thus, there are ſome things alſo more directly unlawful to be ſtudied, as I have already ſhewn, and which will much ſhorten an Univerſal Idea, as Witchcraft, as Rebellion to God, and ſuperſtitious Magick, as tempting him.

But,

But, beſides theſe greater Evils, How many may I add, ſpend their time about Words, and never dive into Senſe? How many pleaſe themſelves rather with the ſlight imaginations and fancies of other than trouble themſelves to look for truth? I ſay, we need only reflect, how eaſily we may diſpence with theſe, and many others ſorts of Knowledge, and not envy the Poſſeſſours of them; and indeed, what but ſuch Exuberances in Studies, make our preſent Philoſophy a meer idle Chimera and Vanity?

To be ſhort, the true end of Study, as of all things elſe, is the glory of God, and the good of his Creatures: Now, as we cannot ſay, we purſue either of theſe ends, when we ſtudy Trifles, ſo are ſuch imployments ſinful; and tho' I would obtain a complete Knowledge, and raiſe its Banks too high for the Storms of raving Wit and trifling Error, to be able to deſtroy; yet withall, I would not beſtow the leaſt pains on what might look either unneceſſary or evil.

Of the Choice of Books.

And thus alſo we pity our loſs of Books; alaſs, fond Fools that we are! What

What is loſt that occaſional induſtry and neceſſity cannot retrieve? Beſides, we are miſtaken to ſeek for Wiſdom in the multitude of Authors; we had as good look for it in the Mobile, where ſome are mooney'd, ſome purblind, ſome confident, as Mountebanks, and others, perverſe even as Devils.

Nay, when we conſider the meer multiplicity of Books, tho' I would allow my ſelf to conſult the choicer for my Aſſiſtance, yet in general, I would as ſoon hear every Man's Dream as read his Works; and I ought therefore, rather firſt to conſider what Books I ought to read, and next, what may be convenient for me by way of reſort.

Now, as for the Election of Authors, I know no other method than the Vogue of the Learn'd; in Morality and Divinity, thoſe whom Time and Antiquity have commended, and who have ſtood the Cenſure of Ages, are to be choſen; and not every Modern Author, whoſe gawdy Titles and popular Prejudices make him better at Noiſe than Reaſoning: But as for experimental Wiſdom, as intereſt is likely to improve the World with her Age, ſo the latter Authors are there to be prefer'd before blind Antiquity.

But

But wouldſt thou know a more particular Teſt for good Books, I mean moral ones; they are ſuch as have Learning and Sincerity, but more eſpecially Sincerity: And hence the Scriptures which no one can eſteem, to exceed in regular Learning; yet as being moſt pure and tranſcendant in ſincerity, infinitely exceed all other Books: Alaſs! 'tis not Notion but bright Sincerity, that duly and juſtly gives the Preference. Indeed, what good can a ſiniſter, cunning, or Pedantry do us?

Upon the whole, 'twere too tedious for me here to give you long Catalogues of Books; and beſides, my deſigns is rather towards a general Advice; if the Student want particular Authors Names therefore, let him conſult the proper Artiſts, and the peruſal of Books themſelves; and yet let him even then rather chooſe a few and choice Books than a Library; for a multitude will confound us, where a moderate Quantity will aſſiſt and help us; and in truth, Maſters of great Libraries too commonly like Bookſellers, deal no deeper than in Titles.

As for the encouragement of diverting needleſs Studies, I ſhall only ſay this, 'tis fit a Gentleman ſhould have at leaſt an inſight into all things; he need not aim at being

being a Maſter in all, and yet he may take a ſlight View or Lanskaf of all: for tho' he intends but one thing as his buſineſs, yet he may juſtly make the Survey of all, the Ring of his Recreation and Diverſion: For who can diſtinguiſh things better than he that has the largeſt proſpect?

And yet in ſuch looſer Studies, I would not read a mean Book: Suppoſe he help thee to a good Notion or two, will that avail thee for thy pains and loſs of time? Nor needſt thou doubt in ſuch caſe, but that if thou readſt the choicer Authors upon the ſame Subject, that they will give thee the ſame thing, and in much better order, than a little pretender ſhall. I may ſay, our dozing our ſelves with an unprofitable reading, What is it, but like poyſoning and cankring our minds, and which induces us to dote away our time in perpetual maze and confuſion?

When thou haſt therefore tryed ſome few pages in an Author, and canſt not like him, reject him: for as 'tis impoſſible for a man to read all Books, ſo 'tis enough if he do the beſt; and 'tis our Unhappineſs if a Pearl lye ſcatter'd in an unproper Soile: and if a good Notion be loſt, becauſe deliver'd by an ill Author, I ſay, 'tis a misfortune in diſcretion inevitable; for the Man

Man is mad that thinks to read all Books: and yet, if an Author lye in a good method, a little pains may ſerve to Examine him.

Further, there is a weak and cowardly prejudice in men, I mean, when the dread of being ſeduc'd by ill Books, makes them afraid to read good ones, if they have but a bad Name: But why ſo, I ſay? If what an Author write be true, Why ſhould I be Bug-beard from an opportunity of being wiſer? if falſe, Am not I a fool ſo to queſtion the integrity or ſtrength of my Reaſoning? and thus is it not a ſhame, that an *Hobbs* ſhould fright an Univerſity worſe than a Monſter?

I am afraid, the too common and Fondling Notions of the World are a little rotten at the heart, or elſe methinks their Abettors need not be put to theſe ſhifts and burnings, to confute their Adverſaries: Alaſs! Truth, like the Sun, of its ſelf, and without force, is able to cleer all the Fogs of Fallacy and Sophiſtry; and nothing but Error and Prejudice need dread the Combate of Argument, and the Teſt of Examination.

An affected ſingularity indeed in all colours, is odious; but this Perverſeneſs in the popularity of the World, makes it, that

if

if ever we intend to ſtudy Truth, we muſt be ſingular ſometimes, and dare converſe with Men and Books that are ſo; or elſe at laſt, we may find to our loſs, that we ſhall explode Truth and Sincerity too often with ſuch Authors. I ſhall add a little in general of Speculation and Practice, as the main rule of our Study, and conclude.

Of Speculation and Practice.

Our Speculation in general, ought to be ſo far ſubſervient to our Practice, that I may ſay, we profane Precepts as well as Piety, when we take their words into our mouth, or tranſcribe them with our Pens, and do not live and act accordingly. In Divinity nothing is more dangerous than Knowledge without Obedience: Chriſt tells us, *That he that knew his Maſters Will, and perform'd it not, ſhould be beaten with many ſtripes:* And he that pretends to Vertue no otherwiſe than in Notion, is no better than an Hypocrite, or at beſt a Chymera Book-worm.

'Tis true, we ought not to neglect Speculation; and yet as Practice is the end of Speculation, ſurely no man will prefer the means before the end. Practice without Speculation at worſt, makes us but imprudent;

dent; but meer Speculation renders us unprofitable, and drones: And in truth, Vertue, by meer Speculation, is confounded, and only ripen'd by Action.

Nay, Knowledge without Practice, is but a Luſt of Curioſity; and the man that cannot propoſe a good Moral End in his Studies, had as good divert himſelf with the Purling of Brooks and Pibles, as the meer change of Words and Notions; and yet 'tis the curſe of your dreaming Speculatiſts, that they not only have no taſte of real Wiſdom, but miſpend the time that ſhould lead them to it. Wiſdom is Folly, and Prudence Madneſs, in ſuch a man; and yet, Hypocrite-like, he ſhall read their Precepts even with delight, as long as their Novelty laſts.

The meaſure therefore of our Speculation, ought to be this; ſufficient to advance our Practice, and not impede it, of things uſeful, and not of unprofitable Whimſeys, of bettering Life, as Vertue and Religion, and not turning men into thinking, and reading Melancholliſts; 'tis a Vice to procure that knowledge that is not of advantage when had; and we miſemploy our method of thinking, if we engage it purely in a puzzle of Thoughts: Indeed, the Mind working on matter, produceth worthy

thy Notions, but on its ſelf nothing but Cobwebs and Trifles.

And thus alſo, there are ſome men ſo weak as to look for Morality even in Plays and Romances; but alaſs! they but flatter themſelves, and ſeek but for the Colours of Vertue, while they dare not the Brave and Nobler Self-denial of her purer Precepts: Poor Pretenders! Why do they ſhuffle ſo? a courageable Enemy is better than a Baſtard Friend: Think you ever to reconcile Good and Evil, or God and the Devil? Surely, the man that even carouzes in his Luſts, is an innocent to ſuch as Hypocrite.

Upon the whole therefore, you ſee I may make my ſelf learneder by reading, but only wiſer by moderating and regulating my Actions: I will not therefore ſpend all my Vigour in Diſcipline, in the Dreſſing Room of my Soul: I muſt live as well as think; and yet, as I know Error is too often to ſtrong for me, I will always leave room for Repentance, Amendment, and new Precepts.

And, as our Speculation therefore ought not to be continual, ſo at length, I would have a man ſay, *Lectum, conſideratum, & Scriptum eſt, & nunc vivam*; when once *I* have made my Rule to live by, I'le ſee how I can

can draw my Life and Actions by it; Wiſdom was never intended to be acquir'd only, but enjoy'd; and that Knowledge is Folly, not Wiſdom, that does not apply its ſelf to the uſes of Man.

And to conclude; the only Reaſon that makes Speculation and Practice differ ſo much, comes from the vicious and chimera Prejudices of Mankind: indeed, were our Knowledge reduc'd ſincerely to the due bounds of Wiſdom, we ſhould find our Precepts would be like to Demonſtration; and a man would no ſooner read them, but he would be convinc'd beyond all doubt, to act by them.

Of CONSTANCY.

ONe may ſay, the *Sun*, the *Air*, and all things about us, contribute to make us what we are in every reſpect; but our minds, and the purity thereof, ſo that indeed, who ever loves us on any other account than that, their love muſt needs be tranſitory; for being made what we are by our circumſtances, and they changing as they perpetually do, we become others than we were; ſo that in ſuch caſe, it cannot be juſtly called an Unconſtancy, to change our Affections, when the Objects themſelves have chang'd.

And hence it is, that our Conſtancy in Love, What is it but a perpetual Inconſtancy, and which cauſes our hearts to encline ſucceſſively to all the Qualities of the Perſon that we love, giving ſometimes the preference to one, and ſometimes to another? So that, in truth, the beſt of our Conſtancies, except to God, want a Foundation; and really, what are they but our Inconſtancys limited, and unreaſonably bound up in one Subject, by an unaccountable Obſtinacy?

And thus, What but this is it, that makes

makes us ſeek for new Friends, and freſh Faces every day, and yet not but that that which makes us love new Acquaintance, is not always ſo much a wearineſs of our old, or the pleaſure of Change, as the Diſtaſte which we have, that we are not enough admir'd by thoſe that we know too familiarly, and the hope we have to be more admir'd by thoſe that know us but a little?

But to return; there are two ſorts of Conſtancy in Love; the one is, becauſe we find perpetually in the perſon we love (as in an inexhauſible Fountain) new Cauſes to love; the other is, that one holds it diſhonourable to change or break ones word; and ſo alſo, there is an inconſtancy which comes from a Levity of mind, and which changes every moment its opinion, or out of weakneſs, which makes it receive all the Opinions of others: and ſo there is another Inconſtancy, which is more excuſable, and which comes from the things themſelves, through their loſing their reliſh.

Nor is ſuch an Inconſtancy, except in Vertue or Friendſhip to be diſcommended; for why may not I juſtly follow my Inclination, and the change of Things? But he that is falſe to his friend, or that complains of his friend, that he

may be able before hand the better to justify his own levity, is guilty of a perverse Treachery; or else, I may say, our perseverance deserves neither praise nor blame; for indeed, 'tis no more than a continuance of our Taste and Thoughts, and which we may as innocently as justly be able to remove from us, or change at pleasure.

But as for our constancy in Goodness, Sincerity, and Truth, it is the chief and crown of all Vertues, and even the best of Vertues: Vertues themselves degenerate to a Vice without it; if we have either Bravery or Goodness therefore, let us remember to crown all such endeavours wi[th] Constancy. Constancy will make [a] condemn'd Innocence glory in her V[ertue] and Patience and penitent Guilt [to] and co-operate with Justice. Wh[en] constant to the Tracks of Vertue, my [mind] shall be immovable and easy, and n[either] Crowns shall make me proud, nor R[ags] asham'd.

Nay, and while I thus mix Constancy with Wisdom, my Affairs shall be in order, and Prudence shall cut out their seasons: I'le foreknow the variety and difference of business, and neither Accident nor Novelty shall confound or surprize me; indeed that man ought not so much as to

presume

presumes at the name of prudence, that by a steady perseverance in Study and Meditation, has not strengthned and garison'd his Reason, and given it an entire prospect above the common little Mountains of Prejudice and Inconstancy.

To be short, I would even hate my mind till I make it speak the same thing to morrow that it does to day; my certainty and my faith shall be the same, and I will have an equal regard for them at all times. Cannot human Frailty bear this? purified Reason and Precepts shall.

My Ideas shall not be fleeting and changable at every blast of Reasoning, nor Resolution wavering; I will know the ...ty of Piety, Vertue and Truth; if ...ve no bottom, I'le never hamper ... with them; if they have, if pos- ... will follow them; nay, and I hope ... help of God, by the same rule, to be ... to reduce my Notions to Principles that shall last as long as the Sun shines.

Have I misfortunes? and what then! does not the same reason of things always continue? or was I ever so weak as not to expect Accidents? if not, Why is my Mind and Resolution chang'd? is not my Reason the same still? or what! must I commit my self to the Wind, and be as change-

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But as for our conſtancy in Goodneſs, Sincerity, and Truth, it is the chief and crown of all Vertues, and even the beſt of Vertues: Vertues themſelves degenerate to a Vice without it; if we have either Bravery or Goodneſs therefore, let us remember to crown all ſuch endeavours with Conſtancy. Conſtancy will make even condemn'd Innocence glory in her Vertue; and Patience and penitent Guilt ſubmit and co-operate with Juſtice. Whilſt I am conſtant to the Tracks of Vertue, my Breaſt ſhall be immovable and eaſy, and neither Crowns ſhall make me proud, nor Rags aſham'd.

Nay, and while I thus mix Conſtancy with Wiſdom, my Affairs ſhall be in order, and Prudence ſhall cut out their ſeaſons: I'le foreknow the variety and difference of buſineſs, and neither Accident nor Novelty ſhall confound or ſurprize me; indeed that man ought not ſo much as to

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To be short, I would even hate my mind till I make it speak the same thing to morrow that it does to day; my certainty and my faith shall be the same, and *I* will have an equal regard for them at all times. Cannot humane Frailty bear this? purified Reason and Precepts shall.

My Ideas shall not be fleeting and changable at every blast of Reasoning, nor my Resolution wavering; I will know the certainty of Piety, Vertue and Truth; if they have no bottom, I'le never hamper my self with them; if they have, it possible, I will follow them; nay, and I hope by the help of God, by the same rule, to be able to reduce my Notions to Principles that shall last as long as the Sun shines.

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able as the Weather-cock; be a Philoſopher to day, a Fidler to morrow, and every day find ſome new Whimſeys for my Entertainment?

No, Conſtancy is the moſt potent and crown of all Vertues; and through Conſtancy I will, nay I doubt not, but to conquer all things. Conſtancy even in drops wears Stones away, while nothing is more weak than a Pretender; if we have never ſo great an Appearance in our Actions either of Vertue or Courage, yet if we want Conſtancy and Perſeverance, our Profeſſio is idle, and our Pretences are vain; na and they reflect more upon us, than if w were abſolutely negligent.

And yet, tho' nothing can recommend its ſelf more to us than Conſtancy, yet it ought to be with this Limitation, in what is good, and truth only; and not in a lie, or evil. Conſtancy in Vice enhances our Guilt, and Perſeverance in Error after Conviction, be it on any pretence whatever, is the ſure method of Folly and Ignorance. Indeed, Conſtancy is only in good things; and 'tis Obſtinacy that fixes us in evil, and that makes Sin and Vice eternal, and that forbids Repentance for fear of Change.

OF THE

Art of War.

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ife and Death; and who art
thou, who preſumeſt to aſſume it? Art thou a King? even a King ought to be a Father to his Subjects, and not a Slaughterer: but is that for Trifles, to drown them in Blood? Surely, they forget King *Philips* Monitor; *Remember thou art a Man therefore, who can too eaſily engage themſelves in War?*

And yet tho' hence we ought to abhor War, yet we ought never to forget it, no, not even in time of Peace: if the rigour of our Diſcipline ceaſe, yet at leaſt our Military Precepts ſhould be preſerv'd pure;

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OF THE

Art of War.

Of the Lawfulneſs of WAR.

TO God alone belongs the Prerogative of Life and Death; and who art thou, who preſumeſt to aſſume it? Art thou a King? even a King ought to be a Father to his Subjects, and not a Slaughterer: but is that for Trifles, to drown them in Blood? Surely, they forget King *Philips* Monitor; *Remember thou art a Man therefore, who can too eaſily engage themſelves in War?*

And yet tho' hence we ought to abhor War, yet we ought never to forget it, no, not even in time of Peace: if the rigour of our Diſcipline ceaſe, yet at leaſt our Military Precepts ſhould be preſerv'd pure;

for nothing ſurely can Diſengage us of our Self Preſervation.

And yet not that, not to be backward in juſt Wars, ſhould forward us therefore to Rapine or Murder neither; God certainly has Plagues and real Cauſes of Wars enough to eaſe the World of being overpeopled by, without our Preſumptious, Murders and Deſolations: Have I therefore the juſteſt cauſe of War, if poſſible, I will ſtifle it.

Thus, Is my Merchant injur'd? I will ſatisfie him by repriſal. And, have I wrong'd my Neighbour? I will acquit my ſelf before God, in tendring him ſatisfaction.

Indeed, Princes ſhould conſider the hardſhip of an unjuſt War upon their Subjects, before they begin it. I might add, Is the Right doubtful? And what, will not an Arbitration ſerve and ſave humane Blood?

In truth, War without Cauſe is predatory and bruitiſh, and a meer Souldier is worſe than an Hangman; a Generous Officer ſure would die rather than fight without a good Cauſe declar'd. In doubtful caſes indeed, I'le obey my Prince; but ſhall he make a Man-Butcher of me?

Not but that War undoubtedly may be moſt lawful too; for even the ſame Chriſt that could aboliſh the rule, of an *eye for an eye*,

eye, &c. in forbearance and mercy; yet himſelf could once think a Sword neceſſary, Luke 22. 36. and *Laſh the Thieves out of the Temple.*

To be ſhort; God has given us a Being, And ſhall we not value his kindneſs, by all the lawful ways of ſelf-preſervation? And what, may we not then juſtly reſiſt all violent Aggreſſors, and avenge our ſelves of our ſecret Enemies, to incapacitate them in their evil deſigns?

Nay, and if this be the Law of Nature; Pray where is't aboliſh'd? and ſurely, it is ſuch, nay, and to that degree, that a People may lawfully Raiſe a War of Self-defence of their own heads, and without the Authority of their Prince, where 'tis neceſſary, even as all Caſuiſts allow.

And yet, not but that I may wickedly Proſecute the Juſteſt War too; War ſhould be manag'd, as by a Judge, to Pay the Original Debt, and not as by a Robber, to Murder and Plunder.

Thus I have a juſt occaſion of War, when I ſee another aſſault me, nay, when I have a good Ground of Jealouſie and Suſpicion, I am not bound to wait the firſt Blow: But are my Suſpicions weak, and his Preparations trifling? Peace and Charity commands me to entertain no ill opinion of them. So,

So, Do I ſee my Neighbour's Subjects miſerably diſtreſt? 'tis my Duty not to ſee Piety, Honeſty and Innocence diſcouraged; and yet, though to Relieve the Oppreſt for Religion, may be a good cauſe of War, yet, to propagate it, can be none.

So, Is my Brother Ignorant, or an Heathen? Charity will let me adviſe him, but not force him: But does my Brother Sacrifice his Children? Is he a Sodomite, or a Murderer, as *Benjamin*? ſurely I, with *Iſrael*, may War with him, to bring him to a better temper.

So Papiſts, by their Principle, That no Faith's to be kept with Hereticks, give an Immortal cauſe of War: We fight a more generous and open Enemy, And are not we Bewitch'd to forgive one, Bloody, Barbarous, and Inveterate, as the Devil himſelf is then?

'Tis pity, indeed, we don't Indulge their Tender Conſciences, and let them Murder us; 'tis their Principle and Religion: If it be their Religion, I ſay, 'tis from the Devil, and let us fight them till they alter it: What! Profeſs our ſelves Sheep for the ſlaughter? I don't know whether Proteſtant States may not Anſwer for't to God, as Self-murderers, that they have tender'd ſuch Vermin-Principles ſo long.

So

So, ſurely, I have a right to take a Sword from a Mad-man, to Arbitrate my Neighbour's Popular Commotions, and to interpoſe towards ſetling the Peace of my Neighbours.

Thus, If my Neighbour begins a War, though with another Neighbour; the Wolf ſhall not think, by my ſtanding Neuter, to devour me next; and yet I will not help a too Potent Prince abus'd neither; For why ſhould I aſſiſt him to deſtroy my ſelf?

Thus 'twas the War of Righteous *Abraham* to reduce thoſe Conquerors that carried away his Brother *Lot*. And yet, if the War for my Brother be too deſperate, I am not bound to fling away my Life for his ſake.

But are only my Merchants Injur'd, and by private Perſons? I have no cauſe of War, if either ſatisfaction be tender'd, or the Offenders deliver'd up; but ſuch an Injury, by a Commiſſion'd Subject, is a compleat cauſe of War.

So I may Naturalize a Subject of my Neighbours without offence; but if I offer to Naturalize a Town, or to encroach but one foot on his Dominions, he has a juſt Cauſe of War againſt me; and yet even then he ought not only to demand a Reaſonable Satisfaction, but ſolemnly to denounce it, e're he begins with Acts of Hoſtility. *Of*

Of Generals in WAR.

ONe ordinary General is better than two excellent ones; for nothing is more pernicious than Confuſion and Irreſolution: And yet 'tis hard to truſt the courage of one General only; the Mean ſeems the appointing Three ſeveral Commanders, for Van, Main Body, and Reer; and changing their Commands each Week; and ſo you may not only be aſſur'd of a General on all hazards, but as well ſecure their Fidelity, as relieve their Courages.

Nor were it amiſs alſo, for the ſame reaſon, once a Year for a General to make all his Under-Officers change their Commands; and which, to avoid offence, he may do by Promotion; for ſo he will not only inſtruct all, and make Military Diſcipline familiar, but hinder all Corruption in Falſe Muſters, and prevent all Factions in his Army whatever.

As for the Skill of a General, it has two advantages, Duty and Stratagem; Duty, to know the force and order of Military Diſcipline, and therefore a General muſt be a Souldier; and Stratagem, to prevent and ſecure future Accidents to his advantage;

tage; and, in this, 'tis his own ingenuity; and a Council of War muſt aid him.

Nor is any thing more worthy a General's care in this caſe, than the choice and management of his Council of War: Does he fear Treachery in it, and can't he talk of what he will, though he never reſolves on it then, and ſeem to doubt in what he moſt intends?

But above all, a General ought to eſteem his Life as the whole Armies; indeed, he acts the greateſt publick good in preſerving it; nay, he ought in this, to be ſo nice, as to be always in temper, and never ſuffer himſelf to be harraſs'd out; he is the head of the Army, and therefore ought never to be without vigorous Thoughts and Counſils for every opportunity of Stratagem, or Service that may offer.

And, in this, a General ought to remember alſo, that in all extremities he has a Commiſſion from the Law of Nature, as well as his Prince; not, I mean, but that in affronts and trifles, he ſhould chooſe to let Time give him ſatisfaction; but, in imminent dangers, his own diſcretion, as well as his Princes words, ought to be his Rule.

Further, a General ought to be moſt ſe-

vere,

vere, and yet moſt juſt alſo; ſevere, to awe his Enemies, and preſerve his own Diſcipline; and yet juſt, that he provoke neither to hatred: And, indeed, in this matter, nothing is better than that the General be belov'd: and yet, for a Prince to permit his Army to chooſe their own General for their Loves-ſake, is to Dethrone himſelf.

But, Does a Prince ſee the Army hate their General? he will do well to chooſe them a better: So, does a General ſee his Army jealous of him? let his Friend head the jealouſie, and expoſtulate ſatisfaction, who, beſure, will be more tender than if his Enemies were to Judge him.

But, Does a General find his Prince jealous of him? his only way to anticipate it, is, by laying down his Commiſſion; and when he is ſo ingenious, he need not fear further miſchief. Princes know the evil conſequence of ill-treating ſuch great Officers: if he puniſh one too eaſily, the next he may expect to ſecure himſelf, by going over to the Enemy.

Of

Of WAR in General.

WAR is the deciſion of a Right too high for Judicature; wherein, Arms is the Trial, and Conqueſt the Judgment. To begin a War after Conqueſt perfected, and Mercy ſhewn, is a piece of perfidy, that deſerves no Quarter.

Are you a private Man, and have receiv'd Mercy, through yielding up your Right? ſurely, you Merit a Thouſand Racks if you ungratefully reaſſume it again: you might have died in the Field, or now continue Neuter; but, Is it nothing to fight againſt that Benefactor, that has given you your being, and ſo ſpill innocent blood?

So to allow Quarter, when ask'd, is both a Chriſtian and a Humane duty; while to execute Men by Law-Civil, forgiven by Quarter Military, is moſt barbarous.

But does ſome Hen-rooſt Garriſon withſtand a Royal Army? they deſerve no Quarter, or at leaſt they ought to be decimated; 'tis not Generoſity, but Madneſs, that makes Men prolong Wars, and deſtroy

deſtroy one another without proſpect of Relief.

So, Is mine Enemy perfidious? 'tis his fault that our ſlaughters are endleſs, who, by his Treachery, has put it out of our power to believe or truſt him.

Not that Stratagems are diſallowable, or that Victory is the leſs honourable for them neither; 'tis Jeſting, not Fighting, to proclaim every blow we intend.

'Twas a generous Cuſtom of the Antients indeed, to give notice of Battel by the ſound of a Bell; the courſe of late is more wary, but not leſs bloody, to ſecure Frontiers by Garriſons, and ſpin out Wars by the Tricking of Armies.

Wars are uſually of two ſorts, either of Conqueſt, or like *Moſes's*, to root out the Inhabitants. In a common diſpute. the Deciſion of a *Goliah*, or *Horatii*, may ſave blood; but, an extirpating War, and ſuch as Papiſts and Proteſtants at this day are, can ſafely admit of a Peace on no Terms.

Thus, Am *I* entred into a War, and am *I* like to engage with a ſtronger State? by Garriſons *I* will ſtop mine Enemy, till either by Diverſion or Aſſiſtance *I* can withſtand him; but if neither my ſelf, nor Allies, can probably reſiſt him, *I* will rather

rather generouſly fling my ſelf under ſome agreeable Protection, than ſtand with a ſilly Sullenneſs to be deſtroy'd.

But are your Forces equal? and are you well fortified? Admit the War in your own Country, where you may command both Men and Proviſions upon a loſs, and which abroad may be fatal to your Army. Thus the *Swiſs* that can fight an 100 00. at home, ſtrain hard to maintain but 40000 men when abroad; and yet without Forts, your whole Country's deſtroy'd.

So, is your War with a Trade-State? pen them but in, and ſtop their Courſe, and you make them ruine themſelves: But is ſuch a State too powerful for you? Either buy your Peace, make in with its Enemies, or diſtract him by ſome inteſtine Commotions; perhaps ſome of the Royal Family have a Claim to be aſſiſted.

Would you delay a War? Send an Ambaſſador with Propoſals of Peace; but with ſuch perplex'd Terms, as may judicially require ſome time to deliberate them.

But are you reſolv'd on a War, and in the mean time would blind your Enemy while you are preparing? Amuſe your Enemy by Secret Counſels and cloſe Ambaſſadors; nor need you be wanting in Congratulatory Complements and Civili-

ties. Muſt I preſume, my honeſt Demands will create a War, and may not I wait till I am duly enabled to make them?

So, Is a War begun? Invite your Enemy by mercy, and fright him through ſeverity. Have you two Armies? By the one block up Forts, while the other enters on the Enemy.

So alſo, are you forc'd to proceed by Sieges? Blood will ſave Blood, and by deſtroying every Man in the Garriſon, where there is not a Surrender on Summons, you will make a quick diſpatch of the War.

So alſo, to manage Secrets well, is a great point in War; and ſo for Precepts and Orations, to bear up mens Courages. One General on his Death, for this very cauſe, *order'd a Drum to be made of his skin, only to hearten his Souldiers.*

So, as for puniſhing Warlike Offences, nothing deſerves a greater care: Cowards alaſs! are not worthy of Death; let them rather live to expiate their Diſgrace: but as for the falſe and treacherous, let them be no ſooner diſcover'd, than ſent to the Father and promoter of Perfidy, leſt it prove too late for you to deſtroy them in their ſecond Wiles.

Of

Of CONQUEST.

A Pious Conqueror ought but exactly to do Juſtice and Right to himſelf; if he acquires new Dominions, it ſhould not be out of ambition but neceſſity, and becauſe that his Enemies are perverſe and implacable.

As the Pirate notably anſwer'd *Alexander* the Great, *What are great Conqueſts but great Robberies?* So ſurely, one might as juſtly be guilty of a Robbery as a Conqueſt, unleſs one had the juſteſt cauſe of War to move one to it.

For my part, had I the Empire of the World through Conqueſt, yet like *Lycurgus* with *Sparta*, it ſhould be but to ſettle their States the better by it: Did I root out a Tyrant, yet like the Old *Romans*, would I not rob his Heirs; or ſhould I ſubdue a Common-Wealth, t'ſhould be but to reinſtate them in their Ancient Purity.

Surely, I but pretend to War for my Neighbours Relief, while I make a Prey of him. Indeed, if a State be ſo corrupt, as not to be able to bear to be reform'd, I will rather take the Conqueſt into my own

protection, than leave it weltring in Anarchy and Blood.

To be ſhort; Robbers and Murderers of thouſands in Corruption and Flattery, we admire without regret, while the more innocent Rogues from neceſſity we deſtroy in this World, and damn in the next; but ſurely, God will be more juſt to them.

But to proceed, Would you ſecure a Conqueſt? you muſt root out the antient Governours, or the Mobile in Faction will reinſtate the worſt of Tyrannies: ſo, would you transform a corrupt Common-wealth? you muſt either raiſe their chief Cities, or tranſplant their principal Heads, or elſe the firſt advantage that offers them will confound your Eſtabliſhment.

Thus alſo, a Conqueſt where there are NOBLES, is eaſier than where all are SLAVES; the *Turkiſh* Vaſſals will be forc'd unanimouſly to withſtand you, tho when ſubdued, your Conqueſt is entire and ſecure; while *Engliſh* NOBLES, that may aſſiſt your Victory, will withall by the ſame Hereditary Power, render your Conqueſt as tickliſh.

To preſerve a Conqueſt therefore: *Firſt*, Reſide perſonally ſometime upon it, the better to prevent all Plots: And, *Secondly*, On pretence of kindneſs, take ſome of the

the NOBLES Sons as Hoſtages with you when you depart: *Thirdly*, Continue Titles of Honour to the Natives, but keep all Offices to your own Servants: *Fourthly*, Let your Miniſters be only ſeen in harſh things: And Laſtly, take particular care of all popular Meetings, on any pretence whatever.

To be ſhort; All alterations naturally leave a toothing for new Changes; and therefore the beſt way to ſecure what you have got, is like the generous *Romans* alſo, to make one law of Nations: And ſo, if you let Humanity Crown your Peace, as Valour has adorn'd your War, you need not fear but to govern without danger.

When your Conqueſts find themſelves united to you by Marriages, their Taxes eas'd and remitted, and their whole States chang'd for the better; when you change not the cuſtoms of their Provinces, and your impartial Juſtice gives them not the leaſt jealouſly of their Rights, you will find men are not mad to embroyle themſelves.

And yet, Are your Conqueſts in different Languages? your vigorous beginnings muſt not end in too ſupine a negligence; you muſt have a jealous Eye on Neighbours, leaſt they joyn the diſcontented Na-

tives; and in this Caſe, if you cut off Seditious Heads, yet withall you muſt pardon and reward as generouſly, but eſpecially your NOBLES.

But laſtly, Are you ſo neceſſitated, and would you ſecure your Conqueſts by force? Do it rather by Colonies, than firing them againſt you through ſtanding Forces; he that by right of Conqueſt is Maſter of all, ſurely may command any little particular part, and diſpoſſeſs the Natives of a few convenient fortified Towns for Colonies.

Are a few diſpoſſeſt, do you object? 'tis for the good of the whole, and they become too poor to be formidable; and as they are, you may make them ſatisfaction in another place, if you pleaſe, and which is beſt; or if not, others injoying their Rights juſtly, will never aſſiſt them.

Of

Of Stratagems of WAR.

THere are many advantages of Stratagems; but above all, that they breed confidence in your own Army, and diſmay your Enemy: He'll dread to take the advantage of your Miſcarriages, while he fears the Reputation of your Deſigns.

Nor is it the leaſt Excellency of Stratagem, to alter at every turn your methods. Thus, if ſometimes a Cap on a Staff be made the Signal of Battel, as well as the Sound of the Trumpet, *&c.* how can your Enemy meaſure your intentions?

So, to encourage your Army, print ſometimes a hearty Speech to your Souldiers, with the promiſe of Rewards; ſo do they dread your Enemy? Skirmiſh him with ſome of your beſt men, to make him familiar to them.

So, Would you make your Souldiers unanimous? let them do but the Enemy ſome conſiderable miſchief before they Mutiny, and fear will do the work.

Hannibal finding his Souldiers deſert, in a Speech told the reſt that ſtaid, *That thoſe that had left him had leave, and went as Spies to the* Romans; the *Romans* hearing of

this, cut off the Deſerters right hands, and ſent them back to *Hannibal* again.

So by Letters or chance words in Embaſſies, to inſinuate that the Eenemies Generals or Officers are falſe, will give juſt the ſame jealouſly and diſtruſt as if they were ſo.

Above all, Spyes are greatly to be feared; are they run-aways? command but every Man to his Tent, and they are diſcovered immediately; but Spyes near your Counſels are moſt pernicious; if an inconſiderable Enemy can ſo far undermine you, you may juſtly dread at laſt, leaſt he deſtroy you by Stratagems alſo.

Some to feel an Enemies Pulſe, ſend Ambaſſadours often with good Souldiers in diſguiſe; while others to blind ſuch diſcoveries, continue their number of Tents, and draw their parties out of the whole Army.

To obtain your deſire on your Enemy, counterfeit but that you fear or deſire the contrary, and you need not doubt his readineſs to croſs or diſappoint you: But would you avoid fighting him? beſure keep at leaſt 50 Miles from him.

So, does he ſtreighten you? amuſe him by ſome Truce or Stratagem; Thus ſome have driven Oxen with combuſtible matter fir'd on their horns before them, and ſo eſcap'd.

Nor,

Nor, is it inconſiderable, the skill and Command of Poſts and Paſſes in this caſe, and yet not but that to repoſe your whole truſt on them is as ruinous.

But has your Enemy diſtreſſed you already in Stratagems? uſe the following or like Remedies.

Thus, does your Enemy encompaſs you gather your ſelf cloſe and break through his weaker ſides; does he preſs you between two Hills? make but a Trench behind you, and you may fight which half of him you pleaſe: does the other half come round upon you? a wooden-Bridge made, and laid croſs the Trench, frees you of all.

So, does he ſtop you at a River? either privately ſend out a Detachment to make a Bridge croſs to ſecure your paſſage at another place, or divert the Channel, and ſo make it fordable; ſome have laid combuſtible matter in their Trenches, while others have turn'd the River and drown'd their Enemies with it.

Some have counterfeited preys and fears to draw an Ambuſh, while others have ſet up Sayles on ſticks, and ſhewn their Baggage retinue on an Hill, to terrifie their Enemy with the approach of Succours.

Some by favours to Captives, have divided

ded their Enemies, and by little Meſſages, ſooth'd them in their diviſions; but then remember, that to attack them too ſoon upon it, is to unite them; and here a General's diſpoſitions and paſſions are to be regarded.

Some alſo have let their Enemies enter, and take Towns, and aſſaulted them when weakned by garriſoning; others have waited only for ſome advantage over him, as his paſſing a River, *&c.* but in all caſes, a General had better fight than baulk his men by too much caution.

But to proceed; Is your Army at leiſure? ravaging is the beſt employ: Seiges are uncertain, Conſpiracies loſs of time, ſtorming Towns is dangerous, and Battels more hazardous; but the beſt Plundering is under the Enemies Colours.

But above all, the Reputation of a Generals juſtice, his clemency and ſeverity to perfection are moſt uſeful; he that is gentle to all but the ſtubborn, and implacable to the obſtinate, has a double force to beat his Enemies with.

And yet, after all, a poſſibility of Retreat, and a Back-door to Cowardize, ought to be left to the moſt Obſtinate; 'twill influence your own Souldiers with Fear, to deal with an Enemy, deſperate, and

and beyond all power of eſcape: And thus *Cæſar* would not let his Souldiers ſee, that a Town they beſieg'd was reduc'd to a Bread of Herbs.

To reduce your own Men to a neceſſity therefore, were much the rather to be choſen. Thus, I would Burn my Ships, if *I* Invaded an *Iſland* to make my Men deſperate: But, if *I* ſtorm'd a Town, I would Proclaim, not to kill a Man that laid down his Sword, rather than to ſuggeſt I intended no Mercy.

So alſo, 'tis dangerous after a Battel, to fall upon the Conqueror, unleſs he has had a very hard Victory of it. Slaughters are generally in the flight, and not in the field; and 'tis therefore no little diſadvantage to attack a fluſh'd Victor, and one juſt practis'd in ready fighting.

To conclude, *Hiſtories* may teach us more and better Stratagems than theſe; But where ſhall we find them? Has a General leiſure to conſult Volumes for the reſult and occurrence of an hour? Surely therefore, even in this, *Precepts* exceed *Hiſtory* alſo.

Of Plunder and Slaves.

NOt only the Goods, Slaves, and Lands of the Conquer'd, but their very Perſons alſo, by the Laws of Conqueſt, are at the diſcretion of the Victors; and yet, not but that at worſt, they owe them all the freedoms and duties of Humanity; nothing can excuſe us of Rapes, of putting Women or Children to death, or Men, except Souldiers, or actually in Armes.

Nay, if even Souldiers become your humble Suplicants, and ſurrender on diſcretion, only the Principal Guiltiſts among your Enemy ought to ſuffer Death, I mean in Prudence, as well as Juſtice; for ſure, the Mercy that can ſoften your Enemies, is highly to be eſteem'd of.

In the partition of Plunder, 'tis not agreeable the State ſhould have all; ſurely the Soldiers deſerve the price of their blood: but then let an Oath be Adminiſtred, for every Souldier to bring in his Plunder to be divided; or elſe, not only they may loſe the day, through the Avarice of Plunder, but the worſt of Souldiers will get moſt; while the General, and other Officers, that deſerve beſt, will want even an equal diſtribution.

In

In the *Roman* Diſtribution, the *State* had the Lands, Houſes, and Goods Royal of the Conquer'd, while other Goods were diſtributed to the Merits and Dignity of the Officers and Souldiers; a ſhare being always reſerved, as a Reward for all ſingular Bravery.

But Free-plunder is moſt Barbarous, and, of all Military Offences, deſerveth Death: Nor is the Maxim leſs Bruitiſh, of ſpoyling Countries where we come, to ſtop the progreſs and advantage of our Enemies, to deſtroy dangerous Caſtles and Fortifications, and the Fruits of the Earth, has ſome Sence in it; but, to Burn Houſes, and ruin Temples, and Plantations, What is it but a Cowardize, and a Malicing the very good of Mankind?

Does mine Enemy overcome me? therefore let me bravely let his Valour have ſuch fruits of his Conqueſt, as may reward it; and, if it be my own happy lot, is not a Country Dreſs'd and Civiliz'd, better than Ruine and Deſtruction?

Of SOULDIERS.

NOthing more Embroyls a State, than a Standing Army; if they have not Work, you'll quickly find they will make it, tho' even as in *Turky*, by Domineering over their very Princes: Beſides, Is there any truer Method to Barbariſme? Could Experience ever ſhew us, that Souldiery did not deſtroy Property, and corrupt all Vertue?

And yet, nothing is more unſafe than to Disband a great Army all at a time; it oftentimes creates a New Diſeaſe in a State; the better way therefore to move, is by degrees, and to Caſheer thoſe that can live without pay firſt, and the other after.

But, Are you to Raiſe an Army? chooſe your Officers of the Gentry, and, if poſſible, Volunteers; yet ſtill, provided they be not profligate, or diſſolute; for ſuch Men are no fitter to be Officers, than of any other Employment.

So, let your Souldiers be hardy, your Horſe from the City, and your Foot from the Countrey; their Age between 17 and 40. As for their Strength and Activity, you

you would do well to Exerciſe them before you Liſt them.

To chooſe an Army of your common Volunteers, and Miſcreant Fugitives, is the moſt imprudent; an Army ought rather to be a Body of Martyrs: Debauch'd Men are fitter for an Houſe of Correction, than to be of an orderly and deſigning Body, tho' in an Army.

So a mean Militia and Army of your own, is much better than a great Mercenary Force: By good and conſtant Diſcipline, you may inſpire the worſt of Men by degrees, while Forreigners damp the Courage and Eſtimate of your own.

Beſides, How many States have felt the Ruine of Auxiliary Forces? if you truſt them, they either give up your Cauſe, or Prey upon you; at leaſt they are intereſted but to Fight in Jeſt for you; as in *Italy*, they ſhall not ſuffer your ſawcy Bombs to diſturb their reſt at night in their Sieges.

Further, Forces of your own you may Command at your pleaſure; while Forreigners will be only deſperate for their own ends. Are you neceſſitated to Forreigners therfore? front them in your Army, or mix them ſo as to force them to Fight.

As

As for the breeding Souldiers, liberty only can give us good hearts: The old *Roman* Peaſants durſt face Kings, and make Generals in the Field: their Country was as worthy their Love, as their Courage; while Men cow'd, can ſlave to all Tyrants alike. *Hen.* the Seventh therefore, politickly ſettled Farms of ſuch a Size, *&c.* to breed good Boors by.

As for the ſorts of Souldiers, your Granadeers are a Body of Men deſign'd for any extraordinary occaſion; they wait at the Flank of your Army, as the Dragoons do; and they are often as well Horſe as Foot; and on ſudden and deſperate Emergencies very needful.

As for Horſe and Foot in a well-diſciplin'd Army, experience has ſhewn, Foot doubly to excel Horſe; indeed, Foot with Pikes have often beat double their number of Horſe. Horſe, 'tis true, at a Rout, or, as Scouts, or to raiſe Contribution, or to confound a weak Enemy, are excellent; but, to think a Spur can force an Horſe upon a Pike, is as abſurd as dangerous.

So, What are Pikes, or Muskets either, without defenſive Arms, for Head, Breaſt, Arms, Thighs and Legs, with a Buckler? Men thus Arm'd, put by your Pikes, and come in with eaſe upon your Men

Men with naked Swords; nay, if ſuch Men Ride but as Dragoons, they attack you more ſpeedily, and even juſt where they pleaſe.

Nor is this a Fiction neither; the *Romans*, who by uſe, made ſuch Defenſive Arms tolerable, withall Conquer'd the World with them: And if either the beſt Politicians, or the beſt Hiſtorians be to be credited, this ſort of Men, for all our Fire-arms, are not even yet to be deſpis'd.

Of MILITIA.

THat Souldiers are Voluptuous is not always ſo much from their Corruption, as that Perils ask to be paid by Pleaſures: To dye a Souldier, ſurely is a kind of Martyrdom; and he that blames the Profeſſion for the Abuſe, forgets, that on ſudden approaches of Enemies, and Invaſions, 'tis every Man's duty to be a Souldier; but more eſpecially the *Young, and Unmarried*, Luke 3. 14. 1 Cor. 9.7.

But then I would rather be a Volunteer, than a Liſted Souldier: Surely it can never be lawful to kill Men purely at the Call of the Ambition of Princes.

Souldiers in War, are Sinews to the Body-Politick, in Peace its Feaver: Not that it is ſafe neither, quite to lay aſide your Warlike Diſcipline in Peace; But think you there is any Juſtice for one Man to live ſluggiſhly on the Labour of another?

The juſteſt Mean therefore muſt be, a well-manag'd Militia; and if we are for Teaching Warlike-diſcipline in Peace, Why do we not alſo turn our Univerſity Speculative *Mathematicks* to the more uſeful Improvements of Fortification and Enginery?

But, in a Militia the Diſciplining a few Men, and they every time ſtrangers, and drawn, with Charge, from remote parts, to meet in a Body; ſurely, ſuch a Martial-diſcipline can avail little or nothing.

Let it rather be, that every Man of ſuch an Age, and Stature, be a Souldier; that every Pariſh be a diſtinct Body of them, having its proper Officers in it's ſelf; and, that no one, capable on any account, be exempt from Diſcipline.

This would force our Gentry, as their Officers, into eſteem; and, if by any means, make a Nation Invincible: And ſurely, 'twould rather be a delight, and a diverſion, than a Charge, for ſuch a Militia,

(like

(like as at our Ancient Wakes) to meet and Exerciſe an hour or two in a Week.

And,do you fear in ſuch caſe ſuch Diſciplines being ſuperficial ?How eaſie is the Cure, by the Examination of Commiſſioners for Hundreds and Counties,*&c.* And, Do you want an Army ? How quick does every Pariſh proportion you a Supply ?

Nay, and ſuch an Army you may eaſily Disband with a Donative ; and, every Man knowing his home, is welcomely receiv'd ; while you are out of danger of being peſter'd by Vagabonds, indeed if any ſuch ſhould happen to be diſabled, 'twould be a Generous Charity in the State to provide Hoſpitals for them, or elſe they are provided for, with a kind welcome to your hand.

Donatives to Standing Armies are moſt pernicious, even to make them at laſt, State-robbers;but Donatives here would be the juſteſt reward of our Brethrens Blood.

Beſides, ſuch an Army would have Humanity and Chriſtianity ; nor need we doubt but that their conſtant Exerciſe would make them brave, as Souldiers by profeſſion ; beſides, that Souldiers thus rais'd, would know truly how to value their Liberty.

To conclude; The conſtant and univerſal Exerciſe could not but whet their Spirits and Courages in Emulation, and make them familiar to Force and Arms, while every Souldier imploy'd, would, like the *Romans* of old, know how to Fight heartily for that Peace he knew what 'twas to enjoy; and eſpecially, if when Maim'd, they were aſſur'd of a comfortable Subſiſtence in their ſeveral Pariſhes.

Of BATTEL.

ARe you ſuddenly to give Battel? Publiſh a Speech againſt Cowardize: Alaſs! Are not all our great ſlaughters made, when Men run away? And can you want Topicks?

So, if poſſible, before you fight alſo, give your Men, from ſome Hill, the proſpect of your Enemy; by that you may deride their Diſcipline, and expoſe them to the Contempt of your Army: Fear is ſeldom ſo conſiderable, as when of ſomething unknown.

So, when you Fight, make their Enſigns carry their Pay, and that will make your Souldiers vigorouſly defend them: Nor be without Rewards or Puniſhments;

Thus

Thus, to kill a Captain, ſo much; a General, ſo much; and, to Mount a Breach, ſo much, *&c.*

Does a Regiment offend? Decimate them. Are they Cowards? Mark them with a *C.* and let them live to the Diſgrace: Are they Treacherous? give them the death they deſerve. And yet, to avoid Sedition, let the General but give them a little blow with a Wand; for when you make a Souldier paſs the Pikes, the Army are their own *Executioners.*

As to Figures, Armies are generally drawn into Three Lines; and the *Turkes* uſe the Creſcent; but ſurely, the Ground and Circumſtance ought, in this Caſe, to be conſidered.

Thus, Is your Army biggeſt? fight in open field, and try to compaſs your enemy? Is it little? flank your ſelf with Trenches, and fight cloſe. Have you no Horſe? ſeek to encloſures; but, above all, beware of the Wind, or Sun, in your Faces.

So, Are you aſſaulted in a Wedge, to diſtract you? become a pair of Sheers, to cut off your enemy. Are you enclin'd to compaſs him? equal his breadth, advance gradually your Wings, and retreat your Front; but this is a dangerous Work.

When the Battel begins, Generals, by Drums and Trumpets, Order their Souldi-

ers to the field, and Great Guns attempt the firſt Execution, while the Dragoons Attack them; and e're a ſecond diſcharge, the fight begins, and they become uſeleſs.

Thus, Are the Guns in the middle of their Battalions? divide your Army, and you avoid them; the firſt ſhot is diſtant, and goes over, or under; or your Infantry, by their wide ranks avoid them, while your Horſe are ſecure in their Reer.

After this, Shouts joyn both your Dragoons; who, bearing the firſt ſhock, make room, by retiring to your Flanck and Reer, and while more ſilent Orders join the Battel.

And now the Pikes advance to keep off the Horſe; while the Armies once join'd, the Pikes withdraw within the Bucklers, and your Bucklers worſted within your Pikes.

Muſquets ſerve a ſhot or two, till the Fight is clos'd, but then your Man at Arms, with Sword, Buckler and Armour, does all; who, if the firſt Rank but kneel, their very Bucklers keep off the Bullets; But, What can fence your Rapier with Armour?

The wiſe *Romans* had their Ranks wide, their *Haſtati*, or Young Men, bore the fury of the Battel; if worſted, they retired among

among their *Principes*, or ſtrong Men, and they again among their *Triarii*, or Old Souldiers.

Your Horſe, in the mean time, engage at the ſide of your Army, while your Dragoons retire to take care of your Camp: the proportion of your Foot is; Have you Ten Battalions? Five *Haſtati*, Three *Principes*, and Two *Triarii*; the benefit of ſuch Orders is, your Men are refreſhed by the new ſupport of your beſt Men at laſt; while a ſquare Army runs, and is defeated, before half can fight.

But now, Why do I ſtay? the fight's begun, Stratagems follow, Pits, Ambuſcades, Falſe Allarums, Surprizes of Novel Words, Engines, Shouts, and Appearances of Succours.

Officers fling their Colours among the Enemy, to reward the Souldiers that fetch them again; while the General minds Intelligence, and Orders Succours to the ſide that is oppreſs'd, and the Dragoons refreſh'd; return to try to flank the enemy.

After all, Have you worſted an unequal enemy? either perfect the Victory, or ſnap at his diſheartned Terms of Peace: The only time of ſlaughter is,

when Men are diſorder'd, and loſe their Confidence in one another; to let them Rally, ſpoils all.

So, Was your flight doubtful, and parted by Night? carry off ſome Dead, to diſmay your enemy, through their fewneſs next morning; ſuch a Night cannot but be a Night of Dread, and the leaſt puſh will be likely to give the Morning's advantage.

But are you beat? to hinder purſuit, fight where you may retreat; at worſt, retreat part of your Army orderly firſt; and ſo your Enemy not daring to divide, appoint a common place for the reſt to meet at: but are your Souldiers forc'd to fly? yet at worſt, let them detard their Purſuers, and ſave their Lives by ſcattering their Treaſures.

On the whole, in a pitch'd Battel to be firſt in the Field, is of great uſe; you chooſe your Ground, and you hearten your Soldiers by it; but even on this, nay on Victory, beware of a too careleſs Succeſs; for that almoſt ever ruines the day, and too often ſacrifice all, (while the Souldiers are careleſs, merry, or plundering) to ſome trifling Reinforcement.

To conclude, As for Engines, ſurely *Archimedes*'s Arrow-Engine muſt needs, even

even at this day, gall Horſe worſe than any Guns whatever. Arrows not only are of equal execution, but fret Horſe doubly more than Guns can; but as for your Scithe Charriots, they are now become of no uſe, being ſo readily ſtopt by Stakes.

Of Military Diſcipline.

I Shall not trouble you with the mechanick Rudiments of Diſcipline, as *Shoulder your Musket, advance your Pike*, &c. a Formality not without its uſe; for how can men charge together otherwiſe! But this I ſhall ſay, You ſhould keep your Rancks at 6 foot diſtance, your Files at 3. leſt you cramp your Motion; ſo your Collours and Drums between your Muskets and Pikes, your Captain with the Pikes, and your Lieutenant with the Muskets.

So, the general order of Martialling Souldiers, is to every Squadron, or Ten, a Serjeant or Corporal to head, hearten, and command; to every 100. a Captain; to every 1000. a Collonel; and to the whole Body a General. Or, in Battalions of 6000. thus, 10 Companies in a Battalion,

450 in a Company; and which making 4500. the remaining 1500. are to be 1000 Pikes, and 500. *Velites* extraordinary.

So the proportion of a good Army, ſhould be in 6000 men, 3000 with Bucklers, 2000 with Pikes, and 1000 with Muſquets; as for your Ranks, the cloſer the better, as not ſo eaſily broken; yet ſtill provided, that they leave convenient ſpace for motion, and that their Files be ſo conſtant that their Souldiers never want to find out their Poſt again.

If your Company contain 400 men, you may draw them up 5 in a File, and 80 in a Rank; or, if you'd reduce them to a ſquare for fighting, 'tis but caſting your firſt File into your ſecond, your third into your fourth, *&c.* and then there will be 40 Files of 10. and ſo you may bring them to 20. of 20. if you pleaſe, to be ready to anſwer which way ſoever attack'd.

And, as inferiour Officers ought to reduce Souldiers to a readineſs in ſuch Diſcipline, to be able to anſwer their Generals Commands upon occaſion; ſo ought they to enure their Souldiers to hardſhip alſo, that they be not diſmay'd in extremity.

Thus, to let them carry their own Corn, will not only help, but ſtrengthen them; ſo for them to learn to ſwim, may ſave them

them on occaſion; while to drown them in luxury and eaſe, What is it but to ſoften and effeminate their very Courages withal, to their Deſtruction.

As for your diſciplining Dragoons, there needs not ſo much care; they being deſign'd rather upon extraordinary occaſions than in any thing like a regular fight. Your Horſe indeed ſhould be more orderly; thus, ſuppoſe 300 in a Battalion, of which 150 to be men at Arms, and 150 to be *Light*.

Your Pikes are to front the ſquare of your Army, and as 5 Ranks of them is as many as can well charge at once; and as the Fight begun, and the Army ſecur'd from the Horſe, they fall to make room for the Men at Arms; ſo 7 Files of Pikes, that is, 1 or 2 to be ready to ſupply falling men, is as many as you can have occaſion to front with.

The manner of Commanding an Army, is, the Souldiers follow the Colours, and they the Drums; the inferiour Officers command the Centinels, and the Superiours them, while the General governs all. A bad General, or a bad Army therefore, are equally dangerous.

On the whole, an 100 men in Military Diſcipline, and convenient Arms, are a match

match for two in confuſion; the one helps each other; the other promotes but one another's deſtruction, while the cull'd Angular men of Officers and Corporals in an Army, bind and hearten the whole regular Number as into a Body.

Of Marching an Army.

TO march an Army through a Foreign Country, obſerve theſe Rules. Firſt, that the Prince have due notice, that Quarters may be provided, and a ſufficient pay preſcrib'd. Secondly, That the ſecond Body go the ſame way that the firſt did, and that if they are in great Bodies, they march not every day.

Thirdly, That damage done by Souldiers be made good. Fourthly, That they approach no prohibited place within a Mile. And laſtly, That they do not quarter in Cities or Towns that are intrench'd.

The uſual method is, your Dragoons march firſt to ſcower the Road, then your right Wing and Carriages are to follow; then your Body with its Carriages, and after thoſe your left Wing with its Carriages,

riages, and after all your Cavalry.

And, thus withdrawing a little your Carriages, you are ready for the *Enemy* any way, and he cannot well attack you in your march if you are circumſpect, but that he will be at as much diſadvantage as your ſelf.

Your Dragoons who ſcower the Road, guard your Pioneers alſo, who are to plain your ways, and make Entrenchments for your Camp; and in this, not to multiply Men needleſly, your own *Souldiers* may ſerve as Pioneers, and who, when an *Enemy* approaches, may retreat to their Arms; your Spades and Pick-axes being carried by for them in Carts.

If you march where you may be ſtreightned in Proviſions, have at leaſt a Months neceſſaries before hand, and take continual care for *Supplies*; and to this end you may have a Market with *Sutlers* in the middle of your Camp, while your Cattel laden with Corn, are driven by your Bakers, Butchers, and Cooks, after them.

Above all, take care to march in exact order; and if a few Men aſſault you, and flye, or a Prize of Cattel appear, do not let them decoy you into an Ambuſhment; a General muſt anticipate *Stratagems* as he marches.

So,

So, Do you fear ſurprizes or ambuſhes? beware of Hills, of Woods and Hedges, and you need not fear but that either *Scouts*, Duſt, or Birds, will give you notice, that you may at leaſt provide your ſelf of Advantage againſt their attack.

Further, when you march, never acquaint your Army with the enterprize, leſt it periſh through the diſcovery; but rather getting a Chart, pick up ſome Countrey Guides, and make them yours through threats and rewards to conduct you.

As for the ſize of your Army, the *Romans* by their Conqueſts ſeem'd beſt Judges of fighting, and they thought 24000, or at moſt 50000 Men a double Army enough; indeed, more not only confounds and devour one another, but are not well manageable, nor can they conveniently march in the Field.

Of Treachery, &c.

IS an *Enemy* Treacherous or extream Bloody in his Wars? Does he break his Word, or lay Countries waſte cauſeleſly? He has flung up his Right either

ther to Treaty or mercy from thee, and the mildeſt Quarter that he can expect upon it, is, that he be decimated.

Now the Treacherous are not only ſuch as are faithleſs, and obſerve no Treaties, but thoſe that War like Robbers without the leaſt apparency of cauſe to juſtify it, or thoſe that abuſe our *Embaſſadors*, or any other way violate the ſacred Laws of Nations.

Not, but that the juſt right of War leaves me all the liberty of *Stratagems* to bribe or divide mine *Enemy* whatever; nay, I may ſend *Spyes* to *Aſſaſſinate* him, as well as Parties to Plunder him; but if I am once either falſe or perfidious, my *Enemy* has no tye of mercy to me till I am naked in his Power.

So I may uſe all the honeſt means of ſimulation; thus I may juſtly ſeem to fly, to draw mine *Enemy* to an *Ambuſh*, and ſo I may plunder under mine enemies Colours, and make falſe *Alarms*; alas 'tis not fighting, if I am not allowed by falſe Paſſes to draw mine enemy from his Guard, the better to make a real one.

The true Rule therefore is, all known ſigns of Treaty, whether by Flag, or otherwiſe, I am bound in veracity to ſtand to; but in other matters, even Chriſt himſelf

ſelf gave us another Example, after he was riſen from the dead; and ſet his Face as if he were going where he was not.

Nay, Does even a Neſt of Pirates reform to a Government, and our Treacherouſeſt *Enemy* begin to leave his Perfidy? I will not too far hazard the Wiles of the Fox, but after a moderate ſelf-juſtice and repriſal for my injuſtice, I am bound to treat both and either as my Brethren.

But, above all Treachery, beware of truſting *Exiles* too far, in leading your Expeditions; conſider how dearly ſuch Men may value their own Countrey, and how redily they may be apt to purchaſe their liberty at thy expence.

Of

Of Fortification and Sieges.

FOr a Fortification, take ſome Rocky Nap in a Plain, that is neither blinded by Hills nor Woods; the Walls if poſſible, are better natural than rais'd; for if cut out of a Rock, neither Batteries nor Mines can deſtroy the Hill.

As for the thickneſs or height of Walls, or the number of Redoubts, they are Matters wholly at diſcretion. Can you make a Caſtle like a City? Surely, your works ought to be ſuited to your own ſize and proportion of Ground, and to the Enemies approach, and not a Figure.

A Fort of two or three Angles only, is of no value; but after that, the more the better, provided if not like *Babylon*, too big for Intelligence: But the ſilly imagination, that the ſtrength of a place depends on every Mathematical Figure, is trifling.

A Fort not ſtrong by Nature, cannot receive much by Art; Now by Art the Walls ought to be three yards thick at leaſt, and Towers built at every 200 Yards.

For Ditches, two are beſt, without and within; if you have one only, 'tis beſt within,

in, and that of 30 Yards broad at leaſt, and 12 deep, with Artillery to ſcour them at every 200 Yards; and ſo 'tis better without Water than with; if your Water freeze, the Town is gone at an inſtant; and if not, a Bridge of Boats is eaſier made than another.

Is your Ditch to Water, or Rock? there is no poſſibility of mining your Wall. Is it in the inſide? there is no way to come to fill it up; your Wall in Battery will fall the other way: and ſo that your Ditch will be good when your Wall is flat.

Further, in Forts, let your Houſes be low, ſo as not to hinder your proſpect; let your Gates be ſecured by Ravelin and and Portcullis, and let your free paſſage be ſecur'd by Draw-Bridge, or at worſt by a Timber-ſtand from the bottom of the Bridge, and which you may command by Cannon of your Inner Redoubt.

Little Entrenchments without the Walls are moſt miſchievous, the loſing and retreating from ſuch little Baſtions, are perfect Baits of Cowardize to your Souldiers; and ſurely, 'tis no good Leſſon to teach them to give ground.

Further, in founding a Fort, the Air and Water are greatly to be regarded, as alſo an agreeable Country, and Roads near it;

if

if built in too fertile a Land, it may luxuriate it; if in too barren, not be able to provide againſt a Siege.

The beauty of Forts in Buildings, or otherwiſe, is not much to be regarded; but Frontiers that are like to be diſturbed by War, will require all the encouragements imaginable: Now ſuch are, 1. Free-trade, 2. Eaſy Juſtice, 3. Aſylum, *&c.*

A Fort thus ſetled, the Inhabitants by the Law of Nations, owe the Government a Right to defend her; and in which caſe, tho' a ſingle perſon may deſert it, a Prince may juſtly withſtand a general departure, provided he fear not their Treachery.

But is a Siege begun? Due order is to be obſerv'd: Let Women and Children keep their Houſes to avoid diſturbance; and the men be diſtributed into three parts, 1. to be on the Guard, 2. ready as a reſerve, and a 3d. taking their reſt. Some add, a Maſtiff Dog to their Centinel, full as ſerviceable as a Man.

Nor let your Diſcipline be neglected on any Account; Towns have been ſtorm'd even at Dinner time; and yet not but that in ſuch caſe, when they have, the Beſieged ſometimes by Showers out at their Windows, and ſometimes by firing the Town,

have made their Walls good again againſt the Beſiegers.

Some on the other hand, have ſeem'd to leave the Walls, as if the Town were fired by ſome Bomb, only by a falſe Fire, the better to draw the enemy to a diſadvantagous Attack; and while at the ſame time, the Walls have unſeen, been doubly guarded.

But does the Siege proceed? and would you avoid mining? Digg holes every 10 Yards, like Wells by your Walls, and they will give vent; or ſound the Mine, and countermine it. So, is your Ditch in the out-ſide, and your Wall flat? make but a Ditch within of 30 Yards broad, and the Breach is as eaſily kept as the Wall.

Some, when a Siege has been drove hard, have ſhot in empty Bombs thoſe propoſitions, that the Officers would not acquaint their Souldiers with, while others ſeeming only to march near a Town, have fallen upon it at unawares, and ſo ſurpriz'd it in Diſorder.

Some have ſeem'd to fly, and leave their Camp, and ſo drilling out the Enemy, ſurpriz'd the Town; while others poyſoning their Camp-Victuals, have deſtroy'd the Enemy that way.

So,

So, Where a Town has ſtood doubtful, t'has been ſecur'd by begging to receive ſome ſick Men, while the ſtouteſt men have been ſent in diſguiſe into it.

So ſome have poyſoned Waters, others drove in the Beſieged's Friends, to conſume their Victuals, while ſome have been reliev'd by Nutts floating down a River.

Cæſar made a Bread of Herbs for his Souldiers; and *Londonderry* fed on Starch for Bread, and Leather boyl'd ſoft for Meat.

But are the Beſieg'd come to a Treaty? 'Tis neither honourable nor ſafe for a Governour to parly in a Siege, nor to accept other Terms, than at leaſt to go out Arm'd, and in order. Surely, He's mad that can truſt himſelf naked with a Triumphant and Revengeful Army.

Nor is't a little imprudence for a General to divide himſelf to deſtruction in beſieging little Henrooſts before a Royal Army; and if there be no ſuch Army, Forts alone cannot hinder your Army from ravaging your Enemies Country.

To conclude, Forts are only of uſe againſt Enemies & on Frontiers; 'tis a Self-deſtructive Policy to think to retain Subjects in Obedience by them: the wiſe *Romans* choſe rather to demolliſh them;

but while you have Forts, Military Diſcipline is as neceſſary; for your Garriſoners in their Sallies, as your Field Souldiers in their March.

Of the CAMP.

THE Order of your Camp ought to be, as if you were ready to charge your Enemy; only you may ſtand a little wider, for the conveniency of Streets and Air, and for the benefits of reintrenchments, but always in the ſame manner, that theSouldiers may naturally know their home, and the whole ſeem a moving City, conſtantly with the ſame Gates and Lodgings.

Nor ought your Camp, if near an Enemy, to want either Water or Proviſions; nor if your ſtay be long,a good Air; above all, ſtreighten not your march by want of ſecuring Paſſes; nor lye too near to Hills, leſt your Enemy incommode you.

Your Ditch ought at leaſt to be 6 Yards wide, and 3 deep, together with Half-Moons for your Artillery, to flanck your Enemy as he approaches; and ſo your Camp

Camp may be better for conveniences, than either as on a Hill or by a River.

Further, While you are encampt, beware of Surprize; and while your enemy is near, beſure watch all comers and goers; nay, a third part of your Souldiers ought to be continually Arm'd; and a fourth of thoſe, perpetually on the Watch, ſome at the corners, and ſome on the Patroll or Search, leſt your enemy either Stratagem or Beſiege you in your Camp.

Laſtly, In decamping, the uſual order is, the General Sounds his Trumpet thrice the firſt time, to give notice to take down Tents, and pack them up; the ſecond, to load their Sumpters; and the third, to march away.

FINIS.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

ERRATA.

PAge 34. Line 17. read, *together with your Rosacrucian figments.*

P. 64. l. 1. r. *quatuor modis*, for *Quarto modo.*

P. 85. l. 13. r. *That dominion*, for *the dominion.*

P. 112. l. 12. r. *with such formalities, and the like as.*

P. 124. l. ult. r. *of That nature*, for *that of nature.*

P. 130. l 14. r. *Judged by him*, for *judged by them.*

P. 189. l. 17. r. *currunt* for *current.*

P. 193. l. 2. r. *fancy and Idea*, for *fancy an Idea.*

23. r. *their indifferency*, for *as an indifferency.*

P. 224. l. 15. r. *Hypocrites*, dele *as.*